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IN THE 
Supreme ~ourt of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
Record No. 1984 
JAMES L. CAMP, JR., AND JAMES L. CAMP, ill, THE 
LAST NAMED BEING AN INFANT UNDER THE 
AGE OF 21 YEARS, BY JOHN C. PARKER, 
Ja.., HIS GUARDIAN AD· LITEM, 
versus 
J. G. BRYANT, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF 
J. FENTON BRYANT, Ja., DECEASED. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERROR. 
To the Honor'able Chief Justice· and Justices· of the Supreme 
· Court of Appeals of Virginia: 
Yo~r petitioners, James L. Ca~p, Jr., James L. Camp, ill, 
an infant under the age of 21 years, and John C. Parker, Jr., 
his guardian ad litem, respectfully represent that they are 
aggrieved by a judgment of the Circuit Court of Southampton 
County, Virginia, entered in favor of J. Fenton Bryant, Jr., 
against the said James L. Camp, Jr., and James L. Camp, III, 
on the 15th day of November, 1937, for $10,000.00 with in-
terest thereon from th~ 23rd day of July, 1937, in proceedings 
held pursuant to a notice of motion for judgment for $50,-
000.00 by the said J. Fenton Bryant, Jr., who was plaintiff 
in the Court below, against your Petitioners, who were de-
fendants in the Court below. 
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THE CASE BELO\V. 
In the said notice of motion claim was asserted for $50,-
000.00 damages based upon injuries to the person and prop-
erty of the said J. Fenton Bryant, Jr., resulting from a col-
lision between his automobile and an automobile belonging 
to one Elijah Joyner (not a party here nor in the Court be-
low). The notice of motion alleges the said collision was 
caused by the ·negligent operation of a third automobile 'vhich 
belonged to James L. Camp, Jr., one of the defendants, and 
was at the time in the charge and custody of his son, James 
L. Camp, III, the other defendant. 
There was a verdict of $10,000.00 in favor of the plaintiff 
against the said defendants, James L. Camp, Jr., and James 
L. Camp, ITI. The Judge of the lower Court, for reasons 
assigned by him in the Record ( p. 19), refused to set the 
verdict aside as being contrary to the law and the evidence, 
and entered .judgment thereon. Of this verdict and judg-
ment your Petitioners now complain. 
Since the said judgment was entered the plaintiff has died, 
and this cause has been revived by order of the lower Court 
in the name of J. G. Bryant, his administrator (Record, p. 
21). There is no claim that the plaintiff's death resulted from 
the injuries suffered in the automobile accident. 
FACTS. 
This accident took place during the daytime of Ma.y 26, 
· 1936, on a secondary State highway near Franklin, in South-
ampton County. The weather was clear, the road dry. The 
road runs approximately north and south. 
Three cars were involved: the plaintiff's, which was travel-
ing• south ; the Joyner car, which was traveling north, and the 
defendants' car, which had been traveling south but at the 
time of the accident was standing still. The plaintiff at-
tempted to pass the defendants' car, and in doing so collided 
head-on with the Joyner ca!. 
Parties and Witnesses. 
The occupants of the three cars will be frequently men-
tioned, and they, as well as the principal witnesses, may well 
be identified at the outset. The plaintiff, J. Fenton Bryant, 
Jr., 57; was alone in his car. In the Joyner car were the owner 
and driver, Elijah Joyner, 25, and his friend, Otis Blythe. 
In the Camp car were James L. Camp, III, 15, and three 
0 
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friends, Marian I. Lawrence, 16, David C. Forbes, 15, and 
Ellis Frankfort, 13. 
James L. Camp, Jr., who was the owner of the defendants' 
car and father of James L. Camp, III, was not present. There 
is no question, ho"jever, as to the son's authority to use the 
car. He had his father:s full permission to use it at any 
time, and under that permiss~on was in charge and custody 
of the car, though not actually driving it. 
These occupants of the three cars were the only eyewitnesses 
to the accident. All testified except Otis Blythe, the passen-
ger in the Joyner car, who was not called by either side. 
Two other persons were witnesses to some· of the events 
leading up to the accident and were near enough to hear 
the crash, although they did not see it. One of. these was 
Harvey Cutchin, who lives on the highway at a curve 300 
yards north of the place of accident, .and was standing on 
his porch. The other was Sol "\V. Rawls, a passing motorist, 
who was driving north and had almost reached Harvey 
Cutchin's.gate when he heard the crash behind him. Both went 
immediately to the wreck and were the :first persons to arrive, 
and the only ones until several minutes later. Another wit-
ness, Leland Story, testified that he passed along the road 
shortly before the aecident going to Franklin, but knew noth-
ing of the accident until he was on his return trip some time 
later. All of the parties and witnesses above named were 
residents of the ·immediate section and were thoroughly 
familiar with the road. 
In addition to these primary witnesses, there were the 
usual number of persons who later came to the spot and 
examined the wrecked- cars. Among these was State Traffic 
Officer E. 0. Forbes. 
Description of the Road. 
Before relating the events as they transpired, it is im-
portant to have an accurate description of the road. It begins 
by turning off from the main Franklin-Courtland Highway at 
a point about half a mile west of the corporate limits of the 
Town of Franklin, and after crossing the Southern Railway 
and making a curve, it runs north towards the Country Club 
and towards Sedley. The accident and all the pertinent events 
concerning it took place on this secondary highway within half 
a mil'e of its turn-off from the main highway, and took place 
on a straight stretch lying north of the said railroad and 
curve. The railroad crossing plays no part except as a point 
of location 
., 
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The road is 30 feet wide between outside boundaries. In 
the exact longitudinal center there was a macadam surface 
18 feet wide (when rebuilt after the accident it was narrowed 
to 16. feet). On each· side of the paved surface was a sand-
gravel shoulder 2 or 3 feet wide. On the outside of each 
shoulder was a dirt slope and shallow sand-bottomed gully, 
extending the 3 or 4 feet from the shoulder to a bank. The 
gullies were not dug out; they were simply the angle between 
the shoulder and the bank. 
The road is generally on a level with the surrounding coun-
try, but at the exact point of accident was slightly lower than 
the fields on either side. On the east the bank is about 3 feet 
high at the point where the accident happened, increasing 
in height toward the south, but decreasing and soon disappear-
ing toward the north. On the west side the bank is probably 
1 foot high, with a slight increase in height toward the south, 
but of even height toward the north. At the time of the acci-
dent there were no fences on either side of the road, although 
a fence has since been erected along the west side. 
Some days or weeks prior to the accident the macadam sur-
face had been scarified, that is, broken up or plowed up by 
road machinery, so that at the time of the accident it was 
rough and in· small pieces and the outside lines were not as 
clearly defined as usual. Traffic had loosened these broken 
pieces and had mixed tlrnm with the dirt underneath. 
The road is but slightly crowned, the extreme difference 
between the depth of the gullies and the height of the paved 
surface being probably not more than 14 or 15 inches. Longi-
tudinally, it is practically level, its gradient being less than 
1 foot to 100 feet This gentle and continued descent is toward 
the south. It does not interfere with the vision of drivers 
going in either direction. Contrary to the allegations of 
plaintiff's notice of motion, there was no decline in the road 
which could have kept him from seeing the traffic thereon. 
The road is mathematically straight for 77 4 feet, and prac-
tically straight a greater distance. At the north end of 
the tangent there is a curve to the west, and at the south 
end a curve to the east. Both are of approximately the same 
degree of curvature, and ~re suffi~iently gentle to afford a 
clear line of vision along the road for a distance of 1,162 
feet between cars approaching each other from these curves .. 
About half-way the length of the tangent (but somewhat 
closer to the north end thereof) a dirt road leads off to the 
east. None of the pertinent events took place on this dirt 
road, but it may be remembered as a landmark. 
The above mentioned physical aspects of the road are clearly 
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and accurately shown by the two plats and several photo-
graphs filed as exhibits herewith, as well as by the testi-
mony of the road foreman, Gillette T. Bryant, and of a sur-
veyor, S. W. Armistead (Record, p. 156 and p. 253). 
How the Collision Occurred. 
On the afternoon of the accident the defendants' car was 
on this road driving south towards Franklin. The young 
people w:&o occupied it had been in swimming at the Country 
Club and were returning home. When they were leaving 
the Club David Forbes asked permission to drive, and young 
Camp gave his assent. It was tm<;Ierstood between the two 
that Camp would take the wheel before they reached the main 
highway near Frankliri. As they entered the straight stretch 
of road above described, Camp suggested to Forbes that he 
stop.· Forbes did so, first by releasing the clutch and allow-
ing the car to lose momentum, and when he had thus come 
nearly to a stop, by applying the brakes. He began this 
process soon after he had gotten into the straightaway and 
he completed the stop before he reached the curve at the south 
end of the straightaway. Before he started slowing down 
he had been driving not more than 30 miles per hour, and 
the stopping was one continuous and gradual process. 
When he startecl slowing down no car was in sight in either 
direction except that of S. W. Rawls, who was coming from 
Franklin and who met and passed them and continued on his 
way northward. Just as Mr. Rawls passed, and at a moment 
when the Camp car was .. within a car length of its stop and 
young Camp had partly opened the door of the back seat to get 
out, the occupants noticed behind them a. car overtaking them. 
This ca_r was at that moment some 300 yards away and w~s 
coming out of the curve back of thein. Driving· it, as they 
learned later, was Mr. Bryant, the plaintiff. Almost simul-
taneously the Joyner car, approaching from Franklin, came 
into view around the curve some 90 yards ahead of the Camp 
car. The Camp car came to a stop, young Camp ·settled back 
on his seat and held the partly-opened door, and he and 
Forbes waited for the other cars to pass before getting out 
to change drivers. While they waited the· accident happened. 
When he came arottnd the curve above mentioned Mr. 
Bryant, according to his own testimony, was driving 30 or 
35 miles per hour (Record, pp. 53, 75), although certain cir-
cumstantial evidence and direct testimony, presently to be 
noticed, indicate that he w~s going much faster. Whatever 
his rate of travel, he never slackened speed until within 
6 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
17, 18 or 19 yards of the Camp'car (his own testimony: Record, 
pp. 56, 83). He then put on brakes, and, to use his own words, 
"cut sharply" to his left. This resulted in a head-on collision 
with the Joyner car. 1\'Ir. Bryant testified that he did not see 
the Camp car until he 'vas within 35 or 40 yards of it, and 
that he never saw the Joyner car at all, and did not know 
what he had hit (Record, p. 58). 
The driver of the Joyner car, however, had seen that 1\'Ir. 
Bryant's failure to slow down was leading~ to danger and had 
given him the entire road. He had pulled over to his right 
as far as he could, so far, indeed, that his car had scraped 
the bank a dozen feet or more (Record,. p. 165) before h_e was 
struck, and he had slowed down until he was almost standing 
still. The impact thus took place on the extreme eastern 
(Bryant's left-hand) side of the road, and at a moment when 
Joyner's car was entirely off the paved surface and on the 
shoulder. · 
1\fr. Bryant himself admits, as all the other witnesses tes-
tify, that his car 'vas at a 45° angle across the road at the 
moment of impact (Record, p. 59). The blow was between the 
right front corne·r of his car and the left side of the radiator 
on the Joyner car. After the impact the Joyner car remained 
where it was struck, ''embedded in the ba.nk" (Record, p. 115, 
p. 144), while the Bryant car pivoted on its right front corner 
· and came to rest headed north, still upright and locked with 
the Joyner car and parallel with it. 
The exact spot of the collision is marked, even to this day, 
by some heavy pasteboard 'vhich was thrown out of the 
Joyner car after the wreck and became mashed into the bank 
(see photograph, Defendants' Exhibit 6, and Record, p. 220). 
It was 110 feet north of the mathen1atical beginning of the 
curve at the southern end of the tangent, and 290 feet north 
of the southern end of the line of visibility above mentioned. 
It was consequently 664 feet south of the northern end of 
the tangent and 872 feet south of the northern end of the 
line of visibility. 
No one thought to mark definitely the point at which the 
Camp car was standing. Indeed, none of the person~ ·who 
examined the physical traces of the accident seems to have had 
the Camp car in mind. However, the plaintiff himself testi-
fied that the collision took place "right beside" the Camp 
car (Record, p. 80); Elijah Joyner said it happened "right 
at the back" of the Camp car (Record, p. 140); and James 
L. Camp, III, and Ellis Frankfort testified it was 10 or 15 
feet behind them (Record, p. 190, p. 241). The exact spot of 
collision being known, this testimony establishes as a definite 
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fact that the Camp car was stopped on a straight portion of 
the road, about 280 feet north of the southern end of the line 
of visibility above refe·rred to, and 880 feet south of the north-
ern end of said line. It was 100 feet north of the mathemati-
cal beginning of the curve ahead of it and 67 4 feet south of 
the mathematical end of the curve behind it. Contrary to the 
allegations of the pl{}fi/ntijf's notice of motion, the Camp car 
was not stopped in any curve. 
As to the position of the Camp car with respect to the center 
line of the road, plaintiff testified that it was ''on the main-
traveled road", though he gave no distances from one side 
or the other fro1n which to judge (Record, p. 61). None of 
the other witnesses for plaintiff testified on the point. All the 
witnesses for the defendants who testified on the question 
'vere in direct contradiction to the plaintiff and testified that 
the Camp car whs well over on its rig·ht-hand side and as 
near as practicable to the bank. Your Petitioners maintain 
the testimony for defendants is conclusive, and the point is 
hereinafter discussed under assignment of error No. 7. 
Remembering that ~{r. Bryant was approximately 300 yards 
behind the Camp car when it stopped, the question immediately 
arises why he continued at unabated. speed and precipitated 
himself into a collision. He answers that he did not see the 
Camp car until he· was 35 or 40 yards from it, and even then 
thoug·ht it was moving, and consequently did nothing until 
18 or 19 yards from it, when he turned out to his left, as 
above mentioned. He assigns as his sole reason for not seeing 
it sooner, that the road was dusty (Record, p. 56), although 
neither he nor any one else testified as to what car created 
the dust. 
Your Petitioners maintain that the testimony conclusively 
establishes that there was no dust between Mr. Bryant and 
their car which obscured his vision, and that the jury could 
not properly have excused Mr. Bryant on that ground, and 
he advanced no other. This is taken up under assignment of 
error No. 7. 
As will appear in argunwnt, your Petitioners maintain that 
it was ~Ir. Bryant's speed and inattention which caused the 
unfortunate accident, and a word should be added concerning 
the testimony as to his speed. S. W. Rawls, who met and 
passed him after passing the Camp car, testified Bryant was 
driving 40 or 45 miles per hour (Record, p. 173}, while Harvey 
Cutchin, who saw him pass his gate, said 45 or 50 (Record, 
p. 218). That much of the testimony is in conflict with 
Bryant's own statement, but the remainder is uncontroverted. 
Both Rawls and Cutchin, as well as the two occupants of 
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the back seat of the Camp car, noticed the large amount of 
dust the Bryant car was making. Cutchin said it blotted out 
his view of the road after he passed (Record, p. 219), and 
Rawls, who noticed Bryant's dust even before his car came 
into view around the curve,. thought it advisable to run up 
his window. (Record, pp. 171, 172). The occupants of the. 
Camp car testified, as did Elijah Joyner, that when Mr. Bryant 
arrived close behind the Camp .car he first wavered back 
·and forth, then skidded sideways up to the point of collision. 
Harvey Cutchin examined Bryant's tracks and . testified he 
''bumped'' in a straight line 62 feet, then skidded 66 feet, 
more and more sideways, until he collided with the Joyner car 
(Record, pp. 223, 224). Mechanics and garagemen testified 
Bryant's car was severely damaged, almost totally wrecked, 
the item of damage ~ppearing in the Record, p. 186. 
Addenda. 
In concluding this statement of facts, certain matters should 
be mentioned to clarify the issues involved. 
The extent of the injuries suffered by the plaintiff and the 
amount of damages awarded him are not in issue. He was 
seriously hurt and spent 3 months in the hospital. He was 
discharged with a permanent injury which lie carried until his 
death some 18 months after the accident. 
It was testified th.at David Forbes was under 16 years of 
age, was learning to drive, and that these 'vere the reasons 
why young Camp ·desired him to relinquish the wheel before 
they reached the heavily-traveled main highway. These facts 
are not controverted, but it is your Petitioners' assignment 
of error No. 2 that they were admitted to the jury. 
It was testified that James L. Camp, III, on two different 
occasions after the accident and in the hearing of three wit-
nesses (H. G. Cobb, Elijah Joyner, Marian I. Lawrence), made 
the statement, "It was my fault'', or, "It was all my fault". 
The circumstances under which these statements were made 
are disclosed by the testimony of the said three witnesses. 
The fact that he made them is uncontroverted, but their 
adn~.jssion to the jury is another of the assignments of error 
hereinafter discussed (assignment of error No. 3). 
And finally, no attempt was made to develop· the testimony 
on the question whether Forbes put out his hand when he 
stopped. This was immaterial, and the trial court so ruled, 
for the obvious reason that the Bryant car was about 300 
yards away when the Camp car stopped, and the plaintiff 
himself admitted that it was standing still when he first saw 
it (Record, p. 83). 
,, 
I 
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ASSIGNl\1:ENT ~OF ERROR N0.1. 
Your Petitioners respectfully submit that the trial court 
erred in overruling your Petitioners' motion for a mistrial on 
account of certain statements made by plaintiff's counsel in 
his opening statement to the jury. 
These statements ·were (1) that defendants' car stopped to 
change drivers to prevent the parents of J. L. Camp, III, from 
seeing that he had allowed David Forbes to drive, and (2) that 
the plaintiff had no animosity towards the defendants 
(Record, pp. 34, 35). 
(1) Petitioners maintain that any mention of a desire on 
J. L. Camp, III's, part to keep secret from his parents the 
fact that Forbes was allowed to drive was highly improper 
for three reasons: 
(a) Evidence of such a desire would have been inadmissible. 
It was immaterial why young Camp wished to take control 
of the car .from Forbes. His reasons had nothing to do with 
the manner and position of stopping. If it be admitted that 
the stop was made to change drivers, it is distinctly an irrele-
vant inquiry to ascertain 'vhy drivers were to be changed. 
These are matters of inducement, and of condition of mind, 
and have nothing to . do with the acts performed as a result 
thereof. 
(b) No such evidence was introduced. 
Not one word of testimony appears in the record to s-q.pport 
the statement made by plaintiff's counsel. No question was 
ever asked concerning it; and apparently no attempt was made 
to sustain the bald assertion. 
(c) The only possible resp.lt of the statement was to create 
prejudice against J. L. Camp, III. 
Your Petitioners ca1i hardly emphasize too much the effect 
on the jury of such a statement. It pictured Jimmy Camp 
as a disobedient child, attempting to play fa1se with his 
parents, who had entrusted the car to him. This was quite 
enough .to constitute a burden of prejudice, which he carried 
throughout the entire case, and it would seem that a state-
ment of the fact is proof of the prejudice. 
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(2) Petitioners maintain that the statement that. there 
was no animosity on the part of the plaintiff towards the 
defendants was grossly improper, and could have but one 
effect on the minds of the jury, namely, that the defendants 
were nominal parties only and the real liability rested else-
where. 
Animosity, or the lack of it, is strictly immaterial in a case 
which does not involve the question of malice. And in auto· 
mobile accident cases, where liability insurance is the order 
of the day, a statement that there was no animosity between 
the parties would positively tend to indicate that the ac.tion 
was a "friendly suit" and that the real defendant was an 
insurance company. The courts· of this state have been care-
ful to exclude any reference to insurance in cases of this type, 
and the decisions on the question are too well known to be 
cited here. There was no occasion to tell the jury that ani-
mosity 'vas absent unless the statement meant something; 
and the bare statement left the jury to its own conclusions. 
Autho'rities. 
As to improper opening· statements, this court said in Baker 
Matthews Lumber Co. v. Lincoln F1l·rnit,ure Manufacturing Co. 
(1927), 148 Va. 413, 139 S. E. 254: 
''Counsel should not in an opening statement refer to mat-
ters which under no circumstances could be introduced in 
evidence, for the purpose of influencing the jury, and while 
the scope of such statement is of necessity very wide, it is 
just as much under the control and judgment of the court as 
the introduction of evidence or the argument of the case upon 
its merits. Counsel should not be allowed to make the open-
ing statement the medium of argument to the jury upon the 
merits, and where ·it is clearly made to appear that prejudice 
has resulted from an improper openin,q statement a new trial 
will be awarded * * * . " (Italics supplied.) 
As to evidence of prejudice, this court said in Rinehart If 
Dennis Co. v. Brown (1923), 137. Va. 670, 120 S. E. 269: 
''There may be cases in which the evidence may not warrant 
any recovery by the plaintiff, or the evidence leaves it doubt-
ful if the plaintiff is entitled to recover, where a verdict for the 
plaintiff for any amount may be said to have been induced, 
or certainly influenced, by the improper remarks of counsel. 
In s~tch cases the verdict should be set aside.H (Italics sup-
plied.) 
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In the case at bar the trial court, at the conclusion of argu-
ment on these two points, said in connection with the state-
ment concerning animosity: 
. "Why say anything about it? Why in the world should 
you go· out and make a statement of that kind''' 
And in regard to the othe~ statement here objected to: 
''You apparently attempt to prejudice the jury by showing 
about keeping a concealment from the father about the age of 
this boy. You may not be able to prove that, and, if you do 
not, you have made a statement to the jury that is preju,di-
oial." (Record, p. 37.) · 
With these expressions your Petitioners heartily concur . 
. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2. 
Your petitioners respectfully submit that the trial court 
·erred to their prejudice in admitting testimony to the effect 
tha.t David Forbes, the driver of defendants' car, was under 
sixteen years of age and was learning to drive. Over the ob-
jection of Petitioners this line of testimony was elicited on 
cross examination from James L. Camp, III, and from David 
Forbes. (R-ecord, pp. 194, 195, 196, and p. 204.) . 
Petitioners maintain that this testimony could not be ad-
missible because it was not a.nd could not be a proximate 
cause of the accident. The defendants' car zmz·s ,qtanding still 
when the plaintiff first saw it, and, therefore, it cannot make 
any difference how old the person was who drove it before the 
stop, or how experienced he was in the handling of automo-
biles. The sole1 question was whether the stop was Jnade neg-
ligently. As was well stated by the trial court when this point, 
was argued before any of the testimony was introduced: 
"It did not make any difference whether the boy behind the 
wheel had a license, or ·whether he was a boy or not. If h~ 
did a negligent act,' he is liable ; if he did not do a negligent 
act, it doesn't make any difference about the other acts at 
all.'' (Record, p. 28.) 
"I don't care if he had the experience of the best driver 
in the world, if he stopped the car where he had no business: 
stopping it and the accident happened, he is just as liable 
as if he had no expetience." (Record, p. 29.) 
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. The harm of admitting this testimony is that it opened to 
the jury the irrelevant question of whether a boy under 16 
should be allowed to drive. There are many people who think 
not, and some of them may have been ou the jury. If there 
were, we submit that probably they were not inclined to dis-:-
miss that question from their minds in arriving at their ver-
dict. 
Authoritie.e.:. 
The closest analogy your Petitioners have been able to find 
in the Virginia decisions is the rule that the lack of an opera-
tor's license is immaterial when I:)UCh lack is not a proximate 
cause of the accident. In the Virginia case of Southe·rn Rwy. 
Co. v. Vooffhan (1916), 118 Va. 692, 88 S'. E. 305, L. R. A. 
1916E 1222, an automobile driven by a chauffeur who did not 
have an operator's license \Vas in collision with a train on 
a grade crossing. The court said: 
"We think it plain in this case that there was no· sort of 
causal relation between the violation of the statute and the 
wrong for which the suit was brought. The want of a license 
for the automobile or for the chauffeur could not by any pos-
sibility have contributed proximately to the happening of this 
most unfortunate occurrence.'' 
Similar holdings are found in many, if not all, of the other 
states. Citations of cases on the principle may be found in 
Berry on Automobiles (6th Ed.), Section 304, Vol.. 1, pp. 
270, 271, and in a note in 35 A. L. R. 68. · 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 3. 
Your Petitioners respectfully submit that the trial court 
erred to their prejudice in admitting testimony to the effect 
that James L. Camp, III, stated after the accident, ''It was my 
:fault". or. "It was all my fault"; and again erred in over-
ruling the Petitioners' motion to strike this testimony from 
the case. 
This statement was made by young Camp on t'vo different 
occasions. The. first was when he was driving to Franklin 
shortly after the accident. With him were the two n1en 'vho 
had been in t~e Joyner car. They were hurt and young Camp 
was undertaking to carry them to a doctor (Record, pp. 137, 
198, 212). The other occasion was after Camp had reached 
Franklin. He had delivered his two passengers to the hos-
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pital and had gone to a drug store to look for a doc.tor to go 
to the assistance of Mr. Bryru1t. In the drug store he stated 
to H. G. Cobb, "It ·was my fault". Cobb testified that Camp 
'vas "very excited, very nervous" (Rec.ord, p. 153, and p. 
198). . . 
Petitioners ~maintain these -statements were inatJrnL~sible 
because they were merely opinio1~s and conclu.sions of Cam1> as 
to responsibility for the accident, and tzvere not state1ncn-ts or 
admissions of fact. 
The question of blame for the accident was the very ques-
tion addressed to the jury. Young Camp would not have been 
permitted on the witness stand to express his opinion. on the 
question <>f fault, and his opinion out of court could be no 
more admissible than his direct testimony. If his statement 
had been a narrative of some fact it would probably have 
been admissible; but it 'vill be noted that it related no facts or 
events whatever. 
The statements were possibly ''spontaneous declarations'', 
being surrounded by excitement and emotion and being made 
under circumstances which negative the idea that they were 
calculated. Spontaneous declarations have many times been 
admitted in testimony, but should properly be limited.to state-
ments of fact; typical illustrations in automobile cases are, 
"I was driving too fast", or, "My brakes would not hold", 
or, "I did not see the other car". With the admissions of -
such declarations your Petitioners have no quarrel; our ob-
jection is based on the nature of the statement made by Camp, 
not on the circumstances under which they wer.e made. 
The situation was well stated by the trial court, when this 
point was being discussed, as follows: 1 • 
"I do not believe that the fact that the child, or the boy, 
said that it was all his fault makes it his fault at all.'' 
And further: 
''I could see how the child might have said that under the 
excitement at that time, when there was not a semblance of 
fault on his part." (Record, p. 271.) · 
The prejudicial effect of this testimony ~eems obvious. The 
jury was inexperienced, was uninstructed on this point. as will 
hereinafter be shown, was already prejudiced, we claim, by 
improper statements of counsel and by erroneous admission 
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of other testimony, and may have made the mistake of con-
sidering the expressions of young Camp conclusive, or at 
least so indicative as not to be ignored . 
.Aut7~orities. 
We feel that the principles above contended for are elemen-
tary in the law of evidence. They are stated, and summarized 
by Professor Wigmore in Greenleaf qn Evidence (16th Ed.), 
Section 441b, p. 549, as follows: 
'' The1 opinion rule is a rule based on the thought that when 
all the data for drawing an inference are before the jury, 
· or can be placed before them, it is superfluous to add, by way 
of testimony, the inference 'vhich they can equally well draw 
for themselves.* • * The application of this principle is often 
finical and unpractical, and the reason of the rule is some-
times lost sight of and arbitrary distinctions put forth; but 
that such is the principle in its essence, and that it still sup-
plies a living test for the solution of the particular instances, 
is constantly illustrated in judicial opinion • • • . '' 
The same principle is stated in 1 R. C. L. 481 in the follow-
ing language : 
''A mere opinion or conclusion, as contradistinguished from 
a statement of fact, may not be proved under the rules re-
lating to admissions and declarations.'' 
Vir.ginia Cas~s. 
Apparently the Virginia Court has never been presented 
with the necessity of making a direct decision as to th~ admissi-
bility of statements which are limited to such expressions as, 
"It was my fault". In the following case, however, this court, 
through Judge Kelly, recognized the principle here contended 
for: · 
Ellis v.- Va. Rwy. db Power Co. (1922), 132 Va. 24, 110 S. E. 
382. 
A woman passenger on a street car was struck by the car 
when it moved off just after she alighted from it. A stranger 
picked her up, and in the presence of both the passenger and 
the motorman, the following conversation took place: The 
motorman said, "It was not my fault"', and the stranger 
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answered, "It ·was your fault, you hardly ga:\1C me time to 
get out of the ·way, and I was in front of her". 
Concerning the admissibility of this statement the opinion 
says: 
''It is insisted by counsel for the defendant that the alleged 
statement was a mere expression of opinion, but the question 
cannot be disposed of on that ground. This point might well 
be made as to 'the expression, 'It was yonr fault', but the 
residue of the statement, 'you hardly gave me time to get out 
of the way, and I was in front of her', is a statement of fact 
which the declarant as a 'vitness might properly have been 
allowed to make". (Italics ours.) 
It will be noted that the above case draws the distinction 
here contended for by the Petitioners, between fact and con,.. 
elusions of fault. As further illustrating this difference, we 
call attention to the well-kno'vn automobile case of Baptist 
v. State (1932), 162 Va. 1, 173 S. E. 512. 
In this case the driver of the defendant's car made a state-
ment shortly after the collision that ''she was not as far 
out in the road as she thought she was, and the light blinded 
her". The trial court and Supreme Court held that this testi-
mony was admissible. Of course it was. It was a statement 
of fact and not of opinion as to fault. 
Cases from Other Jurisdictions .. 
The principle seems to be 'veil recognized in all jurisdic-
tions. McCot·d v. Seattle Electric Co. (1907), 46 Wash. 145, 
89 Pac. 491, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 349. 
A. statement made by a passenger in a buggy concerning 
who was to blame for a collision betwen the buggy and a 
street car was held inadmissible. The court said, in part: 
"It has been held that declarations similar to the one here 
sought to be proven were conclusions, and not statements of 
fact, and, therefore, not admissible.'' (Italics supplied.) 
Plymouth Coumty Bank v. Gilman (1892), 3 S. D. 170, 44 
Am. St. Rep. 782. 
This was a case involving negligence of a bank in failing 
to collect certain notes. Statements by the cashier to the 
effect that the bank was at fault were admitte~ in evidence, 
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and on appeal this was held to be error. The court said, in 
part: 
''But while we think it was competent to give the state-
ment of the cashier as to any fact .relating to the collection 
of the notes, we are of -the opinion that it was ·not competent 
to give his statements that the failure to collect the notes was 
the 'fa;ult' and 'neglect' of the bank. Those were not state-
ments of facts relating to the collection or non-collection of· 
the notes; but an expression of the mere opini6·n of the cashier 
as to the conduct of the bank." (Italics supplied.) 
.And further : 
"That question was one for the jury to decide upon all the 
facts in the case, uninfluenced by the statement of an officer 
of the bank as to his opinion of the conduct of the bank. For 
the error in admitting this evidence, and in refusing to strike 
it out after its admission, the judgment of the circuit court 
must be reversed, and a new trial granted.'' 
Cases on this point involving automobile accidents are col-
lected in notes found in 76 A. L. R. 1121 and 101 A. L. R. 
1199. It would appear from these notes that in some instances 
expressions of fault, when spontaneously made, have been 
admitted, but it would also appear that in most cases the 
expression was mixed with statements of fact. It is resp~ct­
fully urged that if instances should appear where testimony 
was admitted concerning- conclusions of fault only, such in-
stances are contrary to sound principle and, in View of the 
statement of the Virginia Court hereinabove cited, a.re not 
to be followed. 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 4. 
Your Petitioners respectfully submit that the trial court 
erred to their prejudice in granting over their objection plain-
tiff's instruction No. 1 as follows: 
"The court instructs the jury that if they believe from 
the evidence that the defendants negligently sto}.Jped their car 
on the highway-, or negligently allowed it to remain standing 
on the highway, under such circumstances that as a proxi-
mate result thereof the plaintiff was injured without contribu-
tory negligence on the part of the plaintiff then it is the duty 
of the jury to find for the plaintiff.'' 
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We maintain that this instruction was improper in· the use 
ofthefollowinglanguage: 
''Negligently stopped their car on the highway, or negli-
gently allowed it to remain standing on the highway/' 
This language was equivocal. It left the jury to imply that 
mere stopping on the highway was negligent, or that the length 
of time in which the defendants' car remained standing was 
'in itself negligence. · The instruction should have specified 
the particulars in which stopping a car on a hirrhwav is neg-
ligence, either by setting out such particulars or by referring 
to other instructions, and should have eliminated all reference 
to the length of time the defendants' car remained sta~ding, 
in view of the short time (not over .60 seconds) in which it 
had been stopped.when the accident happened. 
Prof. Minor, in ]\lfinor's Institutes (2d Ed.), Vol. IV, Part I, 
p.829,says~ 
"Instructions ought to be asked upon specified poitnts, 
clearly expressed, and not generally 8 • ~ 'upon the law of 
the case' . -'·' · 
The language of the instruction here objected to was over:.. 
emphatic. The jury was otherwise fully instructed .on the 
law of negligence in stopping on highways. Plaintiff's in-
struction No. 4-A was· granted, as follows: 
''The court instructs the jury that it is the duty of every 
driver of a motor vehicle ·who intends to stop on the highway 
to use reasonable care to see that such stopping can be done in 
safety.'' 
And defendants., instruction F, which was also granted, 
stated in part: 
''The present statute, which was in force when the accident 
happened in this case, is that 'no vehicle shall be stopped in 
such manner as to impede or interfere with or render dan-
gerous the use of highways by others, and no vehicle shall be 
stopped except ·close to the bight-hand eurb or edge of the 
highway., .. 'J 
These instructions were .sufficient and covered the entire 
law applicable to the alleged negligence of :defendants. Your 
Petitioners maintain that the over-emphasis and inexactness 
of instruction No. 1 was prejudicial. 
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ASSIGNJ.\!IENT OF ERROR NO. 5. 
Your Petitioners rr-spectfully submit that the trial court 
erred to their prejudice in refusing to grant defendants' in-
struction D-1 as follows: 
''The court instructs the jury that the admissions of J. L. 
Camp, 3rd, that he was at fault do not prove that he was at 
fault. The question of whether he was at fault is one for 
you to decide from the evidence.'' · 
This instruction was merely a statement of the principles 
maintained by your Petitioners and expressed by the trial 
court in the course of argument hereinabove mentioned, that 
Jimmy Camp's own opinion as to the fault of the accident was 
not controlling; that he might in his excitement or inex-
perience have believed at the time, and even have continued 
to believe, that the accident was his fault when as a matter 
of fact it was nothing of the kind. If Jimmy Camp's state-
ments were controlling, no trial by a jury wa.s necessary; if 
they were not controlling, the jury should have been so told. 
During the trial your Petitioners first moved to exclude 
the testimony concerning these statements and after the nature 
of the testimony was fully disclosed moved to have the testi-
mony stricken (Record, p. 270). Both of these motions were 
overruled by the trial court, whereupon Petitioners attempted 
to protect themselves by asking for the instruction here dis-
cussed and for their instruction D. Neither was granted and 
the jury was not instructed in any manner 'vith regard to 
Camp's statements. As we see it, the case went to the jury 
under the prejudice of these consecutive errors. 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 6. 
Your Petitioners respectfully submit that the trial court 
erred to their prejudice in refusing to grant instruction G, 
and especially the following language included in that instruc-
tion: 
"That he (the plaintiff) was under the duty," either when 
drivi'ng on a dusty road, or when seeing an especially thick 
quantity of dust ahead of him to exercise dtJe and reasonable 
care to bring and keep his car at such speed that he could 
stop within the range of his vision * "" • . '' 
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Instruction G was designed to cover the plaintiff's duties 
and to incorporate in one state1nent all of the tests by which 
his contributory negligence should be measured. The plaintiff 
claimed that dust prevented him from seeing the defendants' 
car ahead of him. Your Petitioners maintained that the plain-
tiff was driving at a speed which was excessive if his vision 
was obscured by dust. Thus the offered instruction _covered 
a theory of defense advanced by your petitioners and applied 
it specifically to a condition of fact testified to by the plain-
tiff, and, if good la,v, we submit was a proper instruction. 
There is no statute in Virginia on the specific point, and no 
decision which, in our view, constitutes a precedent. Iri. the 
absence of statute and of a specific ruling by this court, your 
Petitioners maintain that the law should be what it is in other 
jurisdictions, namely : 
Whenever the vision of a driver is completely obscured by 
dust on the ·road, he sho'ltld stop and remain standvng until 
the obstruction is cleared; and whenever his visi01Z· is partially 
obsa'ltred by d'ltst on the road, he should immediately bring his 
car to S'ltch speed and under such control that he can stop with-
in the range of his vision. 
It seems to us obvious that dust indicates danger, and that 
the law should require a motorist to heed a condition which 
indicates danger, and that a specific application of this re~ 
quirement to his speed is a proper instruction to be granted 
in any case where dust and speed are factors. In the instant 
case a most cursory examination' of the facts shows that the 
plaintiff's speed played a vital part in the events; and there 
is no room for spec:ulation: as to whether the alleged dust 
indicated danger, because the plavntif! specifically testified 
that the dust indicated to his mind traffic which he could not 
see. Let us repeat here what he said, reduced to narrative 
form: 
''The visibility on the road was very poor on account of the 
dust made by traffic. The; dust prevented me from seeing the 
Camp car until I was 35 or 40 yards from it. That dust was 
just ahead of me, and indicated there was a car in front of me 
which I supposed was in motion. I saw the dust from the 
.Camp car and I knew that it was created by a car going the 
same w·ay I was going. I had been in dust off and on all the 
way from Joyner's Dhurch (about a mile). When I came 
around Harvey Cutchin's corner it was much thicker up there 
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ahead of me. I do not know how much thicker, but I imagined 
there was cars in the vicinity of that dust when there were 
not any around H~rvey· Cutchin's." (:~~ecord, pp. 55, 56, 73.) 
The trial court granted no instruction which specifically con-
cerned the plaintiff's duty as to speed when confronted with 
dust .. The only mention of dust made in any instruction was 
the foliowing statement included in defendants' instruction 
G-1, which was offered after instruction G was refused: 
"If the road was dusty, he (the plaintiff) could not assume 
that it was clear any further than he could see through the 
dust.'' 
Your Petitioners maintain that if the last repeated lan-
guage is law, it necessarily follows that the language above 
quoted from instruction G is also law, and that the jury 
should have been specifically instructed as to speed. 
The plaintiff will maintain that the situation is analagous 
to night-driving and that the law of night-driving in Virginia 
is contrary to the instruction now in question. Your Pe-
. titioners confidently assert, however, that the situations are 
entirely different, and will attempt to demonstrate· the dis-
tinctions. ' 
Darkness is a pe·rmanent obstruction and covers all roads 
and all surrounding terrain. To drive within the range of 
lights would restrict traffic to an extent incompatible with 
modern needs. It w.as this consideration which led to the 
present Virginia rule on night-driving. 
Dust, on the contrary, is not. a permanent obstruction, but 
is strictly temporary. It does not apply to all roads, but only 
to those roads which are not hard surfaced. It does not apply 
at all times, but only in dry weather. It does not remain on 
the road, but may settle down or be blown away. .Modern 
traffic conditions are. not hampered to any serious extent by 
a rule which requires motorists to drive within the range of 
their vision on roads heavily clouded with dust. 
Moreover, darkness indicates an absence of traffic inasmuch 
as automobiles are required to ca.rry lights at night. Dust, 
on the other hand, indicates the presence of traffic and con-
sequently 'Should be heeded by the motorist who sees it. In 
this respect dust is not only different from darkness, but also 
differs from smoke and fog, which have no connection with 
traffic. · 
Niewe'd. from every standpoint of reaso~ we mitintain tb.at 
. the instruction properly stated the law. 
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Statem.ents of the Law. 
We find the following rules laid down by the text-books: 
Blashfield .Automobiles (Perm. Ed.), Section 743: 
''Temporary obstruction to the view of a motorist· will 
ordinarily affect his speed. Under such circumstances he must 
exercise reasonable care to avoid a. collision, and such ordi-
nary care requires him to stop if necessary or to substantially 
lessen his speed before plunging headlong into such an ob-
struction. Such a situation may be occasioned by a cloud 
of dust, or pall of smoke, or blinding sunlight, or by storm.'' 
(Italics supplied.) -
Huddy, Automobiles (9th Ed.), Vol. 3-4, Section 162, p. 299: 
"If the driver's view is obstructed or obscured, he must 
so regulate his speed as to have his car under control in order 
to avoid unforeseen accidents. Independently of statute, any 
considerable speed when the driver's view is obstructed or 
obscured may be found to be negligence. This situation may 
arise when dust is raised and is so thick as to obscure the 
vision of a driver, or where drivers enters a smoke screen 
from opposite directions and drive at the rate of fifteen miles 
per hour, or when, on account of a blinding storm, the driver 
can see but a short distance ahead of his machine.'' (Italics 
ours.) 
To the same effect is BerrY' On Automobiles (6th Ed.), Vol. 
1, Section 209, p. 175. 
The only Virginia text-book on automobiles not only sets 
forth the sa~e principles, but specifically mentions the distinC-
tion between temporary obstructions, such as dust and smoke, 
and permanent or semi-permanent obstructions such as dark-
ness or fog: 
Vartanian On Automobiles, Section 88, p. 179: 
"The law requires the driver of a vehicle to stop when his 
vision is entirely obscured by a temporary obstruction, such 
as a dust cloud or a smoke screen, when his failure to do so 
would jeopardize the safety of others, and to remain at a 
standstill until the temporary obstruction has come to an 
end. Thus it is held that failure to stop until an impenetrable 
cloud of dust raised by- a third automobile in passing, had 
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subsided, was negligence on the part of the driver. * • * It 
seems that fog is not considered to be such a temporary ob-
struction on the high,vay as to require the driver to stop until 
it has cleared off. The fact that it partakes of the nature of 
a relatively more permanent obstruction and the considera-
tion that a contrary rule 'vould blockade the highway for an 
unreasonable length of time and render travel impossible, is, 
no doubt, the underlying reason for its being excepted from 
the. general rule.'' 
Decisions. 
The Virginia Court seems never to have passed on an in-
struction concerning speed in dust, smoke or fog, but the lan-
guage of the instruction offered by your Petitioners certainly 
sets forth the la'v as it has been decided in a majority of the 
states. Some of the cases will be here noted: 
Castille v. Richard (La., 1924), 102 So. 398, 37 A. L. R. 586. 
Two automobiles proceeding in opposite directions on a 
dirt road were wrecked by sideswiping each other while driv-
ing in a cloud of. dust. Held: The drivers of both cars were 
guilty of negligence as a 1natter of law in continuing to drive 
when the dust was so thick they could not see the road ahead 
of them. 
· In its opinion the court said: 
''The district judge held that both parties were at fault 
in driviJig their automobiles in an impenetrable cloud of dust. 
We think he was correct in this. The dust was so thick that 
the occupants of the cars could not see 10 feet ahead of them. 
Each of the cars measured approximately 6 feet from hub to 
hub, so that, allowing for a margin of safety from the ditch 
on each side, there was very little room on this narrow and 
much traveled roadway for cars to pass each other. In these 
circumstances it was inexcusable negligence for the drivers of 
the automobiles not to have come to a full stop until the dust 
had subsided.'' 
Neilsen v. Christiensen (Utah, 1934), 38 Pac. (2d) 745. 
Plaintiff, passenger in an automobile at night, was injured 
when the car ran through a barricade and thereby swerved 
off the road and was wrecked. The barricade was across the 
entire paved portion of the road. It bore a detour sign direct-
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ing traffic to take a. side road which led off from the main 
highway 60 feet before reaching the barricade. It was 5 to 6 
:feet high and had two lighted red lanterns on it. 
The car in which plaintiff was driving was going'at a speed 
variously testified as 28 to 50 miles per hour .. The driver 
admitted he saw the barricade when 200 yards away, but did 
not rP.co~·nize it as such and did not reduce his speed until15 
feet a;way. He testified that the detour road which led off from 
the highway and went at an angle in a southwest direction 
(the highway ran due south) was an infrequently used road 
and the traffic on it naturally caused, and there was when he 
approached the point, dust arising around the barricade which 
obscured his view. He testified that under these conditions 
he could not see the barricade in time to escape hitting it. 
Held: This condition only increased the driver's duty of 
care, and did not excuse him for not recognizing the barrier 
as such and' for failing to slow down sooner; he was negligent 
as a matter of law; his negligence was the sole proximate cause 
of the accident_; the trial court should have so rUled and with-
held the case from tlre jury. 
The court said~ 
''He did not reduce the speed of his car until he was in 
the dust when he saw the barricade about 15 feet ahead of 
him. The presence of dust in the hil}hway is itself su;fficient 
warning to cal~ upon the driver of the car, in the exercise of 
due cMe, to red~tee his speed and have his car under control. 
• " * This is particu,larly tr'lte if the d~ts.t was of such charac-
ter as to obscure his 'l.'isio·n of the road ahead.'' (Italics sup-
plied.) 
Trevilia;n v. Boswell (Ky.), 43 S. W. (2d) 715. 
Plaintiff's car was struck by defendant's truck going in op-
posite direction. Defendant asked for an instruction on "un-
avoidable accident'', on the ground that dust interfered with 
his vision. Held: R.efusal of such instruction was not error. 
The court said: 
''If his vision was interrupted by a cloud of dust, it was 
his duty to exercise ordinary care under that condition to 
avoid a collision with other vehicles on the highway. If he con-
tin~wd to travel u-ith the knowledge of the presence of a cloud 
of dust which i·nte·rfered 'with his vision, and with his opera-
tion of the truck with dtte re,gard to the presence and safety 
24 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
of other vehicles on the highway, in that event it was his duty, 
if necessary to a·void a collision, to bring ]pis truck to a stop.'' 
(Italics supplied.) 
To the same effect are the following decisions : · 
Harmon v. Haas- (N. D., 1932), 241 N. W. 70, 80 A. L. R. 
1131. 
Outman v. bnpe'rial Oil Co. (La., 1932), 144 So. 749. 
All of these cases concern dust. The following cases con-
cerning· other temporary obstructions to vision are completely 
analogous and in support of the principles laid down by the 
dust cases: 
Palmer v. Marceill.e (Vt., 1934), 175 AtL 31 (Concerning 
smoke) . 
. Plaintiff, driving 30 miles an hour o~ a straight highway 
18 or 20 feet wide, observed 500 feet ahead a thick cloud of 
smoke which entirely obscured her vision of the right-hand 
side of the highway. She slackened speed a car length before 
she entered the obscured area and kept to her right-hand side 
of the road. She collided with the rear of defendant's truck 
which was a few feet beyond the cloud of smoke and partly, 
if not wholly, on the paved surface. She did not see the truck 
before the impact. 
Held: ·Contributory neg·ligence as a matter of law; trial 
court was correct in directing a verdict for defendant at close 
of plaintiff's evidence. 
The court said: 
"As we have seen, she saw the smoke when she was some 
500 feet from it. It was, as she testified, so thick that she 
could see nothing in or beyond it; she did not know how far it 
extended ahead of her; neither did she know what there might 
be in or beyond it, or whether there might be someone driv-
ing a horse and wagon or walking in the obscured area. She 
said, and. was corroborated, that she reduced speed to an un-
determined extent, when about a car length from the smoke, 
but the force of the impact, which not only wrecked but over-
turned her car, and drove the truck, with brakes set, a dis-
tance of 20 feet out of the road and partly across the ditch, 
showed that the speed could not have materially abated.'' 
• • • 
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''While plaintiff was entitled to assume that no obstacle 
was unlawfully upon the highway, she was not thereby ab-
solved from the exercise of reasonable care. * "" • "\Ve think 
that the record shows the plaintiff to have been guilty c;>f con-
tributory neg·ligence which bars her recovery." 
Bowmaster v. DePree (:M:ich., 1931), 233 N. W. 395 (Con-
cerning snow). 
Plaintiff's truck 'vas stopped on the highway and was struck 
by defendant's car approaching from the rear. It was a cold 
and blustery day, with some snow falling and with a high wind 
swirling the snow so that sometimes vision was temporarily 
obstructed. Defendant testified that because of the swirling 
snow he slowed down to 15 miles an hour when he saw the 
road obstructed ahead of him, and that he turned to the left 
and applied his brakes and, as he did so, his car swung 
around and hit the plaintiff's truck. 
Held: The defendant was guilty of negligence as a matter 
of law in driving at such a speed that it was impossible to 
stop within the assured clear distance ahead of him. The 
eourt stated that it was the duty of the driver of an automo-
bile to observe vehicles on the road ahead of him, and to keep 
his car under control and operate it with care so that he 
would not run into vehicles ahead of him, and that this duty 
might require him to reduce his speed where his vision was 
in any way interfered with. 
Virginia Law as to Night Drivvng Distinguished. 
Your petitioners are fully cognizant of the recent decision 
of this court in the case of TWJJ'lnan v. Adkins (June, 1937), 
191 S. E. 615, to the effect that it is not law in Virginia that 
a driver at night must drive at such speed that he can stop 
within the range of the vision afforded by his headlights. 
This case decides the law in Virginia as to night driving, but 
we submit that it does not decide and was not intended to 
decide that the same law applies in case of a temporary ob-
struction such as a cloud of dust. 
According to our reading of the opinion the specific rulings 
in the Twyman case were as follows: 
1. There is no statute in Virginia stating or implying that 
it is the duty of a driver at night to operate his vehicle at 
such speed that he can stop within the range of his lights. 
2. In the absence of statutory provision an instruction to 
that effect is too broad1 and refusal to grant it is not error. 
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3. It is not a rule of law in Virginia that a driver at night 
is under the duty of operating his vehicle so that he can stop 
within the range of his lights; the question of whether failure 
to do so is negligence is one for the jury under proper in-
structions. 
The facts of the case disclose driving in darkness and in-
termittent fog, and we think it obvious that the court did not 
intend to extend its rulings to cover all situations of obscured 
vision. When Justice Spratley says in his opinion 
''It is not difficult to realize that unfortunately and too 
frequently an unexpected hazard may arise within a space 
considerably shorter than the range of a car's lights, or the 
range of the vision of the driver,' ' 
it would seem reasonable to interpret the last clause as being 
limited to the vision of a driver at nig·ht afforded by his lights, 
or at most, the vision of a driver whose outlook is obscured 
by darkness or by some permanent obstruction. Certainly 
it does not appear to be sound argument that the same prin-
ciple applies to dust which indicates the presence of traffic. 
Cars hidden within such dust are not ''an unexpected hazard'' 
to one who has first seen the dust ahead of him, and the rule 
of la'v governing the actions of such a driver should be, and 
we maintain is, different from the rule in the Twyman case. 
Your petitioners tnaintain that the Twyman case is entirely 
distinguished in fact from the instant case and is to be diR-
tinguishecl in ·principle; and that in the complete absence of 
a more applicable decision by this court than is found in the 
Twyman case, the rule of law in Virginia is the common law 
rule which h~s been adopted in various other jurisdictions as 
above set out. 
ASSIGNMENT OF' ERROR NO. 7. 
Your petitioners respectfully subtnit that the trial court 
erred to their prejudice in refusing to strike the plaintiff's 
testimony before the case went to the jury, and in refusing 
to set aside the verdict as contrary to the law and evidence, 
on the grounds (1) that no primary negligence on the part 
of defendants was proven; (2) that eyen if primary negli-
gence on the part of defendants be granted for the sake of 
argument, the testimony sho,ved conclusively that such neg-
ligence was not the proximate cause of the accident; and (3) 
that the plaintiff 'vas clearly guilty of contributory negli-
gence. 
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(1) Defendants G'ltilty of No Negligence. 
Certain elements of alleged negligence on the part 9f the 
defendants were completely eliminated by the testimony. The 
defendants' car was stopped; but that was not negligence if 
the position of stopping was proper. It was stopped to change 
drivers; but the purpose of a stop is no element of negligence. 
It was stopped gradually and under control, but even if it had 
not been, the method of stopping could not be material in 
this case inasmuch as defendants' car was standing still when 
plaintiff first saw it. Prior to the stop it had been driven 
by a boy who was under sixteen and 'vho lacked experience 
and he may or may not have put out his arm as a signal to 
stop; but these matters could not be material when the plain-
tiff never saw the car until it was stationary. 
~{oreover, as mentioned above, the defendants' car was 
not ·stopped in any curve; it was not stopped at any place 
where there was any grade in the ro.ad to hi4e it; and it was 
~ot left standing for any material length of time. 
The elimination of these elmnents leaves only two ques-
tions to be discussed, namely, ( 1) whether stopping on a 
dusty road was negligence, and (2) what was· the position 
of the defendants' car with respect to the center line of the 
highway1 · 
. Your petitioners maintain first, that there is no law under: 
which defendants can be found guilty· of . negligence for 
stopping on a dusty ·road, if the 'stop was otherwi~e properly 
made; and second, that the testimony shows conclusively that 
the defendants' car was as far to the right.:. hand side of the 
highway as it was practicable to get. 
(a) Stoppin,g on Dusty If:oad Is Not Negligence. 
For the sake of arg'Ument on this. point, it will be ass.umed 
that the road was so dusty that vision was seriously ob-
scured, although your petitioners maintain that such was not 
the fact, as will hereinafter be discussed under the head of 
plaintiff's contributory neg·Iigence. 
If the plaintiff contends that the jury was entitled to :find 
the defendants guilty of negligence simply. because · they 
stopped when the road was dusty, the plaintiff' is advocating 
a novel principle of negligence which may be stated as fol-
lows: 
"If a car stops on a road 'vhich is sufficiently dusty to 
obscure the vision o.f drivers thereon, then, regardless of the 
fact that the car is stopped in a proper manner and in _a 
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proper position on the road, it is a question for the jury 
whether the mere stopping is neglig·ent. '' 
Defendants maintain that such is not the law in Virginia 
or in any other jurisdiction. A motorist has the right to stop 
on a highway provided his stop is at a proper tin1e with re-
lation to the movements of other traffic, is made in a proper 
place both as to the center line. of the road and as to the 
longitudinal nature. of the road, that is, with regard to 
whether the road is curved or straight, or whether it is hilly 
or level. If he is not negligent in any of these particulars, 
there is nQ law which makes him negligent because . the road 
is dusty. . : . 
. There, are no ·statutes in Virginia which hold or intimate 
that such stopping is negligent. Section 2154 (133) is obvi-
ously addressed to the pla.ce of stopping·. Section 2154 (122) 
is specifically entitled ''signals on starting, stopping or turn-
ing", and concerns the giving of such signals. These _are 
the only two Virginia statutes on the subject of stopping. 
Your petitioners maintain that each of these statutes is to 
be read as a 'vhole, and neither is to be construed as cover-
ing a situation not germane to its subject matter. Specifically, 
your petitioners maintain that no part of these statutes can 
be construed to mean that a stop made in a proper place and 
manner can be held negligent simply because it was made 
when the road was dusty. 
We have found no Virginia decision in point; nor do we 
find .cases from any other jurisdiction which discuss the ef-
fect of dust on the right of stopping. The following case, how-
ever, sets forth the principle that foll on a road does not make 
a stop negligent: 
Morton v. lJfooney (Mon., 1934), 33 Pac. (2d) 262. 
· Plaintiff collided with the rear of a truck that had stopped 
in the highway behind an automobile stalled in a fog bank. 
Held: That in the absence of statutory regulations, stopping 
a car on a hio·hway would not constitute negligence, and in 
the absence of a showing of a . lack of -due diligence no pos-
sible n.egligence could be p·redicated upon th,e mere showing 
that defendants' car was tempora.r,ily stopped. 
While this decision is not controlling upon the Virginia 
court, your petitioners confidently maintain that in the com-
plete absence of statute and deci~ion, there should not be en-
grafted upon the present law of negligence a rule which prac-
tically says that an;y stop may be found to be negligent if 
trouble results from it. 
James L. Camp, Jr., et als., v. J. G. Bryant, Adm'r. 29 
(b) Defendants' Car Was Stopped at the R·ight-hand Edge 
of the Highway. 
Your petitioners maintain that this is a fact concerning 
which the minds of reasonable men cannot differ when the 
testimony,. and not speculation, is the basis of conclusion. 
None of the plaintiff's witnesses except the plaintiff him-
self gave any testimony whatever on this point. That is true 
although one of his witn~sses, Elijah Joyner, was involved 
in the accident and was peculiarly able to notice the position 
of defendants' car. The plaintiff himself gave no testimony 
except the single statement that the defendants' car w.as ''on 
the main traveled -road". 
If by this statement plaintiff is to be taken as meaning 
that the defendants' car was in its usual lane of travel, then 
plaintiff has in other respects testified to an impossible state 
of facts, as may be mathematically demonstrated.· The -road 
is only 30 feet wide. Joyner's car was approximately 6 feet 
wide, and although it does not appear in the record, we think 
judicial notice may be taken that plaintiff's car was approxi- · 
mately 14 feet long. It is uncontroverted that the plaintiff's 
car swung· sideways across the road after its right-hand front 
corner had struck the Joyner car, and.thus that at some mo-
ment the Joyner car and the plaintiff's car together occupied 
~0 feet of. the road's width. It is also the plaintiff's owil tes-
timony that the collision took pla.ce ''right beside the Camp 
car'' (Record,. p .. 80). 
If this test.imony of the plaintiff be true (and he cannot 
be heard to deny it) then the back end of his car would have 
struck the defendants' car if the defendants' car had been di-
rectly in the. right-hand lane of travel. Yet the plaintiff's 
car never touched defendants' car. The only possible con-
clusion is thatl if the accident took place ''right beside'' the 
defendants' car, the defendants' car must necessarily have 
been near· the rig:ht-hand edge· of the highway, that is, near 
the gully and bank on its right-hand side, which is exactly 
where the defendants' witnesses sav it was. 
Independently of this evident inaccuracy, the testimony . of 
the plaintiff falls .far short of the definiteness which is re-
quired for proof of negligence. It is significant to note that 
he was never asked by his counsel to say what he meant by 
''the main traveled road", and that he based the statement 
on a,.photograph ·of another· car taken 13 months after the 
accident. His entire testimony in chief on the subject of the 
photograph consumes less than two pages and will well bear 
reading (Record, p. 60 to p. 62). 
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The questions asked him were distinctly .leading. Their 
nature is indicated by the following excerpts: . 
'' Q. Is that the true location of where this car was at the 
time when you turned to the left? 
''A. As best I can judge, I would say that is right. 
''Q. That car seems to be standing on the main traveled 
road. Was or was not the Camp car on the main traveled 
road¥ , 
"A. It wa.s on the main traveled road. 
"Q. Is that or not a proper position for that car to take 
to indicate where the Camp car was standing? 
''A. I would say so. · 
''Q. The car in the picture indicates where the Camp car 
was standing' 
''A. Yes." 
His cross examination is even more illuminating of the 
fact that the plaintiff was not testifying from aoourate ob-
servation, but was testifying from guess: 
'' Q. Now, ~ir. Bryant, could you see that day about where 
the edge of the paving had been' It had been scarified, I 
understand. Could you tell about where the edge of the pav-
ing had been Y 
''A. I think that could have been told by making close ob-
servation of the road. 
'' Q. And was it from that that yo'lt placed the car in this 
picture No. 3 (same picture as No. 2 above), which you say is 
placed as yozt saw the Camp car ahead of you? 
''A. Uh-huh. 
'' Q. It was placed 'unth reference to the ·edge of the mac-
adam, wasn't it? 
''A. That is about the position as I recall it that that car 
was parked in. 
''Q. Will you answer my question again, please, sir. It was 
placed by you with reference to the edge of the macadam, 
wasn't it! 
''A. What-the Camp carY 
"Q. No, sir, this car in this picture No. 3. 
''A. Yes. Yes, that is about the way I saw it. 
''Q. So that if the macadam was wider at the time of this 
accident th341 it is now; then, the car in this picture should 
have been placed closer to the ditch than was your idea of 
where it was? · 
''A. If the macadam were wider t 
"Q y . 
. es, s1r. 
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"'A. I don't exactly understand your question, Mr. Parker. 
'' Q. I understand that you placed the car which shows in 
this picture ,vhere you think the ·Camp car was, and that 
your method of placing it was by arriving at the edge of the 
macadam shown in th~s pictureJ and how far the Camp car 
was to the right or left of that edge ; is that right? 
''A. Yes. 
''Q. Now, I say, if the macadam, at the time of this acci-
dent, happened to be wider than it is now, that car in this 
picture should have been placed closer to the fence, shouldn't 
it? 
''A. I think that car is about where it was between the two 
je'Jwes. · 
'' Q. Do you decline to answer my question? 
''Mr. Pulley: He has answered it, ym.~r Honor. 
''A. (Continuing:) That car was placed on that road, Mr. 
Parker, just as I thought it ought to be placed) if it was eon-
crete from ·curb to curb. 
''By lVIr. Parker: 
''Q. Then, you had no reference to the·edge of the paved 
surface shown in this picture when you placed that cart 
''A. No. The reference I had in the placing of this car was 
the position I thought that car occupied from that fence on 
this highway. 
"Q. I ask you, Mr. Bryant, if, a few minutes ago, you did 
not tell me you placed this car in this picture with reference 
to the paved surface in this picture? 
''A. Well, I did not get your question, Mr. Parker. 
"Q. You did not get the object of it, did you, Mr. Bryant? 
''A. No, I did not get your question~ B'ut that car was 
placed in that picture just as it was on the road.'' (Record, 
pp. 91 to 93.) 
It is pertinent to remember that the paved surface was a 
foot wider on each side when this accident happened than it 
was at the time the photograph was taken; also that the fence 
'vhich the plaintiff adopted as his controlling· point after first 
saying that he adopted the edge of the macadam surface as 
such, was not in existence when the accident happened. 
The only other testimony on this point was from defend-
ants' witnesses, and they all testified the defendants' car was 
stopped as close as was reasonably possible to the gully and 
embankment on its right-hand side. 
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. James L .. Camp III's testimony, reduced to narrative form, 
was as follows : 
''A go9d. way befor~ we got to the _corner David started 
slowing down and pulhng over to the ~1ght. Then he put on 
his brakef;3 gradu~lly and. pulled Qver as far as he could get to 
the right. The car was about as close to the right-:hand bank 
or ditch as it. co~ld get. When I finally got out I just kh1d 
of stepped. over a little. Qit .to the .bank on that side of the 
road. I did -not have to jump, I could just take a long step 
from the running board.'' (Record, pp. 187, 190, 191.) 
David F~rbe~ testified ~s f~lio~s : 
: I 
"When I got just a little beyond th.e side road Jimmy 
told me to stop so I pulled over to the right as far as I couln. '' 
(Record, p. 200.) · 
'.'When I stopped I 'vas over next to the ditch on the right-
hand side.'' (R_ecord, p. 201.) 
The testimony of Marian I. Lawrence was as follows : 
, "After Mr. Bryant's car and Mr. Joyner's car came to-
gether, we all got out of our car just as quickly as we could, 
and I got out on the field side and stepped down in the little 
ditch. The wheels of our car w:ere off the hard part of the 
road and we could not have been any nearer to the field un-
less the rig·ht w:heels of our ear had been down in the little 
ditch.'' (Record, p. 211.) 
Ellis Frankfort testified: 
''When I got out of the car I stepped right down off the 
running board on the right-hand side. Where I stepped to 
thfl ground 'vas about a foot frun1 the little gully that run~ 
right along the field and the edge of the road. I do not think 
~had to. jun:;tp over towards the ditch to step down where I 
did.'' (Record, p. 244.) 
. The court. is obliged, on a -motion to set aside the verdict 
and on an appeal. from. ·such a motion, partiallv to weigh the 
testimony·. and :positively to reject testimony · of· any party 
which is obviously UD;certain ~nd is clearly refuted by all other 
witnesses. We ,maintain that the testimony of the plaintiff as 
to .the. position of the defendants' car, in view of his equivoca-
tion and inexactness, should. be rejected by the court. The 
testimony of all the other witnesses on this point, being clear 
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and unequivocal and verified by their statements as to where 
they stepped from the right-hand side of the car, should be 
taken as conclusive. 
(2) Defendants' Negligence Not Proximate Cause. 
Assuming for the sake of argument that defendants' car 
was stopped in the direct lane of travel on its right-hand side 
of the road, and that therefore such stopping was negligent, 
your petitioners maintain that such negligence was not the 
proximate cause of the accident. 
If a car stops in the road at a. time when there i:s no traffic 
in its rear for several hundred yards and at a place where 
traffic from the rear can observe its presence, then it is not 
· to be reasoned as probable or· expected that a car will run 
into it from the rear or will come up at such speed that it 
cannot stop or turn out in safety. These are matters of com-
mon experience and ev~ry-day occurrence, and of law as 
well.' The law provides for a signal from a moving ear when 
a stop is intended, but does not provide for the signal to 
be continued after the stop has been completed. That in it-
self negatives the idea that a· stopped car will be run down. 
If a car is stopped where it can be seen, the negligence of 
the driver of an overtaking car is subsequent in time to the 
neglignce of the driver of the stopped car. While the inter-
val of time may not be great, it is sufficient to make the 
negligence of the former a proximate cause, and the negli-
gence of the latter not a proximate cause. . 
Your petitioners maintain a collision from the rear cou1d 
not have reasonably been expooted to result from the stopping 
of the Camp car; that even if such a result had been sug-
gested to a man of ordinary experience, he would have con-
sidered it as hig•hly unlikely. If that be true defendants' 
negligence was not proximate cause; on the contrary, Bryant'.c; 
negligence was independent of and subsequent to the negli-
gence of the defenda.nts~ nnd was therefore th~ proximate 
cause of the collision. 
.A uthotities. 
Scott v. Hoosier Oo. (W. Va., 1936), 185 S. E. 553. 
On an icy road in the day time, plaintiff collided with a 
truck parked on the highway -ahead of him. The truck was 
parked on the wrong side of the road, and there was testi-
mony to indicate that it was entirely upon the paved surface. 
The road was straight for 150 feet in the direction from which 
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the plaintiff approached, but the plaintiff did not see the 
truck until he ·was 25 or 30 feet away from it. · 
The court held that the negligence of the truck driver in 
parking on the highway was not the' proximate cause of the 
injury; that the proximate cause was the plaintiff's own neg-
ligence; that the trial court erred in permitting the case to 
go to the jury. 
The court said: 
"The plaintiff, of course, could not recover unless the evi-
dence showed that the act of the defendant in violating the 
statute was the proximate cause of the damage. Certainly 
the fact that the truck was on the wrong side of the road, or 
rather that it was headed in the wrong· direction, had, un-
der the circumstances shown, no direct bearing upon the cause 
·of the accident. ·Neither can we see upon what theory it can 
be said that the fact that the truck was parked upon the pub-
lic highway in violation of the statute was the proximate cause 
of the accident. * * ~ To drive 'vithin 30 feet of a parked 
truck, under the circumstances of this case, without looking 
at the road in front, we think, without doubt, convicts the 
plaintiff of being· guilty of negligence as a matter of law. 
That negligence, havin,q appreciably followed that of the de-
fendwnt in point of tirne, was the independent, efficient, or 
proximate, cause of the damage to the plaintiff's oar. It was 
a happening distinctly intervenin,q between the negligence of 
the defendant and the accident, without which the accident 
would not have happened. This fact prevents the act of the 
defendant from being the proximate cause of the damage to 
the plaintiff." (Italics supplied.) 
Hu,ghes v. Luther (N. ~c., 1925}, 128 S. E. 145. 
This was a collision at night between the plaintiff's auto-
mobile and defendant's truck which was parked on the side 
of the hig·hway without lights. Plaintiff drove around a curve 
at 27 miles per hour and saw the truck 75 yards ahead of him. 
Another automobile was approaching from the opposite di-
rection, and its lights obscured the plaintiff's vision. Plain-
tiff thought the truck was moving (a striking parallel with 
the case at bar) and did not stop or turn out. He collided 
with the rear end of the truck. 
The court held that the defendant's negligence in parlting 
the truck on the highway without lights was not the proxi-
mate cause of the accident. It said~ 
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"·Conceding that it was negligence for defendant to stop 
his truck on the roadside, in the nighttime, and not to have 
a light on the rear, as required by statute, this negligence was 
'lzot the p1·oxintate ca-use of the injury to plaintiff's automobile. 
Plaintiff approached defendant's truck at a rapid rate of 
speed * * * and, it appears, drove into the truck which he 
saw first at a dista~ce of 75 yards.'' (Italics supplied.) 
Although there are many cases in Virginia on proximate 
cause, and some of them applying to automobile accidents, we 
have found none involving facts sufficiently similar to the 
case at bar to constitute a precedent. The citations herein-
above contained from other jurisdictions are of course far 
from exhaustive, but indicate the trend of the holdings and, · 
so far as we have been able to ascertain, the consensus of 
authority. 
(3) The Plaintiff lVas Guilty of Contributory Negligence. 
Your petitioners maintain that the testimony shows that 
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence which proxi-
mately caused the accident; that this showing is conclusive, 
and the question of his negligence is not one about which 
fair-mind~d or reasonable men could differ, and is not one 
which should have been submitted to the jury. 
While the nature of his negligence is evident in mass and · 
at every point of the testimony, we list the following speci-
fications: · 
1. The plaintiff was negligent in not seeing the defendants' 
car sooner than he did, and in never seeing the Joyner car 
at all; which is to say, he failed to maintain a proper look-
out. 
2. He \vas negligent in not slowing down or otherwise pre-
paring for the traffic ahead of him until he was within 18 
or 19 yards of the defendants' car. 
3. He was negligent in approaching the defendants' car 
at such speed that he was forced (as he himself claimed) to 
choose behveen running into the defendants' car and turn-
ing out to pass it in the face of oncoming traffic. 
4. He was negligent in approaching defendants' car at such 
speed that when he turned out to pass he went out of control; 
that his lack of control is evident from the fact that he skidded 
until his car was at a 45° angle across the road with the front 
thereof on his left-hand edge of the paved surface, and was 
unable to pass through the ample space which then existed. 
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These specifications will not be discussed in the ·exact order 
or terms in which they are above stated, but they remain as 
a summarized charge of the various elements of his negli-
gence. 
A. Consideratio1~ of Dust a.s Affecting Plaintiff's N·egligence. 
The alleged dust is the only excuse plaintiff· advanced for. 
not seeing the defendants' car sooner, and consequently for 
not reducing Iris speed. If his vision was not obscured by 
dust, it is plain that he was negligent in not seeing the de-
fendants' car and the Joyner car and in not driving as the 
situation required. Dust is therefore the keystone of the 
· plaintiff's defense against contributory negligence, and the 
situation in regard to the dust will be carefully analyzed. 
There TV as No Su.ch Dust as Plaintiff Clai1ns. 
Your petitioners maintain that the testimony shows coif-
elusively that at no time was there sufficient dust ahead of 
the plaintiff to obscure his vision to any material extent; that 
such dust as was present was quickly blown away by the wind, 
from west to east; that the testimony leaves no room for fair-
minded men to believe that the plaintiff could not have seen 
the traffic ahead of him in ample time, if he had been looking,. 
· and that the jury was unjustified in concluding (if they did 
so conclude) that Mr. Bryant could not see the defendants' 
.car and the Joyner car. 
The plaintiff's testimony was that he was prevented by 
gust from seeing the defendants' car until he was within 25 
or 40 yards :from it (Record, pp. 56, 72). He also testified 
that dust kept him from seeing the car of S. W. Rawls, which 
he admits meeting and passing, until he was between 2 car 
lengths and 5 car leng-ths from it, which is between 9 yards 
and 24 yards (Record, p. 74). He also testified that he as-
sumed that his left side of the road was clear, and that when 
he turned out to pass the defendants' car he could not, on 
account of the dust, see as far as 50 feet along the road ahead 
of him (Record, pp. 77, 78). Neither the court nor tile jur7 
is justified in accepting as correct testimony which is obvi-
ously incorrect, whether wilfully false Ol' unintentionally mis-
taken, and that this testimony of the plaintiff was contra-
dictory to fact we think is conclusively proven by incontro-
vertible evidence. 
In reply to the plaintiff's testimony it seems sufficient to 
say that everybody else on the road disagrees with him . .A.ll 
witnesses other than the plaintiff, including two called by 
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the plaintiff himself (Elijah Joyner and Leland Story), tes-
tified that they could see as far along the road as they could 
have seen if no dust had been there. 
Elijah Joyner's testimony, reduced to _narrative form, was 
this: · 
''I could see Mr. Bryant's car as soon as I turned the curve 
and came into the straight stretch looking towards Mr. Har-
vey Cutchin's. Mr. Bryant was then just beyond the side 1 
road. There was a little dust on the road that day but I 
could see everything up to :Harvey Cutchin's gate 'vhen I got 
around the ·curve. I saw Mr. Bryant's car just beyond the 
side road. That is where he was when I first could see the 
straight stretch of road. I saw the Camp car just as soon 
as I came around the curve and saw it just as soon as I could 
have seen it if there had been no dust at all on the road. 
I saw Mr. Bryant's car coming and saw he n~eded all the 
road he could get, so I pulled in the ditch.'' (Record, pp. 139, 
140, 143, 144, 145.) 
Leland Story testified: 
''So far as the dust was concerned, I could see all the way 
down the straight stretch of that road. If a person looked 
good they could see, but there was some dust down there. 
I was looking well enough to see." (Record, p. 125.) 
The witnesses for the defendants were equally positive. 
S. W. Rawls testified: 
"When I first got around the curve to a point where the 
bank and curve hid nothing· from me, I could see all the way 
down the road towards Harvey Cutchin's. I could see the 
Bryant car coming. I saw the dust from his car coming around 
the curve just before he got in front of Harvey Cutchin's 
house. There was a right strong wind blowing, I would say 
a west wind, blowing· that dust in my direction, and I ran 
my front window up, and I met Mr. Bryant and he gave me 
the sign and I did him. I rolled my window down again be-
cause the dust was blowing· straight across the road. It was 
a pretty good strong breeze. I saw his car about the same 
time I saw his dust. · The dust was right off the back of his 
car." (Record, pp. 173, 171, 172.) 
James L. Camp, III, who saw the Bryant car after the de-
fendants' car had actually stopped, testified: 
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"When I first saw ~Ir. Bryant's car it had just gotten be-
yond the curve at 1\IIr. Cutchin's. I was in the back seat of 
my car on the right and saw Mr. Bi·yant's car by looking 
through the back window. I could see plainly that he was 
maldng right much dust. There was some dust between me 
and his car, but the dust from Mr. Sol Rawls' car never 
got in the way between Mr. Bry·ant 's car and ours. I watched 
Mr. Bryant's car all the way from the time I first saw it 
coming around that curye until the accident.'' (Record, pp. 
188, 189.) 
and further, on cross examination : 
''I was in the act of getting out, so I did not watch David 
Forbes. I didn't get out. I opened the door and my foot 
was on the running board, then somebody yelled that some-
body was coming and I got back and watched Mr. Bryant all 
the time from then until the crash.'' (Record, pp. 197, 198.) 
David Forbes testified: 
''So I pulled over to the right as far as I could and started 
applying_ my brakes and I glimpsed a man-just could see 
him coming around the corner, just before I stopped there-
Mr. Bryant coming around the corner, but I didn't pay any 
attention to him, he ·was up there at Mr. ·Cutchin's. I saw 
Mr. Bryant just before I stopped. I probably rolled one car 
length after seeing him. He was so far behind me that I did 
not see any reason why he \vould hit me-he was just far 
behind me and I knew he had plenty of time. I saw him in 
the mirror." (Record, p. 200 and p. 201.) 
"I was stopped when Mr. Joyner met me and was going 
by me towards the place where he and Mr. Bryant hit. I 
\vas stopped when I sa'v the edge of his car coming around 
the corner.'' (Record, p. 201.) 
Marian I. Lawrence testified: 
"When I first saw Mr. Bryant's ear it was just turning the 
corner up there at 1\IIr . .Cutchin's and was coming our way. 
The driver of our car was just stopping at that time.'' (Rec-
ord, p. 208.) 
and in regard to the Joyner car she testified: 
''There w~s n? dust between us a~d the Joyner car to keep 
me from seeing It." (Record, p. 209.) _ 
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Ellis FrankfortJ another occupant of defendants' car, tes-
tified: 
"When I first saw ~lr. Bryant approaching towards the 
rear of our car, he was just coming around the corner at Mr .. 
Harvey Cutchin's. He was just coming into sight around 
the curve at l\1:r. Cutchin's gate. At that time the automobile 
I was in had nearly stopped, if it hadn't stopped completely. 
From the time that I first saw ~fr. Bryant's car, the ear I 
was in did not r_oll over one length at the most, I don't think. 
When I looked back and sa'v Mr. Bryant's car there was no , 
dust between me and his car that came either from Mr.. Sol 
Rawls' car or anywhere else that kept me from seeing Mr .. 
Bryant's car clearly. And I saw ~Ir. J oyner.'s car ahead of 
us coming from Franklin before he ever reached us. My vision 
at that point was clear also." (Record, pp. 238, 245, 246.-) 
Harvey Cutchin, who was standing on his back porch when 
the defendants' car passed his gate and was still there when 
the plaintiff's car passed his gate, testified: 
"l\1:r. Camp's car did not have as good as any dust. If I 
had paid attention to his car, I could have seen it out of sight.'' 
(Record, p. 219.) 
''The wind was west that day. It blew pretty hard."· (Rec-
ord, p. 227.) • 
This is not a simple conflict between the veracity and 
memory of witnesses. The statement of almost every wit-
ness who testified that the entire length of the road could 
be seen was corrobontted by so1ne action taken by the wit-
-ness as the res'u.lt of what he saw. In the case of Elijah Joyner, ' 
he performed the very unusual act of taking to the ditch as 
far as he could get. In the case of S. W. Rawls, he began 
to run up the window of his car to keep out Bryant's dust. 
In the case of ~Iarian Lawrence, she called attention to the 
_approach of the Bryant car from the rear, and James L. ·Camp 
III ceased his movements to get out of his car. All of these 
things because the witnesses sa~v Bryant's car. 
If these witnesses, from their position, saw the Bryant car, 
it necessarily follows that Mr. Bryant, from his position, 
.could have seen the defendants' car, the Rawls car, and later 
the Joyner car, . and necessarily follows that these auto-
mobiles were not hid from him by any dust. Mr. Bryant 
may not have been looking., but neither the court nor the 
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jury are justified in accepting his testimony that he could not 
see. , 
Plaintiff Negligent Wltether Vision Obscured or Not. 
But your petitioners maintain that it is unnecessary to de-
cide how much dust was on the road; that under either of 
the alternative set of facts in regard to dust, the plaintiff 
was convicted of contributory negligence by his own testi-
mony alone and by the testimony of all the ~ther witnesses.. 
If there was no such dust as to obscure vision, Bryant. 
should have seen the defendants' car sooner than he did. It is 
to be remembered that the road is mathematically straight 
for a distance of 258 yards, of which distance 221 yards was 
traveled by the plaintiff before the collision; also that there 
is an unobstructed line of vision along the road for a dis-
tance of 387 yards, of which distance ·he travelled 290 yards 
before the ·collision. 
The plaintiff testified that he was within 35 or 40 yards 
from the Camp car when he first saw it and that it was then 
standing still (Record, pp. 56, 83). On cross examination he 
said 25 or 30 yards, which makes it even worse (Record, p. 
72). It is thus positive that he traveled an unobstructed road 
a distance mathematically shown to be more than 250 yards 
(from Harvey Cutchin's curve to a point 40 yards from the 
Camp· car) without noticing at any· time that the Camp car 
was ahead of him. If dust did not obscure his vision, this is 
contributory negligence as a matter of law. He is held to 
have seen what he could have seen.if he had looked. 
Moreover, if there was no such dust as to obscure his vision, 
the plaintiff should have seen t~e Joyner car. It is an un-
controverted fact that they were at least 160 yards apart 
(from a point ''beyond the side road'', that is, north of it, 
to .the end of the southern curve) when Joyner emerged from 
said curve. Yet the plaintiff repeated and was positive that 
he never saw the Joyner car at all, and never knew what 
he ran into (Record, pp. 58, 76). If there was no such dust 
as to obscure his vision, this is the most positive kind of con-
tributory neg·ligence. 
ConceQ.ing, however, for the sake of argument, that dust did 
obscure the plaintiff's vision to the extent claimed by him, 
your petitioners assert that plaintiff was guilty of contribu-
tory neglig-ence in not slowing- down after he saw the cloud 
of dust and before he reached it, and again in not slowing 
down after he entered the dust and first saw the defendants.' 
car. 
His testimony was that he saw dust ahead of him when he 
' 
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first came into the straight portion of the road; that the dust 
indicated to him traffic which he could not see; and that nev-
ertheless he continued at unabated speed until within 18 or 
19 yards of the defendants' car. In spite of the fact that the 
dust, to use his own words, ''indicated there was a car in front 
of me", he specifically states that he ass'll!med the road ahead 
of him was clea;r and never slackened speed until he arrived 
at what he calls an emergency. His testimop.y was: 
"I assumed the road ahead of me was clear. I think I 
had a right to assume that in spite of the dust ahead of me. 
I kept on at the same speed. * "" * I never slackened speed 
until I put on my brakes 17 yards behind the Camp car." 
(Record, p. 83.) 
Your petitioners maintain that a motorist who sees dust 
ahead of him should slacken speed so as to provide for what-
ever traffic might have caused such dust or be hidden by it; 
that he has no right in fact or in la'v to assume under these 
conditions that the road ahead of him is clear; and that his 
failure to make any provision whatever for what he might 
discover in the dust is the grossest kind of negligence. 
Again, conceding for the sake of argument that the dust 
obscured the plain~iff's vision in the manner he claimed, your 
petitioners assert that he convicted himself of negligence in 
testifying that he did not slow down as soon as he saw the 
defendants' car. He traveled a distance variously estimated 
by him as behig from 6 yards to 23 yards after he saw the 
defendants' car before he made any change w·hatever in his 
speed. This is a wide variation of estimates, but 'vhatever 
the actual distance, he makes the direct statement that he con-
tinued throughout that distance at unabated speed. 
A motorist may do much in the way of observing traffic 
and controlling his car in short distances. In 23 yards, or 
even less, he ought to be able to deerease his speed materially. 
It was the plaintiff's duty, immediately upon seeing the de-
. fendants' car or from the moment when in the exercise of 
reasonable care he should have seen it, to slow down suffi-
ciently to meet the traffic requirements ahead of him; that is, 
sufficiently to follow the Camp car at a proper distance if it 
had been moving as he as&umed it to be, or to stop behind it if 
it was stationary as it turned out to be; or to turn out and pass 
it after first seeing whether there was oncoming traffic. 
If the defendants' car had been in motion, as the plain-
tiff assumed it to be, he must have known that he was over-
taking it rapidly. He knew there was a curve ahead (Rec-
ord, p. 83) and, therefore, should have ·known that if the 
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.Carnp car was moving he would either have to slow down 
behind it or pass it on a curve. Instead of being attentive 
and of attempting· to ascertain what the situation was ahead 
of him, he proceeded on his way in the assumption that noth-
ing would interfere with his continued tra~el, and thus he 
created for himself the trap which caused his own injury. 
Such behavior is clearly negligence as a matter of law . 
.A ~tthorities. 
Failure to heed a situation which in itself is a warning 
of danger has frequently been held by the courts to be neg-
ligence as a matter of la,v, and not a question for the jury. 
This principle has with son1e frequency been applied to facts 
very similar to the case at bar. 
In Blash:field on Automobiles, supra, and Huddy on Au-
tomobiles, supra, it is stated in substance that temporary ob-
structions to the view of a motorist such as may be occasioned 
by a cloud of dust, put upon him the duty of exercising rea-
sonable care to avoid a collision, and such ordinary care re-
quires him to substantially lessen his speed before plunging 
headlong into such an obstruction. The exact quotations are 
hereinabove set out under assignment of error No. 6. 
In the case of Cla1·k v. Parker (1933), 161 Va. 480, 171 S. 
E. 600, two cars g·oing in opposite direc.tions on a road which 
was practically straight, collided in a cloud of dust. The 
dust was so thick that the plaintiff said he could hardly see 
the lights of the car he struck. Plaintiff was going 40 or 45 · 
miles per hour when he reached the unpaved portion of the 
road an~ entered the dust. Held: he was negligent. In the 
opinion by Justice Holt, the court said: 
''Plaintiff was driving faster than he should on a soft sur-
faced road part-icu,larly -when we remember that the dust was 
so thick he co'ldd scarcely see the lights on the approaching 
car.'' (Italics supplied.) 
This was not expressly a holding of negligence in law, in~ 
asmuch as the jury had already decided against the plaintiff, 
but that this court has taken it to be equivalent to such a 
holding· is evident from the later cas~ of Howe v. Jones (1934),' 
162 Va. 442, 174 S. E. 764, \vhich concerned a collision due 
to glaring headlights. In this opinion, again by Justice Holt 
it is said: ' 
''The reasonableness of the conduct of the parties in such 
circumstances is usually a jury question. This conduct may; 
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be so gross as to 1nake an inference of negligence in,evitable as 
where one going from forty to forty-fiv:e miles an hour drove 
into a dust cloud so dense as to obscure the headlights of an 
approaching car. Cla1·k v. Parker. * * * " (Italics supplied.) 
In Bry01nt v. 1/ox (1923), 135 Va. 296, 116 S. E. 459, the 
court, speaking of a cloud of smoke which was claimed to 
have obscured the vision of a truck driv:er who attempted to 
pass a buggy while going across a railroad on an overhead 
bridge, said: · 
"If it (the smoke) was there before the driver of the truck 
beg·an his effort to drive around the buggy and he was· then 
unable to see through it, his negligenc is manifest. "" • "" ' ' 
There being a conflict in that case as to whether smoke was 
present in such amount as to obscure vision, the court further 
said: 
. "Assuming that the smoke did 11ot seriously obstruct the 
vision, the roadway was clear for 450 feet ahead of the truek 
driver, and the physical facts show (notably the collision 
'vhich came so quickly and while attempting to pass the buggy) 
that the motorcycle n1ust have been in view a sufficient time 
in advance of the collision to warn the truck driver against 
attempting to drive around the bug·gy until after the motor-
cyc.Ie had passed. '' 
Ewing v. Chapman (W. Va., 1922), 114 S. E. 158. 
In a fog· so dense as almost to precluge yision, plaintiff's au-
tomobile proceeding· in one direction was struck by defend-
ant's automobile going in the othe1~ direction. Those in the 
plaintiff's car testified that on account of the fog they did 
not see defendant's car until they collided with it. Those 
in defendant's car, while agreeing that the fog was very 
thick, testified that they saw the plaintiff's car at a distance 
from a car length to 40 feet. Judgment was rendered for 
the plaintiff, but the Appellate Court reversed the judgment 
and entered judgment for the defendant on the ground that 
the plaintiff 'vas guilty of contributory negligence as a matter 
of law. . 
The court said: 
''The assumption upon which the plaintiff proceeded, with-
out adequate precaution, namely, legal freedom of the right 
side of the road, is condemned by the conditions obtaining as 
well as the law. If the fog was as dense as he claims it was, 
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he might well have suspected or feared that others, as reck-
less as himself and his associates, might be on the road and 
unable to keep safely to the right, on account of the fog. He 
and his witnesses admit that no time intervened between their 
discovery of the defendant's car and the collision. There was 
no opportunity to prevent injury by stopping their car. Rea-
sonable care, caution, and prudence i1~ the driving of a car re-
quires it to b_e so handled as to permit such opportunity, and 
the law requires the dri,ver to take a.dvantage of it, if he would 
avoid liability for da1nag·es to others, or preserve his right of 
action based upon. negligence of othe1·s." (Italics supplied.) 
In the cases of Castille v. Richards, Nielson v. Ohristiensen, 
Harmon v. Haas, Outman v. T1nperial Oil Company, Pal·mer 
v. Marceille, Trevilian v. Boswell and Bow1naster v. D·ePree, 
hereinabove cited under assig-nment No. 6, it was held negli-
gence in law to continue driving at a speed which precluded 
an immediate stop, where the motorist's vision was seriously 
obscured by temporary conditions such as dust, smoke, and in-
termittent snow flurries. 
In one case concerning dust, that of lJf.urphy v. Hawthorne, 
(Or., 1926), 244 Pac. 79, 44 A. L. R. 1397, the court refused 
to find that negligence was proven as a matter of law on the 
facts there involved. That case was aggravated however by 
the fact that the accident was at night and the defendant's 
parked truck had no lig·hts. The Oregon court specifically 
said that under the circumstances the question of whether 
the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence in not re-
ducing his speed after his vision was obscured by dust from a 
passing autobns was a.question of fact for the jury. In so 
holding this case is in the minority and is directly contra-
dictory to the cases hereinabove cited. 
B. Independently of Dust, Plaintiff Was N·egligent. 
Your petitioners maintain that whether dust obscured the 
plaintiff's vision or not, the testimony shows ·the plaintiff neg-
ligent as a matter of law (1) in his speed, (2) in not seeing· the 
Joyner car, and (3) in not having his car under sufficient con-
trol to pass through the ample space which was there for 
him. . 
(1) As to speed, it will be remembered that the plaintiff 
testified he believed he was driving from 30 to 35 miles an 
hour althoug·h he never looked at the speedometer; that Sol 
W. Rawls, who passed him, estimated his speed at 40 or 45 
miles an hour, and that Harvey ·Cutchin, who saw the plaintiff 
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pass his gate,. estimate9. it at 45 or 50. Whatever the actual 
rate of speed, uncontradicted facts indicate conclusively that 
he was driving too fast for a road with curves in it, with 
broken surface, and with traffic. The results of his speed 
speak more clearly than the ~otin1ated miles per hour. 
In the first place, his automobile was badly wrecked by the 
collision although the Joyner car was practically at a stand-
still when the collision occurred. The plaintiff's radiator 
fastening was smashed back to the cowl, the starter was 
broken off, the flywheel cracked, the front right wheel torn 
down, and the knee-action supports bent back (Record, p. 
184). The chassis was torn up, the starter housing burst at 
the back end of the motor, the radiator core smashed in on 
the motor, and the cowl "pushed back in" (Record, p. 186). 
The car pivoted on its right front corner until it came to 
rest headed in exactly the opposite direction from which it 
had come. These things could not have happened had he been 
driving· at a speed which was reasonable under the circum-
stances. 
Again, the tracks of the plaintiff's car indicate a speed 
which must be considered excessive. Harvey Cutchin was 
the only witness 'vho testified as to these tracks. He stated 
that he observed then1 while he. was standing in the road by 
the plaintiff's car, at a time when nobody was present except 
himself and the plaintiff, and during the several minutes 
which elapsed after 1\tir. S. W. Rawls had gone to Franklin 
to get an a1nbulance. Harvey Cutchin pointed out to the sur-
veyor and photographer the points which, according to his 
memory, defined the plaintiff's tracks, and they were meas-
ured by the surveyor and pictured by the photographer. 
Cutchin's testimony on this point is on pages 222 to 224 of 
the record. 
The distance measured by the surveyor indicates that Bry-
ant ''bumped.", as Cutchin pnt it, for a distance of 62 feet 
before he began to skid sideways, then skid for a distance 
of 66 feet, more and more sideway~ as he progressed, up to 
the actual point of collision. It is an unavoidable conclusion, 
if the facts be read from the tracks he made, that the plain-
tiff was traveling at an unreasonable speed. 
Furthermore, it is undisputed and indeed was testified by 
the plaintiff himself, that when he struck the Joyner car the 
Plaintiff's car was at a 45° angle across the road; and it is 
an incontrovertible fact that the left front wheel of the plain-
tiff's car, and probably his right front wheel also, 'vas off the 
paved surface on the east side of the road, that is on the 
plaintiff's left-hand side. Notice the following conditions: 
the Joyner car was against the bank 'On the east side of the 
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road; said car was 5 feet 9:Y2 inches wide, while the shoulder 
and gully on that side were a total of 6 feet in width; never-
theless the rig-ht-hand corner of the plaintiff's car struck the 
J oyne; car, the blow being received by the Joyner car at a 
point on the front of said car between the left-hand corner 
and the center of the radiator. 
These facts must be viewed by considering Bryant's actions 
as if the Joyner car bad not been on the road at all inasmuch 
as Bryant himself admitted he never knew the Joyner car 
was there and behaved without reference to any approaching 
traffic. We think it evident that had the Joyner car not been 
on the road at all, Bryant would hav:e turped over or hit 
the bank head-on or in some other way ha~e injured himself. 
Your petitioners vie\v these facts as conclusive that plaintiff 
was driving too fast, and that his negligence in speed is proven 
as a matter of law by the physical position and movement of 
his car. 
(2) Conceding that dust obscured the plaintiff's vision to 
the extent claimed by him, he was negligent in law in not 
discovering the presence of the Joyner car. The plaintiff him-
self admitted that when he turned out to pass the defendants' 
car he could see as far as the front of the defendants' car, a 
distance of 65 feet (Record, p. 79). If he could see that far 
he must of necessity have seen the Joyner car. He testified 
that it was the Camp car which hid the Joyner car from him 
(Record, p." 76), but that is obviously incorrect; at a distance 
of 50 feet behind a car, a motorist can see his left-hand side 
of the road. The real facts are disclosed by the plaintiff's 
admission that he saw nothing· on his left side because he was 
not looking over there. His testimony was: ''I did not look 
to see. I presumed it was clear. I assumed that my left side 
was clear." (Record, p. 77.) 
A motorist is obliged to observe the road in front of him, 
especially the road in close proximity, and his failure to do so 
is negligence in law. He is specifically required by statute, 
.Section 2154 ( 118), to desist from turning out to pass until 
he can see that his left-hand side is free of oncoming traffic. 
In assuming the absence of traffic; and in not looking, his 
negligence seems manifest. 
(3) That the plaintiff was guilty of negligence in not hav-
ing proper control of his car is made definite, once and for 
all, by the fact that he did not pass between the defendants' 
car and the Joyner car. It is to be remembered that the road 
was 30 feet wide between banks and that the Joyner car, be-
ing up against the east bank, occupied only 6 feet of this 
width. The defendants' car, even if we take the plaintiff's 
own testimony as being correct, had its right wheels on the 
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~xact western edg·e of the paved surface, and being a little. 
less than 6 feet wide between fenders it occupied about 5% 
feet of the width of the pavement The paved surface being 
18 feet wide, there was thus a clear space. of 13 feet between 
the Camp car and the Joyner car \vhen they were closest to 
each other. The plaintiff's car was 5 feet 8 inehes wide, say 
6 feet for even figures. It is perfectly apparent that any 
<!ar proceeding at a reasonable speed and under control can 
easily be driven through a space more than twice its width, · 
.and your petitioners 1naintain that the faliure of· the plain-
tift' to drive through the space which was there is a matter 
which speaks for itself-is a situation whieh calls for the 
.application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur-and that his 
failure to drive between the two cars is enough to make him 
guilty of negligence as a matter of la,v. 
Emergency TVas Due to Plaintitf~s Negligence. 
As to the plaintiff's claim that he is entitled to have his 
actions considered under the rule of the sudden emergency 
doctrine, your petitioners call attention to the fact that the 
emergency did not exist until he was 18 or 19 yards back of 
the defendants' car, and that all of the specifications of neg-
ligence in reg·ard to speed and lookout which your petitioners 
maintain have been proven against the plaintiff apply to neg-
ligence which existed before he· arrived at that point. In 
other 'vords, if he was negligent in the particulars specified-
-and your petitioners maintain most confident that he was-
then his negligence contributed to or created the emergency, 
which, in turn, lead to the collision. It is not that he was to 
blame for making a choice between two possible courses of 
:action after he arrived 19 yards behind the defendants·' car; 
it is that the situation then confronting him was created 'by 
his own pre-existing negligence. 
SUMMARY .. 
Your petitioners maintain: 
· 1. That a mistrial should have been granted, and another 
jury should have been impaneled before any testimony was 
taken, because plaintiff's counsel, in his opening statement 
to the jury, said (1) that James L. Camp, III, wished to pre-
vent his parents from knowing that he had allowed David 
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Forbes to drive, and (2) that the plaintiff had no animosity 
towards the (lefendants. 
Both of these matters were strictly immaterial; no evi-
dence was introdu~d to support either of the state~ents ; 
and the prejudice of such statements seems apparent. 
2. Testimony that David Forbes, who was driving the de.-
fendants' car before it stopped, was under 16 years of age 
and was an inexperienced driver, should not have been ad-
. mitted. 
The age· and experience of the driyer were immaterial be-
cause the car was standing still when the plaintiff first saw it .. 
The jury was almost certainly prejudiced by the introduction 
of this irrelevant inquiry. 
3. The statements ill.ade by James L. Camp, ill, "It was 
my fault", should not have been admitted in evidence. 
This was his opinion only, and was not an admission con-
cerning any facts of the accident. 
4. It was error to instruct the jury that they should find 
for the plaintiff if ''the defendants negligently stopped their 
,car on the highway or negligently allowed it to remain stand-
ing on the highway, under such circumstances that as a proxi-
mate result thereof'', etc. 
This instruction was ambiguous and may easily have been 
.interpreted by the jury to mean that they could attribute neg-
ligence to the mere act of stopping·. Such an interpretation 
would not be in keeping with the la,v. The instruction should 
have been upon specified points of negligence, clearly ex-
pressed. . 
5. · It was error not to grant an instruction saying that the 
admissions of James L. Camp, III, that he was at fault were 
. not conclusive. 
Such an instruction is in keeping with what we confidently 
maintain is the law. The jury was entirely uninstructed as 
to the effect of these statements, and the error of admitting 
them in testimony was thus aggravated .. 
6. It was error not to instruct the jury that the plaintiff 
should have driven at such speed that he could stop within 
the range of his vision when driving in dust. 
This principle of la'v applied to facts that were vitally 
in issue, and the principle was not specifically or sufficiently 
covered by any other instruction granted. 
7. No negligence on the part of defendants was proven. 
We maintain that stopping on a dusty road, could not, of 
itself, be negligence; that the only question was whether the 
defendants' car stopped close to the right-hand edge of the 
highway. . 
We maintain that the testimony showed beyond any doubt 
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whatever that .defendants' car was as close as practicable to 
the gully and bank on its right-hand side. 
8. Defendants' negligence, if conceded, was not proximate 
cause. The proximate cause of the accident was plainti~'s 
n~gligence which was subsequent to and separate from any 
negligence of the defendants. 
Defendants' car was stopped on a straight road. If it was 
not hidden by dust, it was not reasonable to believe that it 
would have be~n run down. If it was hidden by dust, which 
we maintain was not the fact, it was not reasonable to sup-
pose that a driver from the rear would approach at such speed 
that he coJild not stop. These facts remove defendants' neg-
ligence from the realm of pro~imate cause. · 
9. The plaintiff was cle&rly and unquestionably guilty of 
cont#bqtory neglig·ence. 
In the :Qrst p~~c~, there was no such ~mount of dust as the 
pl~ID.ti:ff clai~ed. Everybody els~ saw the entire road, and 
if the plaintiff had been maintaining proper lookout, he would 
have seen the cl.efendants' car arid the Joyner car. 
Even if the dust had obscured his vision as much as he 
claimed, 4e should have slackened speed so as to prevent a 
collisio:p. with whatever he might discover in or beyond tbe 
dust. 
The plaintiff was driving too fast for the circumstances 
then exist~p.g. His speed is shown by the distance he skid, by 
the position his car was in. when the impact occurred, and 
by the extent of damage to his automobile. The road was dry, 
the s-qrface broken, there was a curve ahead of him and he 
knew there was traffic near the curve. He should have been 
driving more slpwly. · 
The plaintiff was negligent in never seeing the Joyner car 
at all. He admitted in one statement that he could see 120 
feet aheaq !lll-d in another 65 feet ahead, and at one time or 
another he should have seen the Joyner car, the driver of 
which saw him plainly. If he had seen it, the accident should 
not have happened. 
The pl~iptiff had 13 or more feet of space through which to 
drive between the defendants' car and the Joyner car. In 
:QQt driying thrqugh t}lis. space, and in his confessed inabjlity 
to do so, he 'vas guilty of n~gligence. 
The plaintiff's alleged emergency did not exist before he 
turned tQ t4e left behind the defendants' car. His negligence 
was present before he made that turn, and thus created the 
emergency. 
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PRAYERS. 
Your petitioners represent that the verdict and judgment 
against them is contrary to the law and the evidence, on the 
grounds hereinabove assigned. 
Your petitioners therefore pray that a writ of error and 
supersedeas may be awarded and that the said judgment may 
be reversed and annulled, or in the absence of such reversal 
and annulment a new trial shall be granted. 
Your petitioners desire to state orally through their coun-
sel the reasons for reviewing the decision complained of, and 
hereby adopt this petition as their brief. 
Your petitioners further state that a copy of this petition 
for a writ of error was mailed on the 8th day of February, 
1938, to James G. Martin, Norfolk, Virginia, and Junius W. 
Pulley, Courtland, . Virginia, who were counsel in the trial 
court for J. Fenton Bryant, Jr., and who are counsel for J. G. 
Bryant, Administrator of J. Fenton Bryant, Jr., deceased. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JA~fES L. CAMP, JR., 
JAMES L. CAMP, III, 
JOHN C. P ARICER, JR., 
His Guardian Ad Litem. 
By: J.OHN C. PARKER, effi., 
Counsel. 
I, John C. Parker, Jr., an attorney of the Supreme .Court 
of Appeals of Virginia, hereby certify that in my opinion the 
decision hereinabove complained of should be reviewed by 
the said court. 
JOHN C. P ARICER, JR. 
Received Feb. 10, 1938. 
J. W. E. 
March 1, 1938. Writ of error and supersedeas awarded 
by the Court. Bond $12,500.00. 
M.B·. W. 
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RECORD 
VIRGINIA: 
Pleas before the Circuit Court of Southampton County, 
at the Court House thereof, on the 30th day of December, 
1937. 
Be it remP.mbered, ·that heretofore, to-wit: on the 4th day 
of May, 1937, there was :filed in the Clerk's Office of said Court, 
a Notice of 1\{otion for Judgment, which Notice is in the words 
a~d :figures following, to-wit: 
NOTICE OF MOTION. 
J. F'enton Bryant, Jr., Plaintiff, 
v. 
James L. Camp, Jr., and tT ames L. Camp, III, the last named 
defP.ndant being an infant under the age of 21 years, by 
John' C. Parker. Jr., his guardian ad lite1n, Defendants. 
To: JameR L .. Camp, ,Jr., and James L. ·Camp, III, the last 
named bP.ing an infant under thP. age of 21 ·years, by his 
guardian a.d litem, .John C. Parker, Jr., 
You, and each of you, are hereby notified that on the 17th 
day of 1\fay, 1937, or as soon thereafter as I may be heard I, 
J. Fenton Bryant, Jr., shall move the Circuit Court of ~outh­
ampton County, Virginia, at thP- Courthouse thereof, for a 
judg·ment and award of execution against you, and each of 
you, jointly and severally, for the sum of Fifty Thousand 
( $50,000,00) Dollars, which sum is due and owing by you, 
and each of you, jointly and SP.YP.rally, to me for the damages, 
'vrongs and injuries hereinaftP.r set forth, to-wit: 
pag·e 2 } That heretofore, to-wit, on or about the 26th day 
of 1\{ay, 1936, at the time and '(>lace of the commit-
ting of the grievances herein complained of, I was the owner 
and operator of a certain valuab]P. automobile and you, the 
said ,J. L. Camp, .Jr .• was the owner of a certain other auto-
mobile 'vhicl1 was, at the time of said grievances, operated 
by the said J. L. Camp, III, son of .J. L. Camp, Jr., and the 
latter's agent and servant. . 
That on or about the 26th day of May, 1936, I was driving 
my sa.id automobilP. in a careful and prudent mannP.r--?n my 
rig·ht-hand side of a certain road or highway leading\ from 
\' 
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Franklin, Virginia, to Sedley, Virginia, in the County or 
Southampton, and near the Town of Franklin, to-wit, about 
one-half milA from said town in a northerly direction ; ·that 
at said point on said highway 'vhere said bighway c-q.rves and 
descends at a point some distance beyond the beginning of 
the descent in said highway, the said automobile Q'vned by 
J. L. Camp, Jr., which wa~ at the t~me operated by his agent 
and servant, J .. L. Camp, III, was unla,vfully, illegally, care-
lessly, recklessly and negligently parked on my right-hand 
side of saip hig·hway and facing towarq Franklin, the direc-
tion in whicp I w~s &t the tirne travellh~g, CO!Jlpletely block-
ing the portion of the highway on wh~ch the law ~~d pru-
dence required that I should drive; that you failed to give 
me any warning whatever that your car was thus carelessly 
parked notwithstanq~ng your plain cl.q.iy to do so; that be-
cause of the said curve and descent in said highway :o 
page 3 ~ the said automobile of ,J~ !J. C~mth J r~, was visible 
by me for only a short distance in approa~hing 
same; thai immediately upon seein·g sai(J. a1~tqmobile tn-qs 
illegally parked I, in the sudden emergency confronting me, 
was obliged either to drive my automobile into the rear of 
your said automobile or drive to my left in the hope of avoid-
ing injuri~s to either your automobile, the occupa~ts of the 
same or to myself; that in said emergency I elected to drive 
and did drive my said automobile to my left side of the ro~<.l 
thereby avoiding striking and" injuring you or your said auto-
mobile; that at the time I ·began d:riving to the left ~s afore-
said, thr.re was approaching apd trayeUing in th~ opposite 
direction from m~ a certain autolllobile qriven by one Elijah 
.T oyner, which was then invisiple to me because of your care-
lessly parked automobile obstructil~g my vision and, at about 
the same time I :p1ade said left turn tq tl~e left side of the road 
the said Joyner'~ automobile also drove on the same sid~ of 
the road which was his rig·ht-hand side, thereby eompletely 
blocking the said highway, anq the s~id Joyner automobile 
was driven with great force and violence into, against, upon 
and ip front of my said auto~pbile ~~d thereby and there-
from a collision was caused and r~~ultr.d, by means of which 
said pre111ises my said aptomobile was violently pushed, 
rammed, wreck~d. broken, damaged ap.d rendered worthless 
ani{ I wa,g injnred both in person· anq property as heretofore 
and hereinafter set forth; all of which injuries, both personal 
apd propP.rty were the clirP.ct ~nd pro)):imate result 
page 4 ~ of the recklessness, carelessness, ~eglige~ce ~nd n-
. leg~l parlring qf yo~r said a~tpmo~ile ~s ~foresaid. 
I further stat~ that as the direct and proximStte result of 
yo~r said negligence I was, by means of t~e premises afore-
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said, thrown with great force, and violence against the sides, 
steering wheel, top, front and other parts of my said auto-
mobile thereby knocking, bruising·, cutting, breaking, injur-
.ing and damaging me most seriously, severely and · perma-
nently and as a direct and proximate result of the reckless-
ness, carelessness and neglig·ence of you, and each of you, 
jointly and severally, I became, on or about the day, month 
· and year aforesaid, greatly bruised, cut, hurt~ sick, wounded, 
sore, lame, and disordered and caused to suffer great pain 
and mental anguish and so remained and continued for a 
long space of time, to-wit, to the institution of this action 
and still so remain and was thereby perrnanently injured ancl 
will continue to suffer great pain and mental anguish and 
inconvenience, loss of time and money for the remainder of 
my life and continue to be forced to incur great expense in 
and about endeavoring to be healed and cured, and by means 
of the said premises I have been kept and hindered fro1n 
attending my business and will for the remainder of my life 
be kept and hindered from attending to my business and pre-
vented from making great profits which I would 
pag-e 5 ~ otherwise have made, and will suffer for the re-
mainder of my life great pain and mental anguish 
as a direct and .Proximate result of your said. negligence. 
· WHEREFORE, the said plaintiff sayeth that he is in-
jured and hath sustained damages to the amount of $50,-
000.00. 
J. FENTON BRYANT, JR., 
by his attorney. 
JUNIUS W. PULLEY, p. q. 
page 6 ~ And at another day, to-wit: In the Circuit Court 
of Southampton County, on the lOth day of July, 
1937. 
BILL OF PARTICULARS . 
• T. F. Bryant, Jr., 
v. 
James L. Camp, Jr., and James L. Camp, III, the last named 
being· an infant under the age of 21 years, by John C. Par-
ker, Jr., his guardian ad. lite1n. 
The plaintiff. for further particulars of his claims, in ad-
dition to those set forth in the. notice of motion, states the 
following: 
54 ·Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
The plaintiff expects to prove the following acts of negli-
g·ence on the part of the defendants which were the proxi-
mate causes of the injuries complained of: 
1. That the defendant, James L. Camp, III, while in con-
trol of the automobile o"rned by James L. Camp, Jr., with 
the permission of James L. Camp, Jr., and as his agent ·and 
employee, and when same was being operated on the public 
highway at anabefore the time of the injuries complained of, 
carP.lessly and negligently permitted David Forbes, an in-
fant, inexperienced in operating motor vehicles, to attempt 
to drive said automobilP. over and along said high-
page 7 ~ way, and instructed and permitted him to carelessly 
and negligently stop and park said automobile 
on said highway in such a manner as to impede or interfere 
with. or render dangP.rous, the use of the highway by others. · 
2. That said highway at and near the place where said au-
tomobile was stopped had recently been plowed up and was 
extrP.mely dry and dusty, and at said time there was a great 
deal of traffic on said highway at said point, which combina-
tion of circumstances greatly obstructed the visibility of the 
persons using said highway, all of \Vhich facts were well 
known to thP. defendants. 
3. That the· said car was nP.gligently stopped on the de-
cline of a hill and near a sharp curve in said highway. The 
said automobile was stopped and permitted to stand on the 
west side of said highway, which was the right-hand side of 
said plaintiff and was fully on the WP.ll travelled portion of 
said highway and directly in the lane of travel then being 
used by the plaintiff. 
4. That none of the occupants of the said automobilP. owned 
by Camp gave or attempted to give any signal or warning 
whatevP.r to thP. said plaintiff that the said automobile was 
thus stopped. That therP. was no excuse or reason whatever 
for stopping or parking of the said Camp automobile and 
that same was stopped in violation of law. That the stopping 
of said automobile on said hig·hway was the direct and proxi-
mate causP. of said plaintiff driving his car to his 
pag·e 8 ~ left and thereby running into or being run into by 
the car driven by one Joyner, who \Vas then proceed-
ing in the opposite direction from said Bryant. 
5. That the plaintiff further expects to prove that he has 
sustained injuriP.s and damages in thP.se particulars: 
(a) That his right leg was broken betwP.en the knee and 
hip; tl1at his ri~ht lrneecap was broken; that he was cut on 
the right side of his head; that his right ear was cut; that his 
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left shoulder was knocked or pulled out of place; that he was 
cut in thP. back; and that there were several bruises in other 
places on his body .. 
(b) That his right leg is permanently injured, being about 
two and one-half inchP.s shorter than the left leg and he is 
incapable of bending his right linee greater than a small frac-
tion of normal, and that on account of the leg injuries, he is 
now forced to use crutches and will continue to use them 
hencP.; and that cloudy and damp weather causes the plaintiff 
to suffer more intense pain from the injuries thus sustained. 
(c) That he has suffered great physical pain and mental 
ang·uish and will continue to thus suffer. 
(d) That hP. was confined in the hospital for a period of 
fourtP.en weeks and three days, at an expense on account of 
doctors and hospitalization of $1,162.45, nurses $672.00 and 
medicines $110.00. 
(e) That hP. has employed an extra man to look 
page 9 } after his business at an expense of $5.00 per day for , 
a period of four months, and that he has sustained 
loss of $2,400.00 on account.of not being able to attend to his 
business; 
(f) That Iris .automobile was damaged to the extent of 
$325.00. 
Respectfully s~bmi tted, 
JAMES G. J\IIARTIN, 
JUNIUS W. PULLEY, 
p. q. 
Tlagc 10 } And at another day, to-wit: In the Circuit Court 
of Southampton County, on the 13th day of July, 
1937. 
J. FP.nton Bryant, .Tr .• Plaintiff, 
v. 
~TamP.s L. Can1p, .Jr .• and James L. Camp, 3rd, the last named 
defendant being an infant under the age of 21 years, by 
.Tohn 0. Parker, Jr., his g-uardia11. ad litent, Defendants. 
GROUNDS OF DEFENSE. 
The defP.ndants J. L. Camp, Jr., and J. L. Camp, 3rd, for 
tbeir grounds of defense say: · · 
1. Specific denial is made of all acts of negligence attributed 
to the defendants and to David Forbes in the notice of mo-
tion and bill of particulars. 
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2. David ForbP.s, in driving the defendant's car and in 
stopping same, was not guilty of any negligence; that if he 
was guilty of any negligence in this respect, it was not the. 
proximate cause of the accident. 
3. That J. L. Camp, 3rd, in permitting David Forbes to 
drive the said car, was not gUilty of any neg-ligence; that if 
he was guilty of any negligence in this respect, it 
page 11 } was not the proximate cause- of the accident. 
4. That the defendant's car was not stopped 
neglig·ently· or unlawfully; on the contn,try, it wa~ stopped 
slowly and gradually, giving other cars on the road, including 
the plaintiff's, ample time to observe its movements and be 
guided accordin~dy; that it was stopped close to the right-
hand edge of the highway; that it was not stopped at any place 
which was improper or illegal; that it was not at rest an un-
reasonable or negligent length of time. 
5. That if the defendants or David Forbes were guilty of 
any neg·ligence whatever, such negligence preceded in time 
the actions of the plaintiff to such extent that such negligence 
was not the proximate cause of the accident. 
6. That such dust as was present at and around the place 
of the accident prior to the plaintiff's arrival there, was not 
so located or in sucl1 amount that it 'prevented the ·plaintiff 
and all others from seeing clearly the road and traffic thereon,. 
and such dust had no effect upon the defendant's duties; that 
if there was or had been any such amount of dust as claimed 
by the plaintiff, it would merely have increased the n1easure 
of reasonable care ·which the plaintiff should have taken for 
his own safety. 
7. That there is not sufficient grade on said road to obscure 
vision. 
8. That the curve alludP.d to in the notice of motion and 
bill' of particulars is south of the place where de-
page 12 } fendant's car was stopped; that defendant's car 
was not stopped on said curve ; that the location 
and existence of the curve was known to the plaintiff; that 
the plaintiff could, if he had been exercising prqper care, 
have seen past the defendant's car to said curve and guided 
his actions according to such traffic as was approaching from 
that ·direction. · 
9. That the plaintiff has not suffered damages to the ex-
tent claimed by him. 
10. That the plaintiff was guilty of .ne~·ligence which was 
either the sole proximate cause or a contributing cause of the 
accidAnt, namely, in the following particulars~ 
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11. The plaintiff was guilty of reckless driving under the 
law. 
12. He was driving at an excessive and negligent speed un-
der the law. ~ _ 
13. He did not have his car under proper control. 
14. He P.ither did not use his brakes when he should or his 
brakP.s were inadequately or improperly adjusted. 
15. He failed to drive his car upon the rig·ht half of the 
highway at a time when it was not impracticable to travel 
on such side of the highway and when he was not overtaking 
and passing another vehicle in the manner prescribed by law. 
16. That in attempting to pass the Joyner car he did not 
g-ive to the .Joyner car, as nearly as possible one-
page 13 ~ half of the main travelled portion of the roadway. 
17. HP. did not blow his horn before attempting 
to pass the defendant's car. 
1R He drovP. to the left side of the center line of the high-
way 'vhen said left side was not free of oncoming traffic for a 
sufficient distancP. as provided by law. 
19. That according to his own claim (which however is de-
nied by the defendants), he attempted to pass another ve-
hicle proceeding in the same direction on the crest of a grade 
and on a curve where his view along the hig·hway was ob-
structed. 
20. He followed the Camp car ahead of him more closely 
than was legal and careful. 
21. HP. did not maintain a proper' lookout for the road 
and traffic ahP.ad of him. 
22. He did not slow down or stop undP.r circumstances, 
which, according to his own claims, required him to do so. 
23. He failed to exercise the degree of care in operating 
his car that is r~quired of him by the law for his own safety 
and the safety of others traveling upon the highway. 
And in addition the defendants will avail themselves of anv 
defense permissible undP.r the general issue. ., 
July 8, 1937. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J. L. CAMP, JR., 
.J. I_~. CAMP, 3RD., 
By JOHN C. PARKER, JR., 
Attorney. 
page 14 } And at another day, to-wit: In the Circuit Court 
of Southampton County, on the 22nd day of July, 
1937. 
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MOTION FOR JUDGMENT. 
J. ·Fenton Bryant, J·r., 
v. 
James L. Camp, ,Jr., and James L. Camp, III, the last named 
defP.ndant being an infant under the age of 21 years, by 
,John C. Parker, Jr., his guardian ad litem. 
This day came the parties by their attorneys, and there-
upon came a jury, to-wit: E. E. Pittman, S. A. Wbitehead, 
Jr., C. B. Rock, Jr., P. 0. Duck, H. E. Newsom, C. A. Worrell 
and C. J. Boykins, who being duly elected, tried and sworn . 
the truth to speak upon the issue joined, and having- partly 
heard the evidence, the court is adjourned until Friday Morn-
ing, July 23rd, at 10 :00 o'clock. 
page 15 ~ And at another day, to-wit: In the Circuit ·Court 
of .Southampton County, on the 23rd day of July, 
1937. 
lviOTION FOR JUDGMENT. 
J. ,F'enton Bryant, Jr., 
v. 
James L. Camp, Jr., and James L. Camp, III the last named 
defendant bAing an infant under the age of 21 years, by 
John C. Parker. Jr., his guardian ad litem. 
This day came the parties, by their attorneys, and the jury 
adjourned over on Thursday, July 22nd, appeared in Court 
pursuant to their adjournment. And, having fully heard the 
evidP.nce and argllment of counsel, retired to their room to 
consider of their verdict, and, after some time the said jury 
returned into Court having found the following verdict, to-
wit: ''We the jury find for the plaintiff & fix his damages 
at $10,000. C .. A. Worrell, foreman. 
Thereupon, the defendants moved the Court to set aside 
the verdict of the jury and enter judgment in their favor, or, 
in the alternative award them a new trial upon the grounds: 
That there was no evidence that they were negligent; 
That the plaintiff was guilty of contributory 
page 16 ~ negligence as a matter of law; and for other errors 
assigned during the progress of the triaL 
And the motions are continnP.d. 
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page 17 ~ And at another day, to-wit: In the Circuit ~Court 
of Southampton County, on the 15th day of No-
vember, 1937. · 
ON NOTICE OF MOTION FOR JUDGMENT . 
• T. F. Bryant, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Ja1nes L. Camp, Jr. and James L. Camp, III, defendants, 
(the last named defendant being an infant and John C. 
Parker, Jr., his guardian ad litem). 
This day came again the parties by their attorneys, the 
infant defendant by his duly appointed g-uardian ad litem, and 
the motions of the defendants to set aside the verdict, and 
render final judgment for the defendants, were argued, and 
for reasons set out in writing and filed in the papers, over-
ruled by thP. court, to which action and ruling of the court 
the defendants duly excepted. It is therefore considered and· 
adjudged by the court that the plaintiff, J. F. Bryant, re-
cover of thP. defendants, James L. Camp, Jr. and James L. 
Camp, liT, ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), pursuant to 
said verdict. with interest thereon from the 23rd day of July, 
19H7, at the rate of six per centum per annum until paid, and_ 
his costs in this behalf expended. 
The defendants desiring· to petition for a writ 
pag·e 18 } of error and BU?Jersedeas the court further orders 
that the execution hereof shall be suspended for 
ninety days from this date upon the giving of a proper sus-
pending bond with surety, in the penalty of eleven thousand 
dollars ( $11,000.00). 
pag·e 19} 
lVIr .• Tohn C. Parker, Jr. 
Franklin, V a. 
~fr. James G. Martin 
Norfolk, Va. 
J\fr. Junius W. Pulley 
Courtland, Va. 
Re: J. F. Bryant, Jr. v. J. L. Camp. 
Gentlemen: 
November 10, 1937. 
I nP.P.d hardly say to you that the motion in this case has 
given mP. no small concern. There are numerous questions 
raised by counsel for the defendant company that are ex-
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tremely difficult to resolve in favor of the jury's verdict, but 
in this letter I refrain from specifying the weakness of the 
plaintiff's evidence when weighed in the light of the well 
settled legal principles obtained in this class of cases. 
I have decided to overrule the motion to set the verdict 
aside, but fra:rikness compels me to say that I am taking thi~ 
course in part because it seems to me the most practical and 
speedy method of getting a final judicial determination of the 
rights of the parties. If I were to set the verdict aside I 
would have to meet the same objections on the sec-
page 20 ~ ond trial that are before me at this time, ~nd if I 
should change my views about the admission of 
testimony or on any other matter in connection with the trial, 
and a different verdict were rendered the Court of Appeals 
(where it will unquestionably go in any event) would look 
to the first trial for errors before considering the second 
trial, and would enter judgment in that court according to 
what they considered the right of the case. With these views 
.I see nu reason for a new trial in the matter, and am there-
fore prepared to enter judgment on the verdict of the jury. 
¥Y difficulties in this case are ·largely because of my in-
ability to see any negligence on the part ·of Camp as the proxi-
mate cause of the injury. If the dust was the cause of the 
trouble, as is contended, I still have difficulty in blaming the 
dust on the Camp car. · 
Yours very sincerely, 
JAMES L .. :M~cLEMORE. 
JLM: S. 
page 21 ~ And at another day, to-wit: In the Circuit Court 
of Southampton County, on the 30th day of De-
cember, 1937 .. 
: .T. ·F. Bryant, Jr., 
'11. 
ORDER. 
J as. L. Camp, and ,Tames L. Camp, III, an infant, by J ol1n 
C. Parker, Jr., his guardian ad litem. 
This day came J. G. Bryant, Administrator of the estate of 
.T. F. Bryant, Jr., deceased, and moved the court that this 
cause proceed in the name and on behalf of the said J. G. 
Bryant, administrator of the estate of J. F. Bryant, Jr .• dec'd. 
James L. Camp, Jr., et als., v. J. G. Bryant, Adm'r. 61 
And it appearing to the court that since the date of the 
judgnH~nt entered in this cause on the 15th day of November, 
1937, the said J. F. Bryant, Jr., has departed this life and 
thP. said .T. G. Bryant has duly qualified as his administra-
tor. 
It is therefore ordered on motion of the said J. G. Bryant, 
administrator of the estate of J. lt..,. Bryant, Jr., dec'd., after 
due and legal notice of said motion to the said defendants that 
this cause be revived in the name of the said administrator as 
plaintiff and that the same proceed by and on be-
page 22 } half of the said administrator, said defendants ap-
.l?earing this day by counsel and the guardian ad 
litem being present. 
RIDCORD. 
page 23 ~ ·Stenographic -report of all the testimony, to-
gether with all the motions, objections, and excep-
tions on the part of the respective parties, the action of the 
court in respect thereto, all the instructions offered, amended, 
granted, and refused, and the objections and exceptions there-
to, and all other h)cidents of the trial of the case of J. F. 
Bryant, Jr., Plaintiff v. ,Jas. L. Camp, Jr., and Jas. L. Camp, 
III, etc., Defendants, tried in the Circuit Court of Southamp-
ton County, Virginia, July·22-23, 1937, before Ron. J. I.~. Mc-
Lemore, Judge of said Court, and a jury, at Courtland, Vir-
ginia. 
Present: Messrs. James G. Martin and Junius W. Pulley, 
Attorneys for the plaintiff. 
Mr .• Tno. C. Parker, Jr., Attorney for the Defendants. 
page 24} Courtland, Virginia, July 22, 1937. 
Before the jury was empaneled, the following proceedings 
were had: 
Mr. Parker: Your Honor, I have a motion based on ihe 
bill of particulars, on the admissibility of evidence, which has 
already been broug-ht up by a deposition taken by Mr. Pulley 
before the trial and which is positively coming up during the 
trial. · 
Mr.l\1artin: We think it would come up in ordinary course, 
your Honor, during· the trial. 
(The 1Court and Counsel retired to Chambers to take up 
the motion.) 
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l\ir. Parker: Your Honor, I submit that the nature of 
the question "is that David Forbes, who was driving this car, 
was thirteen days under the a.ge of sixteen years and did not 
have a driver's license. That has already been asked on the 
dP-position. I consider it immaterial and irrelevant, under 
the circumstances. I would like to make a motion that such 
evidence be excluded and would like to make it now for the rea-
son that it will be impossible for the nature of that testimony 
or the question to be kept from the jury unless it is under-
stood by counsel that such evidence is excluded, and 'vould 
like, without taking up too much of your time, to 
page 25 }- briefly argue it, if you would be inclined to hear 
from me. 
J\:fr. J.\llartin: We think a question like that ought to be 
raised as and if it comes into the case. "'\Ve think it is rele. 
vant to show that the boy was not sixteen years of age. 
The Court: Was the car being operated, or running, at 
the timeY 
J\1r. Parker: I think counsel for plaintiff understands that 
at the time this took place the car was standing still. 
l\fr. J.\IIartin: I understand, your Honor, that the car was 
standing still; that this youngster was lea~ning how to drive; 
that he stopped the car to leave the 'vheel, in order that the 
gro,vn people at the ·Camp house could not discover that he 
was driving; and hP. had just stopped thP. car for the purpose 
of getting out from under the wheel and letting another driver 
take charg-e so that a competent driver would take charge; 
and he had parked the car improperly on the hard surface, or 
where the hard surface should be. 
J\fr. Pulley: And 've will prove that he was just driving· 
the car for the purpose of learning at that time. 
J.\IIr. Martin: A;nd was purposely keeping it secret from 
the owners of the car that he was driving it. 
The Court: I do not think the fact that he 'vas 
page 26 ~ keeping it secret plays any part in it at all. The 
only question that I can see that has any bearing 
on the case is that, if he stopped the car on the road in order 
to get an P.XperiP.nced driver behind the wheel and it was 
during that time, that is, during the time of the exchange, that 
the accident happened, that may play some part in the case 
and probably would be a proper matter to go to the jury. 
J\1r. Martin: That is exactly when it did happen, I am in-
formed. 
ThP. Court: It seems to me that would not be quite proper 
to keep that from the jury, if that is a fact. 
1\fr. Parker: If your Honor please, may I make one more 
statement before you make your final ruling: That is a con-
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dition and not a cause. That is no more admissible than if 
they had stopped to pick a flower, or something had fallen 
out of the car and they had stopped for that purpose, under 
which case nothing would be pertinent concerning whether 
or not the driver of the car was of age, or had a license; the 
same thing· would apply, no matter \Vhether it was a grown 
man or who, so far as the stopping was concerned, and the 
cas.es so hold. It is a condition and not a cause, and is there-
fore inadmissible. .And if it con1es in and if your Honor in-
structs the jury that they are not to ~pnsider that point., it 
will, nevertheless, be befort!-~:the jury and be in-
page 27 } jurious to the defendants' case. .And for the ad-
ditional rP.ason that the cases hold that, so far as 
having :a license, or being of age, is concerned, that they are 
conditions and not causes, where cars are stopped on the 
road. The ·test of neg·ligence in this case is just the same 
whether the driver was a child and had no license, or whether 
he was a grown person, because the test of negligence is the 
manner of stopping and the nature of driving the car before 
the stopping, and not the license or the age of the driver. 
Mr. J\fartin: The purpose of the stopping, may it please 
the Court, is because of the man's inex,perience, to put an-
other driver behind the wheel. Of course, if he had stopped 
in a safe place and there had been no negligence, the fact that 
l1e did not ha.ve a license would then be immaterial, but he 
stopped on the road because he did not know any better, be-
cause he was inexperienced, and because he was not a com-
petent driver, to swap and let somebody else take charge, 
on a dusty highway. We had very much the same case be-
fore Judge White, in Portsmouth, in principle, just a little 
different in fact. A young lady was taking driving lessons 
from her father. She came to an intersection, driving her 
father, and shP. said to her father, "What shall I do?" He 
said. ''Go ahead.'' She went ahead and collided with the 
-car in which my client was and hurt l1er quite badly. We 
proved in that case that she was taking lessons, 
page 28 ~ that she was not licensed, and that she was talring 
instructions from her father. That is directed to 
the same principle, though not the same in fact as the case 
at bar. 
The Court: I understand the law to be that, whether a 
person has a license or not, or whether they are expert drivers 
or not, does not determine the question of negligence. That 
is a question of what happened at that time, whether the thing 
they actually did was negligent or not. 
1\fr. Martin: I think that is undoubtedly so, your Honor. 
The Court: It did not make any difference whether that 
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boy behind the wheel had a license, or whether he was a boy 
or not. If he did a neg·ligent act, he is liable; if he did not 
do a negligent act, it doesn't make any difference about the 
other acts at all. 
Mr. Martin: But, as tending to prove negligence, your 
Honor, suppose he was behind the wheel and had never been 
there before; that would be a circumstance tending to show 
his negligence in stopping at that place and time in that dust. 
The Court : Of course, the other boy was there. I sup-. 
pose it would be almost imputable negligence to young Ja1nes 
Camp, if he-let the boy stop or do something· that. 
page 29 ~ he ought not to have done, because the boy, I un-
derstand. was his guest and young friend, and 
whatever the boy did young James was in a way responsible 
for, I should say. Don't you think so 1 
~Ir. Parker: I agree with you thoroughly, but that is not 
the same thing· as considering the evidence of whether or not 
he was under age or licensed. 
The Court: I don't see, really, what it has got to do with 
it-whether. he was under age or licensed. The question is, 
what did he doY 
Mr. Pulley: Inexperience, your Honor, is what we want to 
prove-
The Court : I don't care if he had the experience of the 
best driver in the world, if he stopped the car where he had 
no business stopping it and the accident happened, he is just 
as liable as if he had no experience. 
~Ir. ::1\{artin: But the purpose of the stopping of the car, 
we submit, is material. Let us say, if the engine went dead 
so they could not move it, they would have had to stop tern~ 
porarily. That would have been a perfectly legitimate rea-
son. But to stop on thP. road because you have got a man 
who ought not to be driving, who, because of his inexperience1 
you don't want anybody to know he is driving, who 
page 30 ~ has got no license, that is inexcusable. The pur-
pose of the stop is quite important, we maintain .. 
The Court: ThP. thing that I do not quite follow you on 
is why it is any more important that the boy was behind the 
wheel than it is if young Camp was behind the wheel. 
Mr. Martin: There would have been no stop if young Camp 
had ber-m behind thP. wheel. The only occasion for the stop 
wa.s the illegal conduct of the car in having an inexperienced 
man at the wheel whom they wanted to get out secretly and 
that is the rP.ason they stoppP.d, and there was no legitimate 
rP.ason at all to stop. 
The Court: It looks like you are getting on grounds that 
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you will probably force me to set a verdict aside if you get 
one. 
l\1r. Martin: WP. think we should tak~ that risk if there 
be one. We think we are right,. and if there is any risk about 
it, we are willing to take that rislr. There was no reason 
at all to stop except an illegal reason. 
ThP. Court: It seP.ms to me that a direct question on the 
theory that there was negligence in having -this boy there 
driving this car and stopping and shifting, and that that en-
titled the plaintiff to recover, is not good grounds. 
Mr. Martin: If that were all, your Honor, it 
page 31 ~ mig·ht not be, but as part of the case, to .show that 
there was an inexcusable stop, it is important. 
They inexc·usably stopped on the road where they should not 
have stopped, because th~y had an illegal driver, and im-
mediately after that stop the accident occurred. Otherwise, 
there would not have been any stop at all. 
The Court : Why don't you get exactly the same thing if 
you prove that they did actually stop and exchange drivers 
there? 
Mr. Martin: That might have been a perfectly good reason 
to stop. 
Mr. Pulley: Unexplained it would be. If you did not per-
mit us to explain why he stopped, then the excuse of his. stop-
ping would, prima facie, be a good excuse. He would be pr~­
sumed to be obeying the law~ .but when he stopped for this 
trivial matter, then it is that he becomes negligent in stopping 
at that point when it was not necessary for him to stop at 
that time. 
Mr. Martin: We think it is quite important, your Honor, 
because a legal, proper stop for a necessary reason is quite 
different from an illegal, useless stop made for no reason. To 
take an extreme case, your Hono.r, suppose a driver 
page 32 ~ of a car, inexperienced and u111icensed, had stopped 
his car and backed it up the road, and as it backed, 
surprising us, it struck us, we would have a right to think 
that he was a. youngster playing with the car and backing it; 
but, if instead of backing it while playing with the car, there 
had been a wild bull running in front of him and he had 
stopped it to avoid striking the bull in front, he might be ex-
cusable. And we want to prove that this was a totally illegal, 
unjustifiable stop, and not a stop to exchange drivers because:' 
the driver was tired or sick. 
The Court: All right, we will get to it. 
Mr. Parker : Does your Honor make a ruling now? 
The Court: I am inclined to think that probably they can 
prove it. Unless I have some authority on the point, I. shall 
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have to rule that they can sho'v why the car stopped there. 
Mr. Parker: Exception noted. Do you gentlemen want me 
to take exceptions as this matter comes up, or do you want 
me to make exception to the e;ntire testimony? 
~Ir. Martin: I think if. you just call our attention to it. 
Mr. Parker: Exception noted for the reasons previously 
assigned. 
page 33 ~ Thereupon the Court and counsel returned to the 
court room, the jury was empaneled and sworn on 
the issue, and opening statements 'vere made by counsel. Dur-
ing the opening statement of 1\IIr. Pulley, of counsel for the 
plaintiff, the following statements were made, to which ex-
cept~ons were noted by counsel for the defend~nts : 
Mr. Pulley: * * *We will prove to you that just preceding 
him was an automobile which was owned by Mr. J. L. Camp, 
Jr., and occupied at the time and in the care of his .. son, J. L. 
Camp, III, a young boy some sixteen or seventeen years of 
age. That they had been to the Country Club themselves; 
they were returning home. James L. Camp, III (''Jimmy,'' 
I will call him, he being a young boy, to distinguish him more 
easily from his father), had driven the• car out. to the Country 
Club and there they had gone swimming for some time and, 
after they had finished with that and dressed, they got into 
the car and the automobile was driven back to the point of 
the accident, in the san1e direction, mind you, that l\IIr. Bryant!' 
himself, was going, and preceding him, although unknown to 
Mr. Bryant. The Ca1np car 'vas driven by 1\fr. David Forbes, 
a young boy about :fifteen or something over fifteen years of 
age, but not yet arrived at the age of sixteen. We 
page 34 ~ will show you that Mr. David Forbes was not 
familiar with driving automobiles; that he was 
then learning ho'v to drive. He was, of course, sitting on 
the front seat and by him was another boy. In the back seat 
was a young lady, 1\IIiss 1\IIarian Lawrence, and by her side in 
the back seat was Jimmy Camp. 
They got on the portion of the road about the point where 
the accident happened, there about a couple of hundred yards 
from the Southern R.aihvay intersection. That portion of the 
road had been a tar surface and it had been recently plowed 
up or, as the 'vitnesses will tell you, had been scarified. That 
the weather was extremely dry and that the road was ex-
tremely dusty on account of its having been recently plowed. 
That in order for them to change drivers, fearful that this 
boy, David Forbes, who w.~s driving ~as not sufficiently ac-
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quainted with how to drive to operate the car on another road 
which they were going to intersect-the cement road which 
goes on into Franklin-and also to prevent the parents at 
home· from seeing that Jimmy had entrusted the car to the 
driving of this boy, the car was parked on the road, stopped 
on the highway direclly in the lane of travel of Mr. Bryant, 
who, as I say, was following. They parked there for some 
two or three minutes, or stopped a minute or so at least 
before the accident, and 1\!Ir. Bryant came on down the road 
oblivious of the fact that this car was parked there in front 
of him. •. • :If: 
We claim, Gentlemen, that the cause of this acci-
page 35 t dent, the sole proximate cause of it, was the illegal 
· parking or stopping of the Camp car on the well-
traveled portion of that highway in the lal}.e of travel which 
}fr. Bryant had a right to assume was being used only for 
legal purposes, that is, for the purpose of moving along, and 
not for the purpose of stopping to change drivers, as was 
done in this case. 
Now, Gentlemen, l\.fr. Bryant and neither of his COl:lnsel has 
~ny desire to have you feel that they have any animosity to-
wards these defendants. They were parked there-
r. Parker: If your Honor please, I wish at this point to 
make .objection to the statement of counsel concerning the 
fact of animosity or the absence of animosity, as being directed 
to the prejudice of the jury and as having nothing to do with 
the facts of the accident. . 
T];le Court: I think counsel ought to confine himself to what 
he expects to prove in the case and leave those questions out. 
(~Ix. Pulley then resumed and co~clu~ed hi~ statement.) 
(Out of the hearing of the jury.) 
Mr. Parker: If your Honor please, I wish to make excep-
tion to the following remarks made b.Y Mr. Pulley in his open-
ing statement: Concerning the desue to keep the fact that 
David Forbes 1vas driving secret from his parents; concern-
ing the fact tha.t he was under the age of sixteen ; 
page 36 t concerning the purpose of the stop, the same being 
for the exchange of drivers; concerning the lack of 
animosity between the plaintiff in tllis case and the defend-
ants. I understand that your Honor has ruled against me on 
the question of the purpose of stopping, which was for the 
pu~pose of exchanging dri"\?'ers, but did not rn1e fot· me or 
agaipst me on the fact that it was for the purpose of keeping 
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it secret from the parents, and it being impossible to remove 
the effect of these statements from the jury, I move that a 
mistrial be granted, and including the grounds for the par-
ticular motion, on the ground that the•statement that there 
was no animosity whatever between these parties can have 
only one effect or interpretation an the part of the jury, and 
that is that this is not a personal case between the1n but is 
a case in which the lack of animosity shows that there is some 
other party involved, namely, ah insurance company, and I 
make a JD.Otion for a mistrial on the basis of what ~Ir. Pulley 
as stated to the jury in his opening statement. 
Mr. Martin: ~lay it please the Court, .this statement as to 
~~im9sity, as I understand it, was not directed to pretend that 
there was insurance, as, I suppose,- is ~{r. Parker's idea,. 
but was to show that it 'vas simple negligenee, rather than 
any malicious, bad act by the young people. This is a simple 
negligence case, which shows no reason for any an1mosity on 
either side, but merely to get compensation for 
page 37 ~ the injury actually suffered. There is nothing, I 
· submit, in what counsel said to indicate any insur-
ance, and your Honor can tell the jury to disregard it. 
Mr. Pulley: Why is it necessary th~t people in law suits 
should have any feeling toward each other! 
The Court: V\Thy say anything about it? Why in the world 
should you go out and make a statement of that kind Y Yon 
apparently attempt to prejudice the jury by showing about 
keeping a concealment from the father about the age of this 
boy. You may not be able to prove that, and, if you do not, 
you have made a statement to the jury that is prejudicial. If 
yon prove it, all right; if you do not prove it, I don't know 
what effect it will have upon your verdict. I am going to over-
rule that motion now.· 
Mr. Parker: I save the point. 
page 38 ~ DR. W. T. GAY, 
a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, being duly 
sworn, was examined and testified as follows~ 
Examined by Mr. Pulley: 
Q. Doctor, what are your initials? 
A. W. T. 
Q. You live in Suffolk 1 
A. I do. 
Q. And are you connected with the staff of doctors of a 
hospitalf · 
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Dr. W. T. Gay. 
A. That is right. 
Q. The name of the hospital, please, sir.· 
A. Lakeview Hospital. 
Q. How long have you been there, Doctor? 
A. I went there twenty years ago, absent one year in the 
meantime. I have been in the hospital a total of nineteen. 
years. 
Q. While you 'vere in this hospital, in the performance 
of your duties, did you see Mr. Fenton Bryant, the day of the 
26th of May, 1936 7 · 
A. I did. 
Q. About what time of day, if you recall, Doctor? 
A. It was somewhere around about 7 :30, I think, approxi-
mately. 
Q. Will you explain to the jury, please, sir, what condition 
he was in at that time? 
A. When he came in he was in a right profound 
page 39 ~ sta.te of ·shock. He had a badly broken right thigh, 
just above the knee. It was a compound fracture, 
which means the bone had penetrated the flesh. His right ear 
'vas severed through and through down into the canal, a very 
ragged, irregular cut. I-Ie had some minor cuts on the 1ight 
side of his head and a small one on the right leg. 
Q. Were there any bruises Y 
A. There was probably a little bruise around the cuts on 
his head. At that time, in the emergency, he was not examined 
minutely for every little scratch and bruise. 
Q. Yon administered to him first aid, is that correct 7 · 
A. I did. 
Q. Did you take any X-ray pictures of hin1, sir¥ 
A. An X-ray of the leg. 
Q. Yon have those pictures in court 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And Dr. Rawls is here, also. I~ he familiar with those 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was 1\fr. Bryant conscious at t.hat time? 
A. He was conscious. Of course, he was dazed some. 
Q. Did you see any blood on his person? 
A. Yes, there was some blood on him. 
Q. How about his leg? Did that show any blood there? 
A. Some blood there, not so much. 
Q. Was he or not then suffering with pain, and, 
page 40 r if so, what degree of pain' 
A. He was having very severe pain. 
Q. Did you give anything to_ relieve him from his pain? 
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A. I don't recall just what was given him when he first came 
in. 
Q. How long did he stay there in your hospital, Doctor Y 
A. I don't have that date. 
Q. Did you see him off and on after that Y 
A. I saw him frequently, but did not prescribe for hin1 or 
examine him after the first day. 
Q. Who looked after him specifically after that Y 
A. Dr. J. E. R-awls. 
Q. And he was not your patient from that time on Y 
A. No, sir. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
B.y Mr. Parker: 
Q. Did you have anything to do ·with when Mr. Bryant left 
the hospital Y 
A. No. 
Q. Tha.t was all Dr. J. E. Rawls' decision Y 
A. That is right. 
page 41 ~ Q. Do you knqw anything about a report being 
made by you that he was ready to go back to work, 
or was able to go back to 'vork Y 
A. No. 
Q. Did you make any such report Y 
A. I did not. 
Q. That would have . been Dr. Ra'vls' duty, if any such 
report had been made, wouldn't it Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
DR. J. E. RAWLS, 
a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, being duly sworn, was 
examined and testified as follows: 
Examined by Mr. 1\fartin: 
Q. Dr. Rawls, state, please, your whole name, age, and pro-
fession Y 
A. J apeth Edward Rawls; Suffolk, Virginia; profession, 
physician. · 
Q. And how old are you and how long have you been prac-
ticing medicine? 
A. Sixty-two years; been practicing thirty-seven years and 
seven months. 
Q. Are you c01mected with the hospital in Suffolk Y 
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Dr. J. E. Ra'Wls. 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 42 } Q.. When did yon see :first the plaintiff ~ this 
case, Mr. Bryant, in your hospitalY 
A. On the 27th. , 
Q. That was the day after the accidentY 
A. After the accident. 
Q. Now, tell the jury the condition you found him in and all 
about him when you took charge. 
A. He was, of course, in the bed at the hospital and his 
wounds had been treated by Dr. Gay, they had bandages on 
them, and the fractured limb had been bandaged and also 
had an extension to bring the limb in as normal position as 
was possible. He was, of course, still somewhat shocked and 
knocked out generally from the accident. 
Q. Did you have X-ray plates of him! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Will you pr·oduce tl1em, please, sir! 
A. Do you want the jury to ·see it? 
Q. Yes, 'Sir, shown to the jury where the breaks were, please. 
A. (Exhibiting X-rays to the jury:} The injury was to 
the lo-wer third, or perhaps the lower half, of the right thigh 
bone. 
Q. That is a hove the knee, then? 
A. Above the knee. And this fracture was what we call 
a comminuted, or a shattered, fracture and also a compound 
fracture, beca1u;e it communicated with the outside 
page 43 } world through the skin. 
Q. The bone had come through the outside skin? 
A. Yes. And there is also a fracture of the kneecap on 
the right side. That does not show in tl1is, but we learned 
that a little bit later. We did not get that in the picture. And 
so, this mutilation there of the bone and the injuries that he 
had otherwise, of course, knocked him out physically very 
much and he was very uncomfortable at this time. That was 
on the day that I saw him. 
Q. I guess that is all for the moment. We will introduce 
this X-ray in evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1. Is this 
another one 7 
A. This is another, of the knee. It shows no il)jury in the 
knee-no bone injury-it doesn't show the kneecap because 
the bone here was so dense it did not show. 
Q. That one, then, does not show the kneecap itself? 
A. Does not show the kneecap itself. 
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(The last mentioned X-ray plate 'vas :filed in evidence,. 
marked "Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2".) 
Q. Was the kneecape, itself, broken Y 
A. ·Broken, yes, sir. Of course, this does not show any in-
juries to the soft parts of the knee. The ligaments or muscles 
could, have been torn, or torn in t'vo, or partially, but that 
would not show in an X-ray picture. 
page 44 ~ Q. An X-ray docs not show the soft parts Y 
· A. No, sir, an X-ray does not show the soft 
parts. 
Q. Doctor, with the thigh bone broken and the kneecap 
broken, what did you do to try to help the man f · 
A. We kept the limb in as normal position as we could by 
traction and gave him remedies to make him as comfortable as 
possible and treated his general constitutional condition. That 
was about the extent of it. 
Q. What do you mean by ''traction''? 
A. That is to pull the limb below the fracture so as to bring 
the bones in opposition, or as near in opposition as we could. 
We .first tried what we call traction by adhesive straps, and 
we did not get the extension. that we wished, so then we put 
on wliat we called the skeletal traction, that is, passing a 
metal needle through the bone just below the fracture and 
then making traction on the bone itself, and in that way we 
increased the link. • 
· Q. When you say ''traction'', does that mean pullingt 
A. Pulling, yes, sir. 
Q. And would you pull it with a pulley and weightY 
A. A pulley and weight, yes, sir. 
Q. Wlui.t sort of pulley did you rig up-a heavy weight Of 
A. I don't recall the weights, but it seems to me, as well 
as I remember, ·we put probably ten or fifteen 
page 45 r pounds on there. 
Q. At the end of a rope going through a pulleyY 
A. Yes, through a pulley. 
Q. And where would the pulley be attached to get your 
results? 
A. Well, it "rould be attached in a wheel over beyond the 
foot of the bed, so that the weight could drop below the bed. 
Q. And that would be tied to the metal that went through 
the bone just above the knee? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And how long did he lie there with the pulley pulling 
on the metal arrangement you have just described Y 
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A. I think, as well as I recall, along about July, probably 
the :first or second week in July. He had the extension on 
around six weeks. 
Q. With that extension and lying in that way, is that com-
fortable or uncomfortable to a patient 7 
A. Uncomfortable. 
Q. What about the pain that he suffered? 
A. He suffered a good deal of pain and uncomfortable-
ness from position. 
Q. He came in the day of the accident, and have you your 
records as to the exact date he left the hospital Y 
page 46 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Will you produce that, please, sir, and get the 
exact dayt 
A. August 28. 
Q. 1936? 
A. 1936. 
Q. After he left the hospital on August 28, 1936, where 
did he go and in what condition was he? 
A. Well, he left the hospital on crutches and he would re-
turn to the hospital periodically and we would see just how 
he was progressing, give him any advice relative to using the 
limb and also as to his physical condition, to keep that up. 
Q. You stated that the traction, I believe, was a.pplied to 
try to keep from shortening the leg? 
A. Yes, to overcome muscular contraction. You see, there 
is a certain amount of muscular contraction in the thigh, and 
this overcomes that muscular contraction. 
Q. What success did you haye' Did you keep it a normal 
length,-or not? 
A. I would say moderate success. . 
Q. What about the final result as of today, as to how much 
shortening of the leg? 
A. There is around two and a half inches of shortening. 
Q. What did you prescribe for him to help him to walk? 
· A. We prescribed a shoe with a sole extension-
page 47 ~ a sole-extension shoe. 
Q. Will you show to the jury on the gentleman, 
please, the situation. I will get him to either stand or sit, 
whichever you prefer. 
A. I suppose he can stand here. 
(The plaintiff came before the jury.) 
Q. It is the right leg, isn't it? 
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A. The right leg. I put a sole extension on there, on the 
bottom. 
Q. That extension sole on the bottom is to . try to make 
the leg the same length as the other legY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How about the bending of the knee at present Y 
A. Well, there is still some stiffening of the joint-still 
some stiffening. 
Q. Would it not be better for him to take off ·one of his 
trousers legs and let you show where· the break was, or not Y 
A. I don't know. I don't know that you can see any more. 
You can feel it.-
Q. You can feel the place now? 
A. Yes. 
page 48 ~ Q. Is that a temporary shortening or a perma-
nent shortening? 
A. A permanent shortening. 
Q. It will last him the rest of his life Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. As to the future of it, is there anything you ·can do to 
make it any better than it is now Y 
A. The natural use of the limb, I would say, he would get 
more from that than anything else. There is a possibility 
of massaging the limb helping it; just how much I don't know. 
One thing, it would not do any harm. That probably would 
improve it, do some good. So far as any operative work on 
there, I don't think it would help it-probably make it less. 
Q. You would not advise any operation Y 
A. I would not advise any operation. ' 
Q. The massage might make it bend a little better- at t.he 
knee, or not T 
A. Bend a little better and make the muscles a little more 
active. 
Q. Reasonably and probably, will he or not have to use 
either crutches or a cane the balance of his lifeY 
A. Well, the chances are-in fact, we know, or feel, that 
he will have to use a cane but we hope to probably discard 
one or both crutches, and that is questionable. 
page 49 ~ Q. How about that shoe Y Will he have to wear 
something like that the rest of his life Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Doctor, do yon recall the hospital and doctors' bills! 
A. No, I do n'ot. 
Q. Have you the data with youY 
A. No, I haven't got that. 
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Q .. The bills are put together in the hosp1tal, are they not! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Can you or not l'ecollect whether the hospital and doc-
tors' bill are $1,162 aud some cents f 
A. I could not recall. 
Q. The nurses' bills were separate from the doctors' and 
hospital bills 7 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did he have trained nurses attending him for a long 
while there! 
.A. Yes, sir. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Parker: 
· Q. Doctor, when 'vas he discharged 7 I believe it was the 
28th of August? 
page 50 } A. Yes. . 
Q. Was he then able to walk around on his 
crutchesf 
A. He was able to walk around on his crutches, yes, sir. 
Q. Could he have gotten from his house to his place of busi-
ness and back 7 
A. On c.rutches f 
Q. Yes. 
A. I don't know. He walked up and down the hall. 
Q. I don't mean, could he have walked. I mean, with his 
crutches, at the time he was discharged, could he have gone 
to his work in an automobile, getting in and out on his· 
crutches?· 
A. Probably so, but it would have been risky .. 
Q. Well, how soon after that was it not riskyY 
A. I would think probably a month or so, he would have 
been able to have been carried to his place. 
J. F. BRYANT, JR., 
the plaintiff, being duly sworn, was examined and testified as 
follows: 
Examined by Mr. Pulley: 
Q. Mr. Bryant, were you sworn with the other witnesses Y 
A. No, sir. He has just sworn me. 
Q. Your name is J. F. Bryant, Jr.Y 
page 51 ~ · A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you live in the town of Franklin 7 
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A. .About a half a mile from the western end of the town, 
the corporate limits, yes. · 
Q. How near do you live up the road to the intersection 
of· the Southern Railway Company with the road that leads 
out to Sedley, the public road to SedleyT 
A. Well, I don't know that I have e-ver considered that dis-
tance, Mr. Pulley, but I 'vould imagine maybe three or four 
hundred yards, down the hill and around. 
Q. You were on this road to Sedley the afternoon of May 
·26, 1936. What was your pusiness out there, Mr. Bryantf 
A. I went out to the home of a man whose name is Holcomb 
in regard to having him send me some stove wood for the 
kitchen. 
Q. What time did you leave your home to go there Y 
A. I did not leave my home; I went from my cotton gin .. 
Q. Whleh is downtown in Franklin? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. .About what timeT 
. ·A. I would imagine about half past five. That is purely 
an estimate of the time. 
Q. What time did you have supper at that season of the 
. year? At what time were you going to have sup-
page 52 ~ perf · 
.A. Supposedly 6 :30. 
Q. And did you proceed from downtown directly to Mr. 
Holcomb "s? · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And how long did you take to attend to your business 
with him, sir f 
A. Well, I did not take any longer than I could see him 
and tell him what my desire was. 
Q. And you saw him as soon as you got there f 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you then come on back directly to your home f 
A. No, sir; I stopped at the Country Club. 
Q. Was that on your road coming backf 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. And. about how far from Mr. Holcomb'sY 
A. I guess it is probably a quarter, or maybe a little more 
than a quarter of a mile. . 
Q. And how long did you stay at the Country Club? 
A. I would say I stayed there possibly fifteen minutes, not 
over fifteen minutes, but I did not time myself. 
Q. Were you in a.ny hurry to get home~ 
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A. No. I ~as just leisurely sauntering along to make the 
connection at 6 :30, or thereabouts. 
Q. Did you have any other piece of work to attend to be-
fore supper7 
page 53 ~ A. No, sir. 
Q. And you stayed there~ you say, about fifteen 
minutes? 
A. I would say about fifteen minutes. 
Q. Did you have any one with you, Mr. Bryant' 
A. No, sir, I 'vas alone. 
Q. When you came on back, how fast did you drive? 
A. Well, I did not look at my speedometer, sir-I never do 
except very rarely-I would say that I was driving thirty· or 
thirty-five miles an hour, a leisurely gait. However, I would 
not certify to thirty or twenty-five or thirty-five, but I imagine 
about thirty or thirty-five miles an hour. 
Q. What was the condition of the road at the scene· of the 
accident? What kind of road was it? 
A. Well, it ·was an oil surf aced road that had been sub-
jected to break-ups, and so on and so forth, incident to the 
freezes of the. prior months, which you recall that was a very 
cold winter, and for that reason the road, I imagine, had been 
·scraped preparatory to re-treating it and re-oiling it, and it 
was very dusty. 
Q. Do you know about ho·w long that plowing up of the 
road had been done 7 
A. No, I do not. I don't remember. 
Q. Was it plowed up there at 1\Jir. Cutchin's? 
A. Yes, sir, it was plowed up there. 
page 54 ~ Q. 1\tir. I-Iarvey Cutchin? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And was it plowed at the scene of the accident Y 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. And between ~!r. Cutchin's and the accident? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Had it gotten solid again, or was it soft 7 
A. Well, it had not gotten solid. I would say there was a 
coating of dust on it, which is generally to be found on. 
that type of road in a dry spell. 
Q. Well, was this a dry spell? 
A. Very dry. 
Q. What was the condition of the road, as far as dust was 
concerned? Was it or not dusty.Y 
A. It was very dusty. 
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Q. Did you meet anybody after you passed Mr. Harvey 
Cutchin's? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Who was that Y 
A. 1\{r. Rawls, Mr. Sol Rawls. 
Q. At about what point did you meet him as regards the 
accident? How near the accident? 
A. I met him, I would suppose, two or three hundred yards, 
I would say. I met him, I think, between a side road that 
comes out to this Sedley road and his farm, to 
page 55 } which I imagined he was going~ 
Q. Was his car making any dust or not 1 
A. Yes, sir. ' 
Q. Were you following another car at the time Y 
. A. I ·was not following one consciously. I did not know 
that there was one in front of me. 
Q. Well, what was the visibility on the roadt 
A. Very poor. · 
Q. What was that on account of? 
A. Dust, the dust traffie made, making dust. 
Q. That is the road that leads out from Frltllldin to the 
Country· Club Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And is there any other road, or any other place to 
which you go except the Country Club, in going from Frank-
lin? 
A. I would say the only other place would be to this man 
Holcomb's. 
Q. I mean, any other road which you could take Y Could 
you go to Sedley that wayY 
A. Yes. Oh, yes, that is known as the Franklin-Sedley 
road, I believe. 
Q. Do you remember· meeting anyone else besides Mr. 
RawlsY 
A. No, sir. 
page 56 ~ Q. Mr. Bryant, after you had met Mr. Rawls, 
did you speak to him Y 
A. Yes. · 
Q. Did you recognize him? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When was the first time that you saw the Camp car? 
A. I saw the Camp car, I would imagine, 35 or 40 yards 
from me, and I assumed that when I saw the car that it was 
probably in motion. I figured it was in motion, but I did not 
realize that the car was parked until I got v~ry c\os.e to it. 
,-
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. Q. About how close to it did you get before you r~alized it? . . . -· 
A. I would say 19-18 or 19 yards, 50 or 55 feet. 
Q. But you had seen it farther back 7 
A. Yes, I had seen it farther back. 
Q. And your first impress~on was what t 
A. That the car was in motion -in the same direction that 
I was traveling. 
Q . .And do you mean that you traveled some fifteen yards 
before you realized that it was actually not in motion? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Why had you not seen the car before that timeY 
A. The dust obscured my vision and made it very poor. 
Q. When you saw it at about 17 or 18 yards distant from it, 
as you say, what did you do then7 I mean, when 
page 57 ~ you realized that it 'vas standing still. 
A. I made a sharp cut to the left to keep from 
smashing into the rear of that car. 
Q. Did you use your brakes t 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did anybody in that car give you any signal to indi-
cate that the car was standing? 
A. Not at all. 
Q; Did you see anybody outside the car 7 
A~ I saw the car door open, and I think possibly there was 
an attempt being made to get out of the car by one of the 
occupants. 
/; 
Q. On that road, could you have stopped your car at the 
rate of speed you were going before you ran into this car in 
front of you' 
@,Mr. Parker: If your Honor please, I object to that as the tness' opinion. The jury is entitled to pass upon the possi-lty of stopping. 
Mr. Pulley: All right. · . ." 
l3y Mr. Pulley: 
Q. When you saw the car, when it was standing, did you 
or not apply your brakes? · 
A. When I first saw it? . 
Q. No ; when yon found out it was standing still. 
A. Yes, I applied them gradually, sufficiently to enable me. 
-. to .make that left turn necessa.ry to keep from 
page 58 ~ smashing into the rear of that car, without turning 
over and doing some· damage in another way. 
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Q: Did you turn your car to tile left immediately upon find-
ing out this Y · 
A. That the car was stationary t 
Q. Yes. 
A. Yes. 
Q. What happened then, ~1:r. ~ryant r . 
A. Well, it is hard for n1e to tell just what did happen then. 
The next thing I knew, I had been smashed into and smashed 
into somebody whse car I did not see at all. I never saw 
his car. 
Q. Did you see his car at all f 
A. No, sir. 
Q. H~d you seen his car coming before you turned to your . 
left? 
A. No, sir. If I had, I would have taken the rear end of 
the car in front of me and taken my chance tha.t way. 
Q. You did not know thet·e was a car coming around there, 
you sayY 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Mr. Bryant, are yon sufficiently familiar with that road-
way to tell where that picture was taken from (handing a 
photograph to the witness) Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 59 ~ Q. Where was the photographer standing at- j;he 
time this picture was taken? 
A. What do you mean, where he was standing T 
Q. As regards the accident; as regards where you turned 
out and ran into this other carY 
A. He was standing there. 
Q. Where did the cars cmne together, :.M~r. Bryant, tn this 
picture¥ 
A. In this picture, no,v, as best I recall it-
Q. Can you walk up here before the jury and point it out 
to them, please, sir. You said that the photographer was 
standing where when this picture was taken, as regards the 
accidentf 
A. About where the accident happened. 
Q. On which side of the road were you at the time Y 
A. I 'vas on the right-hand side of the road until I made 
my turn to escape hitting this other car. 
Q. When you made your left-hand turn and the accident 
happened, which side of the road were you on then Y 
A. I was on the left side. . 
. Q. In what angle were you driving at the time you came 
together! 
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A. About a 45-degTee. · 
Q. And what became of your car after the cars came to-
gether 7 Did it stop there? 
page 60 ~ A. Well, I s}lppose it did. I was hit so hard I 
could not tell whether I moved or whether I did 
not. 
Q. You don't know about that-whether you stood still or 
were moved back or forward Y 
A. No, because I was knocked cold enough not to know that. 
The Court: Have you got the pictures marked north, south, 
east, or west, or anything to indicate direction? 
Mr. Pulley: Yes, sir, I have got it noted on these pictures. 
By Mr. Pulley: 
Q. Mr. Bryant, do you know where that picture was taken 
from f 
The Court: When you say "that picture" designate it 
in some way. 
By Mr. 'Pulley: 
Q. Well, picture No. 2. Do you know where the photog-
rapher was standing when he took that 1 First, let me ask 
you this: Wnat does that automobile represent there? 
A. It represents the car that was parked on the high,vay 
in front of me? 
Q. The Camp car? 
page 61 } A. Yes. 
Q. Where was the photogra1)her stanCling at the 
time the picture 'vas taken? 
A. He was standing about where I made my turn. 
Q. "Where you turned to the left? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Which you stated'w;:~s 17 or 18 yards back? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is that the true location of where this car was at the 
time when you turned to the left? 
A. As best I can judge, I 'vould say that is right. 
Q. That car seems to be standing on the main traveled 
road. Was or was not the Camp car on the main traveled 
road? 
A. It ''ras on the main traveled road. 
Q. Is that or not a proper position for that car to take to_ 
indicate where the Camp car was standingf · 
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A. I would say so. 
Q. The car in the picture indicates where the Camp car 
was standing Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. Could you, from where you were at the time you realized 
the Camp car was standing here, see to the curve in this road Y 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Is that about your line of vision Y As indi-
page 62 ~ cated by this picture, just what you could have 
seen? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Pulley: All right, Mr. Bryant, you may take your 
eat, please, sir. ~Mr. Parker: Don't lead him, ~Ir. Pulley. 0 The Court: If you have got any more pictures there, get hrough with him before you have him take a seat. 
Mr. Pulley: Well, I have got the photographer here about 
those other pictures, your Honor. 
By Mr. Pulley: 
Q. When were these pictures taken-about 'vhen f 
A. I think possibly a week ago. 
Q. Were you present when they were taken? 
A. Yes, sir. 
(The two pictures shown the witness and identified by him 
were filed in evidence marked "Plaintiff's Exhibits 2 and 3 ", 
respectively.) 
Q. Mr. Bryant, did you lose consciousness from the acci-
dent? 
A. Well, I suppose maybe that the shock kind of knocked 
me out for a few minutes, but I soon recovered myself, I 
would say-stunned. 0 
page 63 ~ Q. When your cars actually came together, how 
near were you to the Camp carT 
A. Well, when the cars came together, I didn't see any-
thing else after that time. The next thing that I knew any-
thing abgut was being dragged out of my car. 
Q. Do you know wl1ether or not you had gotten in advance 
of the Camp car, or were behind it, or where? 
A. No, I do not. I think I was right by the side of it; that 
would be my recollection, but I don't know about that. 
Q. I see. Y: ou went to the Lakeview Hospital Y 
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.A. Yes, sir . 
. Q. Some friends took you <town there? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you remember the trip Y 
A. I remember that verv well. 
Q. About how many yards from your residence did this 
accident happen, 1\Ir. Bryant? 
A. Well, by the road, I would say 500 yards, possibly. 
Q. On our trip to the hospital, did you suffer? 
A.. Very much. 
Q. While you were down there, Mr. Bryant, tell the jury 
something about whether you underwent pain, what the na-
- ture of the pain was, and what your condition was 
page 64 ~ generally. 
· A. Well, of course, all the time I was there until 
I commenced to get considerably on the mend, I suffered in-
describably day and night. I hardly passed a minute without 
~hocking pain. 
Q. The doctor says that he had to put a weight on y~ur 
l'ight leg and hold it down; was that comfortable or uncom-
fortable? 
A. That was very uncomfortable. 
Q. Did you, during· that time, have to lie in .one position, 
or could you chang·e about? 
A. I lay flat on my back in one position. 
Q. How long, if you recall, did that weight stay on your 
leg? · 
A. I would say that the first one that they had on me, to-
gether with the last one, the one to which he referred as ''a 
traction", possibly a total of seven weeks; six or seven or 
eight weeks, possibly. I don't know. 
Q. He had two, one before he put the pin in and one after Y 
A. Yes, sir. He put me in what they called down there ''a 
box extension''. I was in there two weeks. 
Q. ·Then the traction, or other weig·ht, was how long? 
A. I would say tliat I was in there f:t:om fixe or six weeks, 
maybe. I don't know the dates that I was in that. 
Q. During that time, did you lie in one position, or could 
you .. m·ove about 1 
page 65 ~ A. No, sir; I lay flat of my back until I left 
there. ' 
Q. Did you take ether, or were you conscious at the time 
they put the pin through your knee that the doctor de-. 
scribed~ 
· A. Yes; I watched them do it. 
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Q. Was that painful t 
A. Very. 
Q. How large was that pin, ~Ir. Bryant Y 
A. I imagine it was about the size of a knitting or darning 
needle. I don't know just how large or how small it was, 
but I would say it was about the size of a darning needle, 
that was driven through my leg. 
Q. It went all the way through Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you take any ether, or anything of that kind, to re-
lieve the pain when you first went down the1·e 1 
A. No, sir. 
Q. When you saw the condition you were in, what condi-
tion did you see, sir, so far as your leg was concerned' 
A. I saw this thigh bone protruding through my flesh and 
also protruding through my trousers that I had on, sticking 
through it about that far (indicating). 
Q. What about your ear? 
A. Well, niy ear was pretty badly cut and bleeding pretty 
badly, cut almost half in two. 
page 66 ~ Q. The doctor said that you had lacerations on 
the head; were yon conscious of those f 
A. Yes, sir,;-eonscious of them when he was sewing them 
np. -
Q. :h1:r. Bryant, l1o'v many weeks did you stay in the hos-
pital, or days? 
A. I could not count them up, but I 'vas there from the 
27th of May until the 28th of August. 
Q. After you were released from the hospital, did you con-
tinue to convalesce at homeY Were you still unable to at-
tend to business ¥ · 
A. I could get down there after I had been home awhile, 
by being dragged in my car with the assistance of a f'riend 
and taken out that way, down to the warehouse, and 'vhen I 
g·ot seated down in the chair, of course, ~ stayed there until 
somebody came and helped to move me .. 
Q. Has that condition improved recentlyf Can you get 
about better nowY 
A. Yes, sir. I can get in a car now unassisted. 
Q. How long was it necessary for yon to have someone to 
assist yon in getting in and out of the car after you came 
back? 
A. Oh, I would say fonr months·. 
Q. During that time \vere you able to attend to your busi-
ness~ 
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A. Not as I had been accustomed, but part of it 
page 67 ~ I could attend to. 
Q. What kind of business are you in? 
A. I was buying seed cotton and cotton seed at that time. 
Q. Have you lost very much on account of your inability 
to attend to your business, Arlr. Bryant? 
A. Well, of course, that would necessarily be an estimate 
because I have lean years and good years, for a little fellow 
like me, just like big· fellows have. 
Q. Did you have lean years during the depression? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you during this time, or have you since that time, 
been trying to build your business back to normal¥ · 
C }Ir. Parker: If your Honor please- · Mr. Pulley: All right, I will withdraw it and save you the rouble of objecting. 
By Mr. Pulley: 
. Q. JYlr. Bryant, do you suffer any pain now~ 
A. Yes, sir, occasionally. 
Q. Can you tell the jury when you suffer more than at other 
times, if any? 
A. Well, I suffer more on the approach of falling weather; 
I would say, when the atmosphere is heavy, when it gets 
cloudy or is going to rain, of course, that tells me 
page 68 ~ about it. 
Q. What is the nature of that suffering·? 
A. It is just intense pain where the fracture· was and the 
knee, too. 
Q. How far can you bend your knee now? 
A. That is as far as I can bend it (demonstrating). 
Q. Can you get along at all without those crutches 1 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Do you l1ave any difficulty in getting in and out of au-
tomobiles? 
A. Yes. -
Q. Can you drive now? 
A. Yes, I can drive now. 
Q. You are driving now yourself? 
A. Yes, sir. I drove up here this morning. 
Q. Is that inconvenient to you f 
A. What, in driving? 
Q. Yes. 
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A. It is in the handling of this foot with the sole on this 
shoe. The left side is all right. 
Q. Mr. Bryant, before you went to the hospital, how was. 
your health, sir T 
A. Good. . 
Q. How had your health been all your lifeY 
A. ·Good. 
Q. Down there, did you or not lose any weightY 
page 69 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Very much, can you tell the jury? 
A. I lost about sixty pounds. 
Q. What was the hospital billY What did you pay to the 
·hospital and doctors Y · 
A. I have that bill receipted. I forgot to bring it, but it 
was $1,160-odd. I don't know just the odd dollar. 
Q. And the nurses' bill? 
A. The nurses' bill was $672 and some cents. I have them, 
too. I just overlooked them in my hurry this morning. 
Q. And the medicines ; did you buy any medicines, in addi-
tion to that Y 
A. I bought some medicines, but my incidental expenses 
were about $110. 
Q. That adds up to $1,944.45, as you have related it; is 
that correct? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. •Now, your automobile: Was your automobile was 
wrecked in this accident? 
A. I understand it is ·wrecked pretty badly. I have never 
seen it since. 
Q. Have you swapped it in for another one sinceY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How much were you allowed on your old ear Y 
A. $125. 
page 70 } Q. Do you know .what it was worth before the 
accident? 
A. No, I do not, but I ima~ine it was worth probably-:-! 
don't know that schedule, but It was a 1934 Chevrolet sedan. 
I don't know-around $400, I imagine. 
Q. And you were allo,ved for it $125 Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. 1\'Ir. Bryant, how does this road compare with other 
roads in the community, so far as traffic is concerned t 
A .. That road is a heavily traveled road for a secondary 
road. It is a very heavily traveled road. 
Q. Is it or not a public highwayt · 
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A. Yes~ it is very much a public highway. 
page 71 } .A recess was taken until 2 o'clock P. M .. 
page 72 } AFTEBu.~OON SESSION. 
The court reconvened at 2 P. ~I., and Mr. Bryant resumed 
the stand. 
·CROSS EXAMINATION. 
B""r~r. Parker: · VQ~ .... Mr. Bryant, I want to get it exactly clear how far you 
i r ·· from the defendants' car when you first saw it. What w your testimony 2 .A. 50 or 55 yards. . Q. 55 yards when you first saw itt 
A. I mean feet. 
Q. Feet, when you first saw itt 
A .. Yes, sir. 
Q, And how far from it were you when you first put on 
h¢kesi 
/ A. I imagine I was within 50 feet of it. 
Q. N o\v, didn't you testify this morning that you put on 
brakes when you were 17 yards from the car? 
A. Yes. I was talking feet and you were talking yards, 
yes. 
Q. Now, 17 yards you put on brakes from the car, but you 
saw it how many yards from the cart 
A. I will say 25 or 30. 
' 
Q. Now, what kept you from seeing that car prior to that 
time, Mr. Bryant? 
age 73 } .A. The dust. 
Q. Describe that dust to me. Was it all over the 
road, or was it just ahead of you in a particular bank or 
-cloud? · 
A. It was just ahead of me. That indicated there was a 
r in front of me. I supposed there was a ear ahead of 
e in motion. 
Q. You saw that dust from the Camp car before yo"'!l ever 
got to the Camp carf 
A. I didn't know whose car it was. 
Q. But it was created by a car going the· same way yo-q. 
were1 · 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. How far had you been following that dustY 
A. I had been in dust off and on, I would say, all the way 
from Joyner's Church .. 
. Q. Was it thicker up there when you canw around Harvey 
·Cutchin's corner? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Ho-w much thicker-1 · 
A. I don't know, but I imag·ine there were cars in that vi-
cinity when there were not any around Harvey Cutchin's. 
Q. How far could you see when you passed Harvey Cutch-
in's gate? 
A. I don't know. I remember seeing ].{r. Rawls very 
clearly when w·e passed.. I raised my hand to speak 
pao·e- 7 4 ~ to him. 
b Q. Didn't you see ~Ir. Rawls as he was coming 
towards you before you got to him Y 
A. He was right on me before I saw him. 
Q. You never saw ].1:r. Rawls, then, until you got right on 
him and were in the act of passiugt 
A. I saw him very close to me. 
Q. How close? 
A. I could not tell you how close. I didn't have any idem 
of anything like this oceurring. 
Q .. I am afraid I shall have to ask you to give me your 
best idea of h<nv close. Was he the length of the car 7 
A. 10h, yes, it 'vas a length. 
Q. Two lengths Y · 
A. 'Veil, yes, I should say two lengths of the car, because 
that is pretty close up at you. 
Q. Did you see it ,vhen you 'vere as much as five lengths 
away from it? I a~ talking about Sol Rawls' car .. 
A. No, I don't th1nk so. 
Q. It was coming towards you f 
A. Yes.· 
Q. Could you see the dust created by his car before you 
could see his car? 
A. No; I saw the front of his car and the dust was com-
ing up behind him. 
Q. Yes, but did you see the dust that 'vas curling up behind 
him before you saw his car, itselff 
page 75 } A. Yes, I did. And I n1et one or two cars right 
along there and one or two cars had passed me. 
Q. No cars had passed you between the time you turned 
into Harvey Cntchin"s corner, around there by his gate, and 
J 
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the time this accident happened, going the same way you were, 
had they¥ 
A. I think so. 
Q. Between. the time you left I-Iarvey Cutchin's gate and 
the time the accident happened? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did it pass you before you met and passed Sol Rawls' Y 
A. I think it did. 
Q. Then, a car passed you between the tim.e you got to 
Harvey's and the time you got to Mr. Sol Rawls, is that true? 
A. I think so. 
Q. What happened to· that car~ 
A. I guess it kept going. 
Q. Was that car making any dust? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did that dust cloud your vision at all t 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How fast were you going when you passed 1\{r. Har-
vey Cutchin's gate? · 
A. I don't know; I suppose 30 or 35 miles an 
page 76 } hour. ' 
Q. And you did not slacken down that speed at 
all until you saw this Camp car, did you f 
A. Yes. I slackened down. I just simply commenced to 
saunter, because I was timing myself. I did not care about 
running in ahead of time at home-simply after getting there 
by 6:30. 
Q. I am not talking about after you left the Club. After 
you left llarvey Cutchin's g·ate, you did not slacken vour 
speed until you saw the car ahead of yout w 
UA. No, I did not . . Did I understand you to say .. on the stand that you did see the Joyner car until you hit it? A. Yes, you did, you understood me to say that . . What hid it from you~ 
A. I think the dust, together with this parked car in front 
of me. 
Q. Now, which was itf It could not have been both. 
A. Well, it was the parked car. -
Q. Then you were so close behind the parked car when you 
turned out that you could not see past it? 
A. Yes, because there was a slig·ht curve in the road there. 
I was too close up for the parked car, I imagine, to give me 
any visibility to the left of that car into that curve. 
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Q. When you first looked to see if there was anything on 
the left side? 
7 ~ /.A. I did not look to see. I presumed that that 
Lwas clear. 
ou assumed that your left side was clear Y 
h-huh. 
Q And that is the reason you drove up there Y 
A. Yes. If I had known there was a car approaching, Mr. 
Parker, on that side, I would not have turned out, but I made 
_,1 a left turn to pass the car that was parked headed in the /1) same dir. ection I was, which I figure any other man that was an experienced driver would have done. ·Q. And you did that, Mr. Bryant, at a moment when you ~id not know whether your left side was clear, didn't you? A. No, I did not know. , Q. And you could not see whether your left side was clear? .A.. I did not see ,vhether the left side was clear or not. I saw nothing on the left side. Q. Was it because you were not looking over there,~-<u--~be-
cause you could not see through that dustY · 
./'/ A. It was both. · 
/ !, Q. Then, you were not looking to your left side when you 
urned out, were you? 
A. I looked out when I made the turn. 
Q. Yes, but you did not see whether that was clear or not Y 
. A. It appeared to be clear. 
na9.'e ~ Q. liow far could you see down that road past ~ ( the Camp car¥ 
A. I did not see any distance down. 
Q. ·Could you see five feet? 
A. Oh, I suppose I could have seen five feet, but-
Q. Could you see a hundred feetY 
A. ·No, I did not see a hundred feet. 
Q. Could you see 30 feet? 
A. I don't know whether I could or not. 
Q. Could you see 50 feet T 
A. Mr. Parker, I made that left turn assumi~ that that 
was the better chance for me to take than to liif something 
1 that I saw right in front of me, and I assumed that anybody driving down a highway, and a vehicle going in the same direc-tion that they happened to be driving, and saw no danger ahead. in ma~ing a left turn, ~ould shy out to pass the ob-struction. I Just assume that 1s the way any man who drives 
any kind of a vehicle would do. 
1 Q. Now, will you please answer my question. I asked yo~ ' 
"'-.I 
I 
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whether, when you turned out to your left, you could see as 
/( 
much as 50 feet down the left side of the road to see if the 
road was clear of oncoming traffic Y .· 
A. No, I could not. . 
Q. And when you were at 17 yards, when you turned out 
to pass the Camp car, you could not see as far as 
9 ~ the front of the Camp car from you on the left 
side of the road, could you Y 
Yes, I could see that far,_! imagine, but I did not tak~ 
· any notice of that at that time, because I was struck very 
quickly after I had turned out to go by the Camp car. 
Q. Yes, but, Air. Bryant, you are the man making the claim 
here, and I want to find out from you what the facts wer~. 
!} Could you see as far as the front of the Camp car when you turned out to the left to pass the Camp car, that is, could you see that far on the left side of the road 7 A. I suppose I could. 
Q. How much farther f 
A. Well, very little, if any. The visibility was very little 
at tlla.t time. 
at the Camp car, had you Y , A Q. When you struck the Joyner car, you had not arrived A. When I struck the Joyner car, or the Joyner car struck me, I didn't know much else about what had happened after 
the collision. I just knew that I was struck. 
Q. Do you n1ean that after the collision you could not re-
member what happened? 
- A. I could not see what happened after the collision. 
; Q. I am not asking you what happened after the collision. 
/}
I am asking· you-if the collision did not take place before you 
/ 
I 
reached the -Camp cart · 
page 80 ~ A. No, it did not. · 
Q. It did notY · 
A. That is my recollection. 
Q. And your car never reached the Camp car before yonr 
car collided, did it? 
A. I turned out to pass the Camp car, and when I turned 
out I had the collision. 
· Q. There was not very much time between the two affairs, 
was there? 
A. No; it was very quick. 
Q. To make it clear, as I understand it now, you know, 
I or it is your best memory, that you had not reached a point n the road opposite the Camp car when you met the Joyner / ar, had you? That is true, isn't it 7 
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A. No, it is not, because some passenger 'in the Camp car 
recognized me or made some sign, and that is when I was 
still-
Q. You mean that you were past the Camp ca1· when you 
were struck Y 
A. No; I was right beside it. 
Q. Which way were you looking? 
A. I was looking sort of out of the side. of my eye. 
Q. And it turned out there was a car on your left-hand 
side, dian 't it~ 
A. I don't know where the Joyner car was. 
page 81 } Q. But didn't it turn out that way~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you were not looking to your left, but looking at 
1t.he Camp car, isn't that correct 1 -- A. No, I was not looking at the Camp car. I was looking ahead, but you can see out of the side of your eye in passing, 
you know, whether a person throws up a banner or a hand,. 
without looking at it. 
Q. You saw Mr. Sol Rawls the same way ·when he passed 
youY 
A. Yes, but we were meeting head-on in opposite direc-
tions . 
. Q. Before you passed the Camp car, did you lmo\v whose 
it wasT 
A. I did not until I made my turn. 
Q. You had seen it long enough to see the door open and 
somebody put a foot ont ·t · 
A. The door appeared to be open on the right side. 
Q. Did you see it long enough to know whe-ther there were 
any persons on the back seat l · 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. Did you know whose car it was when you turil'ad outf 
A. Yes. 
. Q. How did you know f . 
A. I knew by the color of the car and I bacl seen 
page 82 } it almost enough to recognize it in the dark. 
Q. Did you recognize it 'vhen you first saw" it! 
A. No, I did not know until I got very close np to it whose 
car it was. 
Q. The dust from wl1ose car was it that kept you from see-
ing the Camp {jar earlier? · 
A. I don't know, because I did not see who 'vas in front 
of me at all. I just presumed-a car .passed me, but I did 
not know who was in that car. 
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Q. Didn't you testify awhile ago that it was Sol Rawls' 
dust coming your way T . 
A. I think his dust was part of it, yes. 
Q. Now, how far from you was Sol Rawls' cloud of dust 
behind him when you first saw itf · 
A. How far was his dust behind him 1 
Q. No. How far was his dust ahead of you when you first 
saw his cloud of dust f 
A. Well, it was pretty close up to me. 
Q. And could you see through it Y 
A. Oh, I guess I could have seen through it, yes, but it was 
just like a fog or any other obstruction of that kind. 
Q. Could you see through it as far as the Camp car was 
then ahead of you~ 
A. No. 
Q. Did you slow down when Sol Rawls' dust 
page 83 }- first hit you Y . 
A. No, because I was driving, as I thought, Yery 
moderately at that time. 
1
Q. And you assumed the road ahead of you was clear' 
A. Yes. 
Q. Yon think yon had a right to assume that 7 
A. I do. 
Q. In spite of the dust ahead of you? · 
A. I do. . 
Q. And kept on at the same speed? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. As it turned out, the Camp car was stopped when you 
first saw it? 
A. As it turned out, yes. 
A Q. And you never slackened your speed until you put on your brakes 17 yards behind the Camp car, is that right? A. Yes, that is right. · Q. You knew there was a curve ahead of yon there, didn't you? · 
A. Very welL 
Q. You are very familiar with that road 1 
A. Very. 
Q. As a matter of fact, the Camp car had not reached the 
curve at the place where it was parked 1 
page 84 }- A. Pretty close. It was not right in the bend of 
the curve. 
Q. I mean, had it reached the point where the road com-
menced to curve? 
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A. I think it had very slightly commenced to curve at that 
point. . 
Q. Then, you attempted to pass the Camp car when it was 
parked in a curve, didn't you Y 
A. No, it was not in the curve. The road had commenced 
-he was right at the beginning, I would say, of the curve. 
Q. Then, you would have had to pass him on a curve, 
wouldn't you? You would have had to driye into a curve in 
order to pass the Camp car f 
A. No, I don't think so. I could have passed him where 
the road was straight, but pretty close to the curve. 
Q. Then, you would have had time to pass the Camp car 
and come back on the road before reaching the place where 
the road curves, is that correct Y 
A. I think probably I would have done that, yes. · 
Q. Who was at the Club, Mr. Bryant, when you stopped 
out there? 
A. Let me see. I think Claude Edwards was there. I am 
'not very positive about some of these, but I will tell you who 
I think was there. I think Claude Edwards was there; I 
think Will Bristow was there, W. 0. Bristow; prob-
pag·e 85 ~ ably Ross Jones, I am inclined.to think he was there 
because of the fact that he goes there every Tues-
day, and so do these others that I have mentioned. Outside . 
of them, I don't know that I recall anybody. 
Q. Weren't you confused awhile ag~ when you said that 
you went to Holcomb's first and then to the Club and still 
did not leave the Club until around six o'clock¥ 
A. I think it was about six o'clock or a little after when 
I left the Club. 
Q. Weren't you af the Club longer than thirty minutesT 
A. I don't think I was there thirty minutes. 
Q. How long were you at Mr. Holcomb's? 
A. No longer than I could call him from the field, or wher-
ever he was at work, to the yard. 
Q. They asked you to stay for supper at the Club, did.D. 't 
they? ·· 
A. Yes. They were very insistent on it. 
Q. In addition to the fact that you stated you were going 
home for supp~r, didn't you state that you were going to see 
Rob Rawls, across the street, 'vho was not so well? 
A. Yes, if I had the time, but when I got there, he had 
supper a little earlier than I had. However, I did expect to 
go to see him later that evening. 
Q. When you first saw Sol Rawls coming towards you, had 
James L. Camp, Jr., et als., v. J. G. Bryant, Adm'r. '95 
J. F. Bryant, Jr. 
he reaehed the side road1 that is the dirt road that 
page 86 } leads in from your left to the road you were driv-
ing· on, and that is about half way from Harvey 
Cutchin's to the place where this thlng happenedJ isn't it Y . 
A. Yes. 
Q. Had he reached that side road wllen you .first saw him 1 
A. I don't know whether he had or not. I am under the 
impression that he had. 
Q. So that he was coming your way? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you were going towards him and towards the place 
where the wreck happened? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q . .And how far between that side road and Harvey Cutch-
in's gate did you meet and pass each other~ 
A. Oh, I don't know about that, Mr. Parker. I did not 
anticipate any such situation as I ran into, but I would say 
half way. I don't know, I have no idea. 
Q. Please tell me, if that was true, could any car have 
passed you, that is ariy car going in the same direction, be-
tween the time you first saw Sol Rawls and the time you 
passed him"/ 
A. I don't know about that. There were a good many cars 
on that road that afternoon going back and forth and I just 
- did not take any notice of that. I did not notice 
page 87} anybody unless it 'vas somebody that I knew. 
Q. l\{r. Bryant, you don't know, and you don't 
presume to testify, that anybody passed you going in the same 
dirootion you were going from the time you left Harvey 
Cutchin's gate and the time you had this aooident? 
A. There were two o1· three cars passed me between Miss 
Lida Holland's home-
Q. I understand that- . 
A. -But if· they were in front of me and raising a curtain 
· of dust, I could not tell who they were or anything about 
that. 
Q. I am talking about cars that were behind you and passed 
you, that is what my question was directed to. 
A. Well, I could not tell you, to save my life, how many 
cars passed me that afternoon, because I did not count them. 
I didn't think about it at all. · 
Q. Now, here is what I want you to tell me, which yon 
should be able to answer : How many cars going in the same 
dirootion you were going overtook and passed you between 
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the time you left Harvey Cutchin's gate ~nd the time this 
accident happened 1 
· A. I only remember one car passing me at all, that is, from 
up there ,vhere Willie Umphlett usecl to live, or in front of 
Dan Gillette's gate, to where I had the accident. 
Q. Did he pass you from the point you first spoke of, be-
. tween that time and Harvey Cutchin's gatet or from 
·page 88 ~ Harvey Cutchin's gate to the time you met S.ol 
Rawls? 
A. I don't ren1ember about that. 
Q .. Isn't it true that between the time you left Harvey 
Cutchin's gate and the time you met Sol Rawls no car over-
took and passed you 1 
. A. I am under the impression that it did, but I have no 
recollection in a positive way about that,. sir. 
Q. After you met and passed Mr. Sol Rawls, ce.rtainly no 
car overtook you and passed you before you had the acci-
dent, did it? 
A. ·So far as I recall, it did not. 
Q. Wouldn't it have been impossible for one to have done 
that in that distance and not get mixed up in the accident it-
self? 
.A. I don't know about that. I did not take any measure-
ments of that. · 
Q. If any car did overtake and pass you after you passed 
Harvey Cutchin's gate, it would have been bound to have 
been before you met Sol Rawls, wouldn't itt 
A. Yes-well, I won't say "yes'' ~Ir. Parker. I paid no 
attention to things of that kind. I don't expect to do that 
going home this evening. There may be cars to pass me go-
ing home this evening or tonight and I would not pay any at-
tention to them. 
Q. It is not a very long· distance from Mr. Cutchin's gate 
to the place where this accident happened. 
page 89 ~ A. I understand that. I a1n very familiar with 
that road. 
Q. I am just asking you, at the speed yon and 1\fr. Rawls 
were traveling when you. passed each other, was it possible 
for any car to have overtaken and passed you before getting 
to the aceident without getting· mixed up in the accident it-
self? · 
A. Yes, sir, I suppose it is possible. 
Q. Well, did it happen? 
A. I told you just a few minutes ago I did not know whether 
it happened or not. · 
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Q. But you did not testify it did happen, did you f 
A. Yes; I told you a car passed me between Umphlett's 
place-
Q. That is the place where ~Ir. 1faddren lives 1 
A. No, sir, ~Ir. Maddren is farther down. 
Q. You did not testify any car overtook and passed you· 
from the tin1e you .left IIarvey Cut~hin 's gate to the time 
this accident happened 1 
A. I am of the opnion it did, but I \vould not testify to it. 
Q. You are not sure of that, though, are you Y 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You are not sure enough of it to make a statement, are 
you? ' 
A. No, sir, I am not. 
- Q. 'Vas there dust on that road all the way from 
pag-e 90 ~ Joyner's Church 1 • 
A. It was in spots. 
Q. Was it worse in spots-
A. Yes. 
Q. Didn't that indicate traffic there? 
A. Indicated traffic might have been there. It did not in-
dicate traffic \vas there at that time. 
Q. Because you could not see the traffic in that dust, could 
youY 
A. No. 
Q. When you turned out at 17 yards, as you testified, back 
of the Camp car, you intended to pass it, didn't you~ 
A. When I turned out? 
Q. Yes, sir. 
A. To pass the Camp car 1 
Q. Yes, sir. 
A. That is what I turned out for. 
Q. That "was your intention, to pass? 
A. Yes. ' 
Q. When you struck th~ Joyner car; you were at a sharp 
angle across the road, weren't you, J\tir. Bryant? 
A. I could not tell you, sir, because I did not see. 
Q. What did happen to your car from the time you put on 
brakes until the time you were struck? 
A. After ·I put on brak~s to the time I was 
page 91 } struck, it was all very quickly done, sir. I just 
knew I had beP.n run into. 
Q. Can you tell me what happened to your car after yon 
turned to the left and be~ ore you \vere struck? 
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1 
~l\... No, sir, I could not, because. I was struck so quickly 
after that. · 
. Q. I guess it is true you don't even know what position 
you were in when your car was struck? 
~. I have not said my car 'vas struck. 
Q. No-I didn't ask you that. Do you know what position 
your car was in when it was struck¥ 
A. You mean the angle? 
Q. ·Yes. 
A. I think it turned about a 45-degree angle when I made 
the left turn to avoid hitting this other car. 
Q. Now, Mr. Bryant, could you see that day about where 
the edge of the paving· had been? It had been scarified, I un-
derstand. Could you tell about 'vhere the edge of the paving 
had been? 
A. I think that c0uld have been told by making close ob-
sr.rvation of the road. 
Q. And was it from that that you placed the car in this 
picture No. 3, which you say is placed as you saw the Camp 
car ahead of you Y 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. It was placed with reference to the edge of the 
page 92 ~ macadamt wasn't it? 
A. That is about the position as I recall it that 
that car was parked in. 
Q. Will you answer my question again, please. sir. It was 
placed by you with reference to the edge of the macadam, 
wasn't it? , · 
A-. What-the Camp car? 
Q. No, sir, this car in this picture No. 3. 
A. Yes. Yes, that is about the wav I saw it. 
Q. So that if the macadam was wider at the time of this 
accident than it is now; then, the car in this picture should 
have been placed closer to the ditch than was your idea of 
where it was Y 
A. If the macadam ·were wider Y 
Q. Yes, sir. . . . 
A. I don't exactly understand your question, !fr. Parker. 
Q. I understand that you placed the car which shows in 
this picture where you think the Camp car was, and that your 
method of placing it was by arriving at the edge of the ma-
cadam shown in this picture, and how far the Camp car was 
to the right or left of that edge~ is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, I say, if the macadam, at the time of this accident, 
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happened to be wider than it is now, that car in 
page 93 ~ this picture should have been placed .eloser to the 
fence, shouldn't it? . 
A. I think that car is about where it was between the two 
fences. 
Q. Do you decline to answer my question? 
Mr. Pulley: He has answered it, your Honor. 
A. (•Continuing :) That car was placed on that road, M1\ 
Parker, just as I thought it ought to be placed, if it was con;;. 
creted from curb to curb. 
By 1\llr. Parker: , 
Q.· Then. you had fib reference to the edge of ihe paved 
surface shown in this pic~"f:ite when you placed that carY 
A. No. The reference I had in the placing of this car was 
the position I thought that car occupied from that fence on 
this highway. · · 
Q. I aRk you; Mt'. Bryant; if, a few minutes ago; you did 
not tell me you .Placed this car in this picture With teference 
to the paved surface in this picture.? . 
A. 'Veil, I did not get your question~ Mr. Parker •.. 
Q. You did not get the object of it, did you, Mr. Bryant? 
A. No, I did not get y()ur question. But _that car was placed 
in that picture juAt as it was on the road. 
Q. :could you see all the way around the curve 
page 94 } on your left-11and side when you turned out to pass 
the Camp cat? 
A. I don't know whether I could or not, because I was 
struck before I had time to see anything. _ 
Q. But you know whether, when you turned ottt, you could 
see, don't you? 
A. Y P.S. I saw the road, but-
Q. Could you see ali the way, as far as you could normaily 
s·ee around the curve at the time you turned out around the 
Camp car? 
A. I couldn't tell you 'vhether I could or not; because I 
was hit just like a bolt of lightning. I could not say I could 
have, for I was struck. I was struck almo~~ in a split second 
after I turned out, by a car coming that I did not see. 
Q. You have testified how far you could. or could not see 
the Camp car. Couldn't you testify as clearly, whel_l ypu 
passed the Camp car., you could see as far as yon could Ii<lr'f 
ma1ly see around the curve 7 
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A. Mr. Parker, when I turned out to go by the Camp car, 
you very we:Q. know I could see the Camp car, else I would 
1 not have turned out for it, and when I turned out by the Camp car, that I certainly had· no time to. see 'vhether I could loolc around that curve. · ' Q. Well, then, you did not look around the curve, did you t A. No, I did not havP. time or did not have an 
pag pportunity to look anywhere. 
Q. Now, can you tell me, going back to my ques·-
. tio , . er or not, when you turned out to pass the •Camp 
car, you could see as far as you could normally see around 
that curve ahead of you on your left-hand side of the road f 
A. I don't think I could, not as far as I could normallY 
see. I think the dust would. have obstructed my view there. · 
Q. At the time you came around Harvey Cutchin's gate,. 
there was no car between you and where the Carnp car was to 
keep you from seeing· it if there had been no dust, was theret 
A. No, if there had been no dust. 
Q. If there had been no dust, there was no car between you 
and the Camp car that 'vould have kept you from seeing it~ 
A. So far as I know, yes. 
Q. Now, did Sol Rawls ever drive over fo his left-hand 
side of the road, that is, between you and the Camp cart 
A. I don't know whether he did or not. 
Q. Did he after you saw him? 
A. He was headed the other way and I did not see Sol Rawls 
any more until I had g·otten into this accident. 
Q. I know, but just answer my question again. Did he, 
after you saw Sol Rawls, take what was your side of the road 
at all, or did he stay on his side of the road f 
A. Why, 1\1r. Parker, I suppose he stayed on-we met go-
ing in opposite directions ; I suppose he stayed 
pag·e 96 ~ on his side of the road. He was on his side of the 
road when I met him. 
Q. You say, ''supposed"; dontt you Irnow it? 
A. Don't I know itT 
Q. ·Yes. 
A. No, sir, I don't know that I1e stayed anywhere after 
he paHsed me. 
Q. I am not asking a bout after he passed you. I say, from 
the time you saw Sol Rawls until you passed each other, was 
he on your side of the road 1 
A. I don't re~an his having ~:ottP.n on my side of the road. 
Q. Don't you rP.call that he did not Y · 
. A. YeH., because I figure that he is a saw~ driver and he 
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stayed on the right side of the road unless something ran 
him off. 
Q. Then, .Sol Rawls' car never g·ot across your line of 
vision of the Camp car after you passed Harvey Cutchin's 
gate, did it? 
- A. No, sir, it did not. 
Q. And there wasn't any other car in your line of vision 
down there after you passed Harvey Cutchin's gate, was 
there? 
A. I don't know whether there was or not. 
Q. If it was there, it was hidden by the dustY 
A. Yes. 
pag·e 97 ~ Q. You never saw that car come in the line/of your 
eye from the time you pa~sed Harvey Cutchin's 
gate until you got to the accident, did you~ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Then, how can you testify you believe a car overtook 
and passed you from the time you passed Harvey Cutchin's 
gate until you got to the Camp car? 
A. I am of the opinion it did. 
Q. Well, where did it go? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Didn't it necesaarily get in a line between you and the 
:Camp car if it passed you on that straight stretch? 
A. I think it wa~ too far ahead of me, Mr. ParkPr. 
Q. It could not have been too far ahead of you, when it 
overtook and passed you, 1\fr. Bryant? . 
A. Well, now, about that, I am just going to tell you-
Q. No, you answer my questions, please, sir. I would have 
to object to any statement you would make unless I knew 
what it was going to be. 
A. I don't know 'vhether-
Q. Well, my question was this: If a car had overtaken 
and passed you after you passed Harvey Cutchin's gate, it 
was bound to have con1e in a line of vision between you and 
where the Camp car was sitting, 'vasn 't it 7 
page 98 ~ A. Yes. 
Q. And nothing did, did it? 
A. Nothing did except the dust. 
Q. No car did, did it f 
A. No, I did not see any car. 
Q. Then, how can you testify, as you did awhile ago, that 
between the time you passed Harvey Cutchin's gate and the 
time the accident happened a car overtook and passed you f 
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A. Well. that car passed me before I passed Mr. Rawls, 
or met him. ·· 
Q. That was before you passed Harvey Cutchin's gate, 
wasn't it? 
A. I don't know about Harvey Cutchin's gate. 
Q. You know where it is, don't you? 
· A. Very well., 
Q. Let us see what happened. Did a car pass you going 
in the same direction you were going after you passed Har-
vey ·Cutchin's gate 7 
A. I would not say positively whether it did or not. 
Q. ·You did testify positively that no car ever came be-
tween you and the Camp car after you passed Harvey 
Cutchin's gate Y 
A. Nothing but dust. 
Q. But no carY 
A. I did not see any car. I don't know whether 
page 99 ~ there was any car passed me or not. 
Q. You don't know whether any car did pass 
vou or did not Y · 
·· A. Only one that I recall. 
Q. Where did that car go after it passed you? 
A. I guess it went to Franklin, or wherever it was headed 
for. 
Q. I mean, what part of the road, the right, the left, or the 
center? 
..A. I did not ,PaY any attention to it. It was not in my way. 
It simply rolled on away from me. 
Q. After it immediately g·ot by you, you were bound to 
see it over here on your left-hand corner, weren't you, Mr. 
Bryant? · 
A. After the car got by me Y 
Q. Yes, sir. 
A. Oh, I suppose I saw it a car length until the dust ob-
scured my vision. 
Q. In that car length, did it maintain its course on its 
left-hand side of the road, or did it come over as it normally 
would, back over in front of yon? 
A. As far as I know, it took its normal position on the 
road. I just suppose that: I don't know. 
Q. Dicln 't you see whP.ther any car passed you after you 
got past Harvey Cutchin's gate, going in the same direction 
you did? 
pag·e 100 } A. I am of the opinion one did pass me-
Q. I didn't ask you your opinion, Mr. Bryant-
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A. Well, then, I tP.ll you, sir, I don't know. 
·Mr. Pulley: If your Honor please, I don't like to object 
to that, but it seems ~Ir. Parker has pursued that far enough. 
He has been over it two or three times. 
The Court: i think so, too. I don't think it has· developed 
.anything. 
By Mr. Parker! 
Q. When you saw this cloud of dust ahead of you, Mr. 
Bryant, down there on the road where the accident took 
place, was it standing still, or was it moving to you or from 
you? 
A. What-the dustY 
Q. Yes. . . 
A. Why, it seemed to be just simply-
Q. Hanging on, the road t 
A. Hanging on the road. 
Q. Then, it was not the dust causP.d by Mr. Sol Rawls' car, 
was it? 
A. Why, at thP. place of the accident, it was not, I don,t 
imagine. 
Q. Well, bP.twP.en you and the place of the accident 7 
A. Where the accident occurred-
page 101 } Q. No, I say, between you and the place the 
accident occurred, was the dust you saw ahead of 
you in the road just a cloud of dust standing still, or was it a 
dust cloud moving towards you or away from ·you? 
.A.. 1\fr. ParkP.r, I would say that right at that point on that 
nftP.rnoon there was just simply a cloud of dust, I mean, dust 
that made the visibility poor. 
Q. And how far could you see tl1rough that cloud of dust, 
thP. way that road was, without reference to Mr. Rawls' car 
or any other particular car that was creating dustY 
A. WP.ll. I would say that Mr. Camp's car, I saw that 
through the dust and that was about as far as I could see. 
Q. And about as far as you could see through the dust on 
any portion of the road, then, that you were driving on that 
afternoon, that is. a portion within a quarter or a half a mile 
before you got to the accident, was the same distance that 
you did see the Camp car? 
A. No. A half a mile before I got to the accident the visi-
bility was better. 
Q. Let us bring it down more closely, then. From Har-
vey Cutchin's gate to the place where this accident happened, 
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the maximum distance that you could see through the dust 
that was all over the road on that section I have described, 
was that distance at which you first saw the Camp car; is that 
correctt 
page 102 ~ A. N.o, I \Vould not say so. 
Q. Well. then. how far could you see throug.h 
the dust? 
A. Well, the nearer I got to the the Camp car the thicket• 
the dust seemP.d to be. 
Q. And you could SP.e that condition from the tim.P. you 
:first turned into that straight stretch, couldn't you! 
.A. No. I did nei>t notice that condition. I don't think l 
would have noticed it that far away. 
Q. No, you misunderstand my question,. ~Ir ~ Bryant. I 
did not ask you if you did notice it, but I asked if you could 
sP.e that condition, that is, the fact that the dust gre\v thicker 
and thicker until you ~:ot down there to where the accident. 
finally did happen 7 Could you have seen that far, or did you 
see that far, from tlle time you first turned the. curve up there 
at Harvey Cutchin's t 
A. No. I did not. 
Q. If you had looked, could you have seen itt 
A. I don't know whP.ther I could or not. 
Q. Then, you did not look to see \vhether it was thicker 
ahead of you or not t · 
A. No. I did not look to see how thick the dust was. 
1 
Q. And you did not see the Joyner car at all, so that your 
ctions were not in anywise controlled by whether the Joyner 
car was there or 'vas not there? 
age 103 ~ A. I had no idea the Joyner ea_r was there. 
. Q. Let us put it another way: You did exactly 
. the same way as if the Joyner car had not been there? 
;( 
A. I would have turned out to pass the Camp car jnst as 
I did d~ unlP.ss I had known that there was an approaching 
car coming. 
; RE-DIRECT EXA1\1INATION. 
' 
By 1\{r. Pulley: 
Q. Mr. Bryant, you stated that when you had gotten there 
about 17 steps of the parked car you turned to the left at 
that time to avoid hitting the Camp car. Did you then take 
time to look to see whether there was a car coming around 
the curvef 
A. No, sir .. 
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Q. Did you have any time to look and survey that road to 
find out whether there was any car coming? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you have time to fig·ure that it was against the law 
to drive whe1:e your visibility was not good, on the left side of 
the road? 
A. No. 
Q. Why did you turn to your left there, as you say, sharply 1 
A. I turned to the left to avoid hitting the car that I saw 
parked there on the road. 
page 104 ~ Q. Did you think that course was necessary in 
/( 
order for you to protect yourself and to prevent 
injury to thos~ 
:. Mr. Park~r: Your Honor-
. / A. Yes, su. 
( 1\{r. Parker: ,Just a second. I object to that, your Honor~ 
as a mental condition and not a fact. If the question is re-
peated, I think it would be obvious to your Honor that it is 
immaterial and irrelevant. 
Mr. Pulley: All rig·ht. 
Mr. Park~r: And I ask that the jury be required to pay 
no attention to the answer that was given by the witness, 
which was given after I made my objection, and before your 
Honor could rule on it. 
Mr. Martin: May it please the court, we are willing to 
do that. We do not thh1k it is important. We will let it go 
out. 
The Court: The question and answer will be stricken out. 
By Mr. Pulley: 
Q. How much time, after you saw that this car was parked 
in your line of travel, as you say, did you have to think as 
to what you would do under those circumstances~ 
A. ·You mean, the distancP. I covered, made by 
page 105 ~ that time? 
Q. No ; in seconds, or anything else, did you 
have any leng·th of time in which to consider? 
A. No, I did not have any length of time, of .course, to con-
sider in that position. 
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a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, being duly sworn, was 
examined and testified ~s follows : 
Examined by Mr. Pulley: 
Q. You are Mr. N. C. Barbour? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you live in Franklin T 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How long have you been there, Mr. Barbour Y 
A. Nine years. · 
Q. What is your occupation, sir? 
A. Chevrolet dealer. 
Q. Have you been in that business since you have been in 
Franklin these nine years? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You are running a service station there now and, in 
connection with it, selling automobiles? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you go to the scene of the accident between the 
Joyner automobile and Mr. Bryant's automobile, 
page 106 } shortly thereafter Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you have any way of knowing about how long it was, 
Mr. Barbour? 
A. AftP.r the accident 7 
· Q. Yes, sir. 
A. No, sir. The parties that were in the Joyner car had 
left and Mr. Bryant was still in his car. 
Q. Well, was there any car owned by Mr. Camp out there 
at the time? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Who was there when you got there? Were there many 
people there 7 
A. About ten, I imagine. 
Q. WhP.re did you find those cars, Mr. Barbour, when you 
got out there? Mr. Bryant, you say, was in one. 
A. He was in his car, and the Ford, which I understood 
afterwards was the Joyner car, was up against the bank and 
Mr. Bryant's car was alongside of the Joyner car interlocked. 
Q. Which .way were they facing? 
A. Facing toward·s the ·Cm1ntry Club,. away from Frank-
lin. 
Q. Both of them in the same direction, parallel Y 
A. In the same dirP.ction~ side by side. 
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Q. Did you notice any glass there on the road 7 
page 107 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where did you see that glass, Mr. Barbour? 
A. In the center of the road. ~hat was ten steps and about 
a foot over, would make it about 31 feet from the rear of the 
two cars that were against the bank. 
Q. And towards what place f 
A. Towards Franklin. 
Q. Do you. mean that there was glass in about the center 
of the road and nearer to Franklin than the two cars were 7 
A .. Yes, sir. 
Q. And 31 feet near~r 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was there any other glass there f 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Was that very much glass, 1\{r. Barbour? 
A. No, sir; some glass, but not very much. 
Q. Do you know where that glass came from? Could you 
tell7 
A. It was headlight glass. 
Q. Did you see Mr. Bryant's car after the accident! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did it have its headlig·hts intactY 
A. One headlight was broken out. _ 
Q. Was the glass that was 31 feet away from 
page 108 } the cars/ at that time glass that had the appear-
ancP. of being similar glass to the one in the re-
Inaining headlig·~t on Mr. Bryant's car? 
A. It was similar glass to what is in a Chevrolet. I did 
not compare the two glasses. 
Q. Well, was his car a Chevrolet car? 
. A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Mr. Barbour, could you see any tracks of automobiles 
wbP.re brakes had been applied, or anything of the kind, on 
thP. left side of the road going· away from Franklin, about the 
place of the glass? 
A. No. sir; The road had been scarified and you could 
not tAll anything about any tracks at all on the scarified part. 
Q. Will you explain to the jury just what condition Y9U 
found the road in so far as the loose part was concerned Y 
What do you mean by "scarifying"! 
A. The road had been .Plowed up and worked over but had 
not been resurfacP.d. · 
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Q. Had it been .Packed down by cars to any considerable 
extent? 
A. To some extent, yes. There was a good bit of loose 
dirt on top. 
Q. Was that dirt dry Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was it susceptible to becoming dustY 
page 109 ~ A. I should say so. 
Q. Is that or not a well traveled highway? 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. A much traveled highway Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And it leads towards the Country Club and out towards 
Sedley, too? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. ~{akes a fork there Y 
.A. Yes, sir, later on. 
Q. Did yon see any marks at about the point where you 
said you saw, the headlight glass indicating that the Joyner 
car, as it turned out later, had made any impressions with 
its tires. at that particular point? · 
A. Yes, sir. Just opposite where the glass was, on the 
edge of the scarified road, the right-hand tire of the Joyner 
car showed an imprint on the soft dirt, and it went over into 
the bank and you could trace the tire tracks all the way to the -
rear tire of the .T oyner car. 
Q. Then, the Joyner 'vheel had turned to the right at that 
particular pointY 
.A. Evidently. 
Q. Did you see any glass up there at the scene 'vhere these 
cars were? 
A. Where they were when I got thP.re ¥ 
Q. Yes. 
pag·e 110 ~ A. No, sir. 
Q. And you say that was 31 feet from the 
other-
A. It was ten steps and about one foot over.-
Q. When did you .. step that, Mr. Barbour? 
A. At the timP. of the accident. 
Q. Did you help get Mr. Bryant a1vay from the car 1 
A. No, sir. I was there when he was taken out. 
Q. Was he taken out, or did he get out of l1is own power 1 
A. He was taken out. 
Q. Do you know who carried him away f 
A. Holland's ambulance. 
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Q. Have you made any allowance for his au.tomobile since 
that time? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. The wrecked car? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What was that worth at the time of the accident? 
A. Before or after? 
Q. Before. 
A. '34 Chevrolet sedans were selling for about $450 at that 
time. 
Q. ""That was it worth immediately after? What did you 
allow him? 
A. $125. 
Q. Did you allow him what it was worth? 
page 111 ~ A. I figured so. 
Q. Then, 'vould you say that the $325 differ-
encP. there was the dan1ag-e to that car? 
A. I would say that was the re-salable damage; the actual 
cost of repairing the automobile, around between four and 
five hundred dollars to repair it. 
Q. I see, but you were going according to the schedule 
which you allow for them 1 
A. That is right. 
Q. You could not see any brake marks on the left side of 
the road_:_ I mean going away from Franklin-at all? 
A. No, sir. I don't think they would show. 
Q. 1\{r. Barbour. is the surface of the toad out there at the 
point where you found these cars below the general average 
of the surrounding country, the fields on either side? 
A. Yes. sir, about three or three and a half feet. 
Q. Then, it is in a sunken depression? 
A. Yes, sir. Looks like it has been scraped out and the 
road put down there at a lower level. 
Q. About how far would you say that that is from the curve 
in the road tl1at goes down to the railroad track? 
A. I imaginP. about 250 or 275 fP.et. 
Q. In other words, upwards of a hundred yards. 
pag-e 112 ~ CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Parker: 
Q. In other 'vords, the wreck was about that far beyond 
the curve? 
A. This side of the curve, the Sedley side of the curve. 
Q. But beyond the curve from Franklin? ~ 
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A. Yes. 
Q. It was around 250 yards f 
A. No. 250 or 275 feet, I should say. 
Q. 250 or 275 feet before the cars got to the curve 'vas where · 
von found the two wrecked cars~ 
- A. That is right. 
Q. And what was the nature of the surface of the road, 
lVIr. Barbour? It was plowed up and dirt, soft on the sur-
face-! don't mean soft in the sense of being muddy, but loose, 
wasn't it? · 
A.. Loose dirt. 
Q. So, if there had been any wheel tracks, or any skidding, 
or anything of that kind on your left-hand side as you went 
out of town and approached the wreck, you certainly could 
have seen that in the surface, couldn't you? 
A. I don't think so. 
Q. Why not? 
A. Because the road was originally surfaced, and then it 
was plowed up and worked in together. It was 
page 113 ~ not exact~y dirt ; I mean. not in the sense of a field, 
it was not rocks. but it was lumpy, and I don't 
believe you could see any wheel marks or any signs of apply-
ing brakes on the surface. 
Q. Could you have seen any wheP.l marks¥ 
A. I don't think so. I did not seP. any. I looked and did 
not see thP.m. 
Q. You were not, by any means, the first person there after 
the wreck, were you? 
.A. No, sir. 
Q. How many cars do you suppose had been, in the mean-
while. parked on one or the other side of the wreck? 
A. I think there were about .three cars there when I got 
there. 
Q. And people out in the road Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Walking around T 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. The only automobile tracks that you saw, then-! mean, 
tracks of the wheP.ls or tires-were those made by the Joyner 
car ovP.r on its right-hand ditch bank and in the ditch; isn't 
that correct? 
A. That is right.· 
Q. And they started leaving what had been the paved sur-
faced about 30 feP.t, or ste_ps, did you say, towards Franklin 
to where you fou-nd it? 
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Q. About 30 steps towards Franklin from where 
you found thP. wrecked car? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. And from where he started, his wheels took a diagonal 
run farther and farther from the center of the road and 
closP.r and closer to the bank, up to the place where you found 
the wrecked car; isn't that correct Y 
.A. Yes-well, his right 'vheel farther and farther from the 
edge of the scarified surface. 
Q. But his right wheel went diagonally more and more 
to his right to the place where you found the wrecked car7 
A. That is right-gradually. 
Q. There was no slipping to the side or back to the road? 
A. No. 
Q. There was nothing to indicate, from where it left the 
paved surfaee to where you found it, that it had been struck 
from the side, was therP. J 
.A. No. 
Q. Just a straight, rolling track? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where you found the cars, Mr. Joyner's car was at that 
point up against the bank, wasn't it? 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 115 } Q. Really as close as it could have been driven? 
A .. Embedded into the bank to some extent. 
Q. Now, 1\ir. Bryant's car was almost parallel with itY 
A.. Yes, sir. ·· 
0. And headed the same way, back towards Sedley? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And were the front ends separated, or were they locked 
together! 
A.. Interlocked. 
Q. Nlr. Bryant's right front wheel was broken, I believe, 
wasn't itY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And the cars were mashP.d in together up there at the 
front end? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And the back ends also almost together? 
A. Almost together. 
Q. In moving those cars apart to get 1\Ir. Bryant .out, you 
had to lift them how far, would you say? 
A.. About three and a half or four feet. 
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Q. What part of the Fenton Bryant car received the im-
pact! 
· A .. The right front fender, hood, and the. bumper arid radia-
tor, about half way across the front. 
Q. And what dh·ection, judging from 'vhat you. 
page 116 } saw of the car, was the impact in relation to the 
longitudinal line 1 
A. Well. the Bryant car was headed at about a 45-degree: 
angle. 
Q. And that means from the right front COliler back to-
wards the windshield, doesn't it f 
A., That is 1·ig·l1t. 
Q. Was the cowl, that is, that part of the car betw·een the 
hood and the windshield, broken up or buckled, or anything 
Iii{e that? 
A. Yes, it was buckled. 
Q. "'\Vhat part of the Joyner car, if yon noticed, did the 
Bryant car hit f 
A. It hit in front, about the left half of his car, the left half 
iOf his car up to abont the center of the radiator. 
Q. You mean the center of Joyner's car to the outside, 
taking that last distance, then, the lllow was 1·eceived about 
half way of that point, is that correctf 
A. That is ri~ht. 
Q. Ho"r much did the Bryant car weigh f 
A. A little over 3,000 pounds. 
Q. And the Joyner car f 
A. I think that weighP.d about 26 or 27 bundred, bet"reen 
26 and 27 hundred. 
Q. Did you, even at that mon1ent, hear anything 
page 117 ~ about the fact that the Camp car had been theve r 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You did not look for any tracks of that, that day, did 
vouf 
.. A. I did not see any. I looked but I did not see any. 
Q. Did you look for any tracks of tl1P. Bryant car? 
A. Well, there wasn't any tracks on tl1e road. There wasn't 
any tracks on the opposite side of the road from the Joyner 
car. · 
Q. You mean your left-hand side of the road as you 'vent 
from ;Franklin? 
A. That is ri~·ht. I tried to locate the position the ·Camp 
car wns. when I heard it had been there, but I could not locate 
the -position. 
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Q. Did you go beyond there towards Sedley to look for any 
tracks~ 
A. No-Oh, possibly 20 or 25 feet beyond the cars. 
Q. 1\fost of your attention was directed to the Joyner tracks, 
because you found them, isn't that correct~ 
A. That is right. 
Q. And you did not make as careful an investigation be-
yond the cars, that is, towards Sedley, as you did on the Frank-
Hn side of the cars, did you~ 
A. No. 
page 118 ~ RE-DIRECT E·XA.}\IfiNATION. 
By 1\fr. Pulley: 
Q. 1\IIr. ·Barbour, could you tell from the impressions made 
on each of thosP. cars. which you looked at afterwards, about 
how 1\Jir. Bryant's car must have been crossing the road, at 
what angle? 
A. No, sir. The only thing I could tell was that it was hit 
at approximately a 45-degree angle. 
Q. And you said that from the glass back to where the 
cars were parked that the back end 'vas 31 feet, or 10 steps 
and one foot 1 
A .. Correct. 
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION. 
~_.': i .. 
By ~Ir. Parker: 
Q. 1\Ir. Barbour, those cars, when you found them, were 
still on their wheels? Neither of them had turned over on the 
side or the back? 
A. No, sir, both of them ·were sitting· upright. 
Q. Wasn't the Bryant car in your garage after it was 
hauled away from the wreck? 
A. Y P.S, sir. 
Q. So far as you know, did anybody take any pictures of 
that car that could be brought here? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Where is tllP. car now? 
pag·e 119 } A. It has been disassembled. 
Q. That is what we call "junked"~ 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. So that no pictures could be taken of it no.w? 
A. No, sir. 
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Bv Mr. Pulley: 
· Q. How long has it been junked? 
A. About four or five months after the accident. 
HERBERT G. COBB, 
a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, being duly sworn, was 
examined and testified as follows : 
Examined by ~Ir. ~Iartin: _ 
Q. Tell the jury, please, your name and where you live. 
A. Herbert G. Cobb, Franklin. 
Q. How old a1~e you and what is your occupation 7 
A. I am forty-seven, druggist. 
Q. On the day of this accident, shortly after the accident, 
did JYir. James Camp, III, come to your place Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did he have any conversation with you or in your hear-
ing·? 
A. He asked me to get him a doctor. 
page 120 ~ Q. Did he make any statement in your hearingY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What did he say? 
Mr. Parker: Just a second, 1\{r. Cobb. I want to object to 
this testimony aH bein~: irrelP.vant and immaterial. It has 
not been shown as a part of the ·res ,qestae or how long it was 
after thP. accident. 
' The Court: He is one of the clGfendants, isn't heY 
Mr. Parker: Yes, sir, but he is a child. 
1\!fr. l\1artin: He iH a child Y He is under twenty-one, your 
Honor. hut he iH a tort feasor, as we view it. 
The Court: If he is competent to testify, if he is old enough 
to testify, I don't know any reason why he could not do so. 
Mr. Parker: I Have the point. 
By Mr. Martin: 
Q. What did Mr. Jimmy Camp, ill, say in your presence' 
A. The first thing he said, he asked me to get a doctor for 
him. I triP.d to locate Dr. Ra,vls and could not, and I tried 
to locate several and could not. He told me there- was a wreck 
out on the road and 1\{r. Bryant was hurt and it was his fault. 
Q. Whose fault? 
A. Mr. Camp's fault, I suppose. He didn't say 
page 121 ~ whose it was. 
Q. Did he say "his fault" or ''my faultuf 
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A. I don't recall whether he said it was "his fault" or 
"my fault". I don't recall which one. 
Q. The Mr. Cainp you refer to is the young gentlemru;1 
sitting here f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was there any more conver.sation with him? 
A. No, sir. 
(No Cross Examination.) 
L:hlLAND STOREY, 
a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, being duly sworn, was 
examined and testified as follows : 
Examined by Mr. Martin: 
Q. Mr. Storey, tell the jury, please, your name and where 
you live. 
A. Leland Storey, Franklin, Virginia. 
Q. On the day of this accident, did Mr. Jimmy Camp, 3d, 
see'you? 
A. I suppose so. I passed him. 
Q. On the day of this accident, were you driving a car on the 
road near where the accident happened 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 122 r Q. Did you see the accident? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. What happened in your car shortly before the accident! 
A. I was behind the car and it slowed down, just looked 
like it was going to stop, so I blew: the horn, pulled out, ·and 
went by. , · 
Q. Which way were you driving? 
A.· Going towards Franklin from Sedley. 
Q. That·is the same direction Mr. Camp was going inf 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What car stopped in front of you, whose carY 
A. It hadn't stopped when I passed him. 
Q. "\Vhose car was it, do you knowY 
A. It was Mr. Camp's car. 
Q. And what did it dof 
A. Itwas slowing up. 
Q. And when it slowed down, what did you do Y 
A.· I blew my horn and passed him. 
Q. Which side did yon go on? 
A. When I pa.ssed him? The left side. 
., 
I 
116 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
Leland Storey. 
Q. As you passed it, what did Mr. Camp's car dot 
A. lie "ras gradually slowing up. 
Q. Do you know whether he stopped, or not, before you 
passed? 
page 123 ~ A. No, he had not when I passed him. 
Q. How far were you from the curve when you 
passed himf 
A. About 125 or 130 steps, something like that. 
Q. You drove on then, did you! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And know nothing· about the accident, itself¥ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you meet anybody else as you came on 1 
A. I met Elijah Joyner. 
Q. About how far after you passed the Camp ca~ before yon 
met the J oyners? 
A. About 120 or -25 steps. _ 
Q. And the Joyner car was going the opposite direction 
from you? 
A. 'Yes, sir. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By 1Yir. Parker: 
Q. ~1:r. Storey, did you, at any time that day, overtake 
. and pass ~Ir. Fenton Bryant? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Then, he was behind you the whole time, wasn't he 1 
A. I don't know. I didn't never see l1im. 
Q. You never saw him¥ 
page 124 ~ A. No, sir. 
Q. You don't know how far behind, or anything 
about itY . 
A. No, sir. 
Q. 'Vhen yon passed the Camp car, could you see clearly 
to your left-hand side of the road ahead of you to that curve, 
to see whether or not traffic was coming f 
A. I could see well enough to see that no traffic \Vas com-
ing. 
Q. You 'vould not have passed it if there had been any, 
would youY . · 
A. No, sir. . 
Q. You passed in the normal manner, that is, blew your 
horn and went hy and got back on your side of the road; 
isn't tha.t correet ~ 
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A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How far ahead of you, while you all were driving, say, 
from Harvey Cutchin's gate down there, could you see the 
Camp car? 
A. Well, I was about 150 yards behind it, something like 
that. 
Q. You saw him clearly? 
A. Yes, sir, I could see him but I could not tell who It was, 
or anything like that. 
Q. You saw his stop-light come on just before you got ready 
to pull out and pass him, didn't you~ 
page 125 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
Q. 8o far as the dust was concerned, llfr. Storey, 
when you turned the curve at Harvey Cutchin's gate-you 
Imow where that is, don't you? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. So far as the dust was concerned, you could see all the 
way down tl1e straight stretch of that road, couldn't you~ 
A. If you looked good you could, yes, but there was some 
dust down there. 
Q. You were looking well enough to see, weren't you Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you knew there was no car between you and ]\fr. 
Camp's car to keep you from seeing that car, 'vas there f 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Do you remember seeing in the east bank of that road 
there a piece of paper that is still there today, sort of em-
bAdded in the bank? 
A. I saw it after I came from Franklin, after the cars 
were ·wrecked. 
Q. You have seen it in recent weeks, haven't you? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. From what car was. that piece of1 paper taken, or do you 
know? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. You remember seeing that piece of paper 
page 126 ~ there the day of the wreck f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And where was it with relation to lVIr. Joyner's car and 
Mr. Bryant's car the day of the wreck? 
A. I don't know, but I think it was between the radiator 
and the front door of Joyner's car. 
Q .. It was between tl1e radiator and the front door of .Joy-
ner 's car as you found the cars after they were wrecked 7 
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A. The best I remember . 
. Q. You didn't know anything about the accident taking 
place; did you Y 
A. No, sir. . . . Q. You l3atne oil into F1•artklin and we·nt oil the other side 
of town and back home before you knew it? · 
A. I did not go out of town. . . 
Q~ But you did go to tlie soutli side of Franklin Y 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. So that you had driv~rt all the 'vay from wliere this 
accident happened to the south side of Franklin. and back 
out there before you knew there 'vas aiiy accident 7 
A. Yes; sir. 
Q. Now, 'vhare did you meet and pass Mr. Sol Rawls oii 
the road? 
A. I did not see him, didn't meet him. . 
Q. Between the time you left Mr. Harvey O~tchiri '~ gate 
and the time you ovei·took arid! passed 1Yir. Jimmy 
page 127 } Camp, did you meet and pass any car V 
A. No, sir. 
Q. None at allY 
4,. No, sir. 
Q. Did any car~ ovettak~ and pass you hi between there Y 
A . . No, sir. 
Q. Now, if you met Mr. Joyner where you remember mset-
ing him, it was about the center Qf the ctirve which was just 
ahead of you the way you were dtiVing, the place where the 
wreck took place? 
. A. It was dn th~ curv~j 
Q. You had had time enough to get )Ja~k on your side, after 
passing the Catnp car, and just aooiit that much tiliie when you 
met J\{r. Joyner, is that right? ~ 
A. By the tim~ I got back good I met him. 
Q. Now, when the Camp car was being passed by you, you 
say, it had'not stopped? .. 
A; .No, sir, it had hot stopped. It was rolling~ _ 
Q. It was rolling about how fast, six or seven miles aii 
hour? 
A. Seven or eight or ten. . 
Q. But you could see ah~ad of you; follo,ving it, that it 
was going to stop f 
A. I could see by looking re.al. good. 
Q. That is what I mean; and you did see it, 
page 128 ~ didn't you 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Leland Storey~ 
Q. The question of whether you could s.ee it is prli~en by 
whether you did see it, and yon did see it, didn't youY 
A. Yes, sir. _ . · 
Q. you saw it a considerable distance ahead of you before 
it was passed by your car, didn't you? 
A. What is that--· _ _ 
Q. Did he slow down all of a suddEhi; or just gradually 
slowf 
A. Well, he· slowed pretty good .and fast. ., 
Q. :Well, ho'v far did it take him to slow doWI17 Where 
did he start slowing doWJ!.? 
A: About where that side road goes in; 
· Q. Tha.t is where he started slowing down! 
A. Yes, sir. _ 
Q. Wlierl you passed the C~mp car, how far was ~t towards 
Harvey Ctitchin's gate, at tlie monient you passed it, from 
this paper on the bank 1 · 
A. It was about two-thirds from the side road to the paper. 
Q. It had already traveled, then, about two-thirds of the 
- distance from the side road to the paper when 
page 129 } you passed it? 
A; Wlieli I passed it. _ . . 
Q. Could ytiti. see, all the way from the time. it started 
stopping at the side road until you pass~d it, that it Was 
goihg to stop 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You did not actually see it stop; did yoii t 
A. No; sir. . 
Q. Nor the position a.t which it stopped, because you did 
not look back; isn't that right? 
A: Yes, sir. _ . . . . 
Q. Did -you see the crash hike place behind you t 
A. No; sir. . . 
Q. You eoulcl not have been far away, could you Y 
A. Not so far; ho, sil'. . 
Q. You could not have been as far as the Southern cross-
ing', could yoli 7 
A. I don't know how far I was. 
Q. well, you passed Joyrier in the center of the curve ; 
was he driving at about your speed? _ 
A. He was driving-! took him to be driving about 18 oi• 
20 miles an hour. 
Q. And about how fast were yori driVing? 
A. Around 30 or 35. 
Q. When you passed him going around that curve? 
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A. Yes, sir. 
Qr How fast had you been driving following 
page 130 ~ the Can1p car? 
A. Around 35 01~ 40. I don't know exactly, but 
the best I can judge. 
Q. When you tnrned out to pass the Camp car, cou~d you 
see all the way ahead. of you to where the curve hid the 
road? 
A. By looking good you could. 
Q. Well, you did see all the way ahead of you, didn't you ? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you say that at that time the road was clear; 
isn't that correct' · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And that is tl1e reason yon went by. Now, yon saw 
those: tracks of lVIr. Joyner's car out there when you got baclt 
.to the wreck, didn't you f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And what did they show 1 
A. \Vhat do you mean 1 
Q. I ·mean, where did you see the tracks f "What did they 
show as to where Mr. Joyner 1s car was and 'vhen? 
A. The tt:ack was in the ditch about 30 steps, or 32 or 33',. 
something like that. 
Q. 32 or 33 steps before it got to the place 'vhere you 
_ found the wrecked carY 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 131 ~ Q. Did it jump into the ditch all of a sndclen,. or 
go gradually into the ditch Y 
A. It went gradually. 
Q. 1\fr. Storey, 'vere those tracks, from the pojnt wl1cre 
they first started into the ditch to the point where yon found 
them, just straight tracks, or was there any slipping from 
side to side to indicate wl1ether or n·ot t11at ca.r was strnck 
before it reached the place where you saw the car 1 
A. I did not see any sliding. 
Q. Well, yon saw them all the way from where they st:ai·ied 
to where the car came to rest 1 
A. On the right-hand side, yes, sir. 
Q. And you did not see any slddding out to one side or tlle 
other of that track Y 
A. No, sir. 
Q. When you got hack there, were there many people! 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. Cars parked on both sides of the toad, going and com-
ing~ 
A. I would not say about both sides, because I had to park 
down close to the railroad. 
Q. So that there were cars parked all the way from there 
up to around the curve and to the wreck~ · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And the people in most of them were out looking at it Y 
A. Yes, sir, I suppose so. 
page 132 ~ Q. When you got there, Mr. Bryant had been 
taken away? 
A. He was in the ambulance. 
Q. That was when you first got there Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
RE-DIRECT EXAl\IIINATION. 
By 1\!Ir. Martin : 
Q. I understood you to say that when you came behind the 
Camp car you were going some 35 or 40 miles an hour before 
you turned out? 
A. That was the speed that I followed it at. 
Q. You followed the Camp car at about 35 or 40 miles 
an hour? 
li.. Yes, sir. 
Q. Then you turned out to your left and passed it, aud when 
you passed the Joyner car, the Joyner car was meeting you, 
driving rather slowly-18 or 20 miles an hour, I think yon 
said? 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 133 ~ RE-CROSS EXA~IINATION. 
By Mr. Parker: 
Q. When you turned the corner there a.t Harvey Cutcbjn 's 
gate, was the Camp car ahead of you at that time? 
A. You see, I was behind it about 150 yards. 
Q. Well, at the time you got in sight of the straight stretch 
down there, ~{r. Camp's car was about where it started slow-
ing up, wasn't it Y 
A. No, sir; I was closer to the car than that. 
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JACK TJMPHLETT, 
a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, being duly sworn, was 
examined and testified as follows: 
. 
Examined by Mr. Pulley: 
Q. Jack, do you live close to Franklin Y 
A. Yes, sir. · · 
Q. Were you out on the road that we are speaking about 
where Mr. Bryant got hurt? Do you know where he got hurt 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you know about where he got hurt? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Were you on that road the afternoon he wa~ hurt7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q." With whom Y 
A. Mr. Storey. 
page 134 ~ Q. Mr. Leland Storey? 
A. Yes, sir: 
Q. Riding inside of the car 7 · ' 
A. Right .. ha.nd seat, in front. 
Q. On the right-hand side? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was he driving? · 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you see ~Ir. Camp's carY 
A. I don't remember seeing it. 
Q. You don't remember about that Y 
A .. No, sir. 
Q. Did you meet any automobile down the road there at 
that pointY 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. About the point, I mean, where Mr. Bryant was sup-
posed to have gotten hurtY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Whom did you meet Y 
A. Mr. Joyner. 
Q. Who? 
A. Mr. Elijah Joyner. 
Q. Do you know him well Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How long have you known him! 
A. I don't know, sir. 
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Q. At what point in the road did you meet him? 
page 135 ~ A. Right on the corner. 
Q. That is the curve, you mean 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. That is the curve that you make before you go down 
to the railroad right-of-way? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You met him right there at the curve? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was the road dusty that afternoon, or notY 
A~ Yes, sir. 
Q. It was? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You had not paid any attention to the Camp car; you 
had not seen that1 that you know of? 
A. No, sir. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
I r~ 
By Mr. Parker: 
Q. Where do you live? 
A. About six miles from Franklin. 
Q. You live in the same house Mr. Leland Storey lives 
in, don't you f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is Mr. Storey's wife your sister, or your aunt! 
.A. She is my sister. 
Q. And yon all live there together Y 
page 136 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What other men were iti the automobile that 
day? 
A. There were two colored men. 
Q. Two colored men Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. They 'vere sitting on the back seat, werentt theyf 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. And all you remember a.bout this is that you metMr. 
Joyner's car going from Franklin2 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And yon remember exactly where yon met him, don't 
you? 
A. Yes, sir. 
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a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, being duly sworn, was 
examined and testified a~ follows : 
Examined by Mr. Martin: 
Q. Your name is 1\fr. Elijah Joyner, isn't itf 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And how old are yon and where do you live f 
A. Twenty-six. I live near Franldin. 
Q. Were you in the automobile we have been calling "the 
Joyner car'' on the afternoon of this accident t 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 137 r Q. Which seat were you in~ 
A. The front, driving. 
Q. Mter the accident, did you talk to Mr. Camp 7 You 
know Mr. Jimmy Camp, 1II7 
A. 'Veil, he came to Franklin for a doctor. 
Q. Did he talk to you then 7 
A. He talked going home. 
Q. Was he in the car with you f 
A. Yes, sir. He came to Franklin. 
Q. In. the same car with yon¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What did he tell you in the car with you f 
Mr. Parker: If your Honor please, simply to mai{e my 
objection binding, I make my objection to this as being irrele-
vant and immaterial, anticipating what its nature 'viii be. I 
understand that you rule against me and I take an exception 
on it. 
By Mr. Martin: 
Q. What did Mr. Jimmy Camp, III, tell yon in the carf 
A. When he was taking me to Franklin? 
Q. Yes. 
A. You mean, when he took me to Franklin to the hospital f 
Q. When he was talking· about how the accident happened 
and whose fault it was, if anybody's. 
page 138 r A. He said, when he was going on to Franklin, 
· he had no business ~topping· there, if he had not 
stopped, it would not have been his fault. 
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CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Parker: 
· Q. Let me get that straight. If he had not ever stopped, 
it would not have been his faultY 
A. It would not have happened. 
Q. Now, Mr. Joyner, at that time, of course, you had been 
hurt, hadn't you 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And could you talk? 
· A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you say anything in reply to Mr. Camp? 
A. I told him it was not all his fault. 
Q. You said it was ~ot all his fault, didn't you? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And at that time you told him it was the fault of both? 
A. I didn't say. I said, "It was not all your own fault". 
That is what I said. 
Q. Didn't you go a little farther than that a.nd tell him-
A. No, sir, tha.t is as far as I went. I did not feel like 
talking then. 
page 139 r Q. \¥hat other person's fault could it have been, 
Mr. Joyner? 
A. Well, we :figured-
Q. It was not your fault, was it f 
A. No, sir. 
Q: As a matter of fact, 1\fr. Joyner, you did just what these 
witnesses have testified here-you pulled your car over to the 
right and went up against the bank where you were struck, 
didn't you Y · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And ·were you moving fast, or slow, or standing still 
when you were struck~ 
A. I was almo.st stopped when I was struck. 
Q. Why did you pull over to your right 1 
A. Well, I seen ~Ir. Camp's car parked in the road and 
seeing Mr. Bryant's car coming· and saw he needed all the 
road he could get, so I pulled in the ditch. 
Q. You could see 1\fr. Bryant's car as soon as you turned 
that curve and came into the straight stretch up there looking 
towards Mr. Cutchin's, couldn't you f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where was he? 
A. He was just beyond the road. 
126 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
Elijah Joyner. 
Q. Just beyond the side road that goes off to your leftY 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 140 ~ Q. "Then did you start pulling off-as soon as 
you saw Mr. Bryant? 
A. Well, not exactly. I got along, I reckon-let's see-I 
will say 150 feet fron1 the curve before I started pulling over. 
Q. That was when you first saw Mr. Bryant? 
A. No, I saw- him at first. 
Q. You started pulling off to your right after you passed 
Mr. Camp's car, then, didn't you Y 
A. After I passed Mr. Camp's car? 
Q. Y~s. 
A. It happened right at the back of his car. 
Q. Then; you started pulling off to, your right before you 
got to Mr. Camp's ca.r Y · 
A, Sure. If I hadn't, I would not have pulled off. 
Q. Why did you think ~Ir. Bryant 'vas not going to stop 
behind the Camp carY 
A. Well, I didn't know. 
Q. What made you pull off to the right? 
A. Well, I saw that car was parked there and he was 
coming, and I was getting over in the ditch. 
Q. When you first saw the Camp car, it was standing still, 
wasn't it~ 
A. No, sir, it was moving along real slow. 
Q. ""\Vasn 't it standing still when you passed it Y 
page 141 ~ A. Yes, sir; I just had passed. 
Q. You knew that the Camp car was not going 
to hit you, didn't you Y 
A. Not where I was at. 
Q. That is what I say-you were driving on your own 
side of the road? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You knew it was not going to hit you? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, who was it you were afraid was going to hit you Y 
A. Well, I was getting over there. I didn't know; I thought 
'maybe both of them might come over there on me. 
Q. You don't ordinarily take to the ditch and scrape the 
bank, do you, Mr. Joyner? 
A. In a case like that I would. 
Q. I know, but what made you think it was necessary for 
you to get out of the road? · 
.A. Well, that car was parked in the road a.nd Mr. Bryant 
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was coming up behind the Camp car, and I pulled off the road 
in the ditch to give Mr. Bryant room to get by the Camp 
car. ~ 
Q. And when you were hit~ you were right up against the 
hankY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And that is your usual custom when you 
page 142 } meet people on the road? · 
A. No, sir, I don't usually pull in the ditch. 
Q. Why did you do unusually in this case~ 
A. Well, I just told you. 
Q. Wasn't it because you could see from the way Mr. Fen-
ton Bryant's car was behaving that if you didn't get out of 
the way you were going to get hit T 
A. Well, the Camp car was so close on the curve, and as 
· I came around the curve--
Q. You are trying your best to put this on the Camp car; 
I can see that. 
A. No, I am not. 
}lr. Martin: ···I object to that. 
The Witness: It is nothing to me in this case. 
Mr. Parker: Your Honor, I apologize. He is entirely cor-
rect. I should never have made it; it was an unintentional 
statement. ·_ 
The Witnes~: I am just telling you like it was. I would 
not tell anything I did not know. 
By Mr. Parker: . 
Q. I ask you this: You had plenty of room to go by the 
Camp car on your side of the road, didn't you! 
A. Had plenty of room 7 
Q. Yes. 
page 143 ~ A. Yes. 
Q. You did not need to take the ditch and go up 
against the bank on account of anything between you and 
the Camp car, if you had been the only ones on the road, did 
you? · 
A. I could have got by, sure, if there wasn't any other 
car involved along there. 
Q. I mean, you could have gotten by just by driving the way 
you usually do on your side of. the road, couldn't you Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. S"o, the reason you took the ditch was because you saw 
Mr. Fenton Bryant coming, wasn't it? _ 
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A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you did it because you could see from the wa.y he 
was going that if you did not take the ditch, he was going to 
hit you Y 
A. I didn't kno'v whether he was going to hit the parked 
car or come over on my side. 
Q. But you thought you had better get. out of the way t 
A. Yes, I thought I had better get. over into the ditch. 
Q. Ho,v fast were you driving coming around the curve¥ 
A. I should say 20 or 25 . 
. Q. Did your car stay where .it was, or move farther on 
towards Sedley! 
A. It stayed practically in the tracks where it 
page 144· ~ was hit. 
Q.: It was practically in the bankt 
A. Yes, sir, it was in the bank .. 
Q. Did it move off towards Sedley t 
A. No, sir. 
Q. 7\:fr.- Fenton Bryant hit yon in the front of your car, 
didn'"t heY 
A. It was kind of on the side. 
Q. I mean, the part of your car that was struck was the 
front part of your carY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Over on your car's left-hand side f 
A. On his right side and my left side. 
Q. There was a little dust on the 1·oad ti1a.t day, wasn't 
there? 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. But you could see everything up to Harvey Cutchin's 
gate when you got around the curve~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You could see the Camp car-
A. I saw· it just beyond the side road .. 
Q. You mean lVIr. Bryant's cart 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And that is where he was when you first got where vou 
could see that straight stretch of road T .. 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 145 ~ Q. You sa.w the Camp car before you really 
got out of the curve f 
A. I saw it just as soon as I came around the curve. 
Q. And you saw it just as soon as you could have seen it 
if there had been no dust at all on the road? 
A. Yes, sir, I could have seen it. 
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Q. You did not see ~ir. Sol Rawls' car at all, did you 1 
A. He weren't there to see. 
Q. Suppose he was up the road ahead of you 1 
A. He was not along there in sight 'vhen I come around the 
curve. 
Q. In sight of whom? 
A. I didn't see Mr. Rawls as I come around the curve. 
Q. You did not see his car at all, then, the whole day of 
the accident until he came back to the accident, did you Y 
A. That is right. 
Q. Did you see the way Mr. Bryant's car behaved or acted 
just before it struck you? 
A. Well, not until it started to pull out and put on the 
brakes. _ 
Q·. You saw the result of putting on brakes; you did not 
see him put his foot down, of course 7 
A. No, sir. 
page 146 ~ Q. What did you see him do? 
A. Just come across the road like that into me 
( inqica ting). . 
Q. Let's see if we can describe that and see if a man can 
take it down and show what it was. How did his car be-
have? 
A. Well, it just come across the road sideways, just skidded 
kind of sideways across the road. 
Q. vVas he sliding sidewise, as well as moving forward, or 
was h·e only moving forward Y 
A. Well, it was mostly sideways when he struck me. 
Q. How far would you say it was back of the Camp car 
when he started sliding sidewise Y 
A. Back of the Camp car 7 
Q. Yes. 
A. I should say-
Q. First, ho'v far was it from you when you first saw 
the sliding sidewise ~ 
A. Up the road from my carY 
Q. Yes. 
A. I should say 35 or 40 yards. 
Q. Let's see that this way: How far was he-
A. A hundred feet. 
Q. A hundred feet only when he started sliding your wayY 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 147 ~ Q. Now, how far was he on your side of the 
side road down there whe:p.. he started skidding? 
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A. I don't understand. 
Q. How far was :rvt:r. Bryant from where that side road 
leads off and goes down throug-h the field when he started 
skidding, because you saw him ·when he first started Y 
A. Oh, he was right close on the Camp car when he first 
started skidding. 
Q. And from the moment he started skidding until he struck 
you, he got n1ore and more sidewise of the road and more 
and more on your side 7 
A. Coming sideways, yes, sir,-well, h.e come practically 
across in front of me. 
Q. Practically across the road in front of you? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was he half way between you and that side road when 
you first saw him, or was he closer than that to you? , · 
A. When I :first saw him? 
Q. Yes. 
A. He was just beyond the road when I first saw him. 
Q. Was there any car between him and the Camp car when 
you first saw him? · 
A. No, sir-between Mr. Bryant and the Camp car? 
Q. No. Was there any car between Mr. Bryant and the 
Camp car when you first saw 1\fr. Bryant? 
page 148 ~ A. No, sir. 
Q. And no car ever gqt in between them while 
you saw the two of them, did there T 
A. No, sit·. '. 
Q. Was there any dust farther up the road in front of 
Harvey Cutchin's gate that you saw? 
A. At Harv.ey Cutchin's gateY 
Q. Yes. 
A. I could not say, that far. 
Q. When you came around the curve, you could see that far 
up the road, couldn't you? 
A. Sure, but I was not looking particularly way up that 
far at that time. · 
Q. So, you don't know whether you could see behind M:r. 
Bryant's car or not? 
A. I could see the dust behind his car. 
Q. But you could not see past there, on up that wayt 
A. No, sir. 
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RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION .. 
By ~Ir. Martin: 
Q. You sta.ted, when you first saw the Camp car, that the 
Camp car was rolling, was moving' 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And then it seemed to slow down 7 
A. Yes, sir, come to a stop. 
page 149} Q. It came to a stopY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And was any hand ·held out by anybody in the Camp 
carY 
A. No, sir. 
Mr. Parker: Just a second. If your Honor please, I make 
objection to that. That point has not come up before. I would 
like to· make this objection: That it could not possibly have 
anything to do with the liability to Mr. Bryant in this case~ 
He testified that the first time he saw the car it was standing 
still, and there is no requirement to keep on holding a hand 
out after you stop. It can't possibly be a cause of this acci .. 
dent. 
Mr. ~1:artin: ~1:ay it please the court, Mr. Bryant testified 
that when he first saw the Camp car he could not tell whether 
it was moving or still, that as he got a little closer he found 
it was still, and then he swerved out to his left. Now, whether 
or not they· stopped the car with a hand out may be material. 
The law requires them 'to give a signal when they stop, and 
we have averred that they gave no signal. 
~1:r. Parker: If your Honor please, Mr. Bryant's testimony' 
was also to the effect that, as it turned out, the 
page 150 ~ Camp car was stopped when he first saw it, al-
though a.t that moment he did not realize it. That 
being the case, it cannot possibly be a proximate cause of · 
this accident or have anything to do with it. 
The Court: My recollection of Mr. Bryant's testimony was 
that he did not know at the moment that it was still, but he 
ascertained after,vards that it probably was still when he 
first saw it. I think he said that. If that is so, I don't see 
how the hand would figure in it at this time. 
Mr. Martin:- He did say, your I-Ionor, that he did not know 
at first whether it was still or moving; that now he believes 
it was still; but he doesn't know now whether it was still or 
not. He can't know. 
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The Court: I think you can leave the hand out of the pic-
ture. 
Mr. :J\IIartin: Well, we offer to prove it, your Honor, and 
save the poin~. 
By Mr. Martin : 
Q. The Camp car then slowed down f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And came to a stop f 
A. Yes, sir. 
· Q. Did you see ·what the people in the Camp car 
page 151 ~ were doing? Did they move around any that you 
could seef 
A. Well, the boy got out. 
Q. Do you know which one got out f 
A. No, sir,-the driver. 
Q. The driver got out f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q .. And did anyone take his place before this crash f 
A. No, sir. He got out and looked back and got back in tl1e 
car. 
Q. The driver got out and Ioolred back and got back in the 
carf 
A. Yes, sir. And about that time l1e and ].fr. Bryant run 
together. 
Q. When the driver got back into the car, do you kno'v 
which side he got in f 
A. Ife got under the wheel. 
Q. Do you know who it wasf 
A. No, sir. 
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Parker: 
Q. Then, the Camp car was stopped long enough, as yon 
remember it, for a boy to get out, get on the road, get back 
• in, and close the door before the accident happened 1 
A. I don't know whether he closed the door or not.. 
Q. Well, he got back in f 
page 152 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And sat down 1 
A. I don't know whether he sat down. 
Q. And all that time Mr. Fenton Bryant was coming on f 
A. Yes, sir. . 
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RE-DIRECT EXAlVfiNATION. 
By Mr. Martin: 
Q. The driver who got out of the car, what did he do when 
he got out~ 
A. Just looked back and got back in. 
Q. Immediately? . . 
A. Yes, sir. As far as closing the door, I don't know If 
he closed the door, because right at that time 've hit-Mr. 
Bryant ran into me, at least. 
HERBERT G. COBB, 
recalled, by the plaintiff, was further examined and testified 
as follows: 
By Mr. Pulley: , 
Q. J\{r. Cobb,-
Mr. Parker: If your Honor please, J\iir. Martin examined 
this witness before, and I think it is proper for 
page 153 ~ him to continue to examine him. 
The Court: Yes. 
Examined by Mr. Martin: , 
Q. ·Mr. Cobb, I examined you when you were on the wit-
ness stand, did I not¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And that was the first time that you and I had ever 
spoken, was it not, across the table here? And you stated 
, about some conversation that you had with }!r. Jimmy 
Camp~ 
A. The III, yes, sir. 
Q. I was tryin~ to get it exactly right as to what he did 
say with you. Dtd you talk with Mr. Pulley about the mat-
ter some days ag·o in preparing to be examined as a witness 
when· Mr. Pulley talked to you f 
.A. Yes, sir, ~Ir. Pulley talked with me about it. 
Q. Will you please tell the jury as accurately as you can 
what Mr. Jimmy Camp, III, said to you on the occasion 'vhen 
he came to ask for a doctorf 
A. Well, he came in the store, as I said awhile ago, very 
excited, very nervous, and. asked me to get a doctor for him, 
that Mr. Bryant was hurt in a wreck, and I proceeded to 
try to get a doctor, but I could not get a doctor for him, and 
he also said, "It was my fault". 
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Q. That 'vas what I wanted to get straight be-
page 154 ~ cause when I asked you before you stated-what 
the jury heard you say. 
A. Yes, sir. When I got off the stand I wanted the jury 
to understand what I 1neant when he told me that it was his 
fault. 
Q. Have you any interest whatever in this case?. 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Have you any reason to come back to the stand except 
to correct this 7 · 
A. None at all. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By 1Yfr. Parker: · 
Q. You were requested by the attorneys to come back on 
the stand? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. They told you, before they called you back, that they 
were going to do so, didn't they 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What did you see that Jimmy did or did not do, or the 
way he behaved, that indicated to you he \vas excited or nerv-
ousf 
A. Well, he was crying, and he was very nervous, too, 
walking around cr'ying. I did all I could to help find a doc-
tor, but I could not find a doctor. 
Q. Do you remember any other behavior on his 
page 155 ~ part to indicate nervousness Y · 
A. No, sir,-just walking around and crying 
and begging n1e to get a doctor for him. 
Q. For whom? . 
A. For Mr. Bryant, to send a doctor out to the wreck as 
quick as I could. 
Mr. Martin : We rest. 
(The following motion \vas made out of the hearing of the 
jury:) 
Mr. Parker: I wish to renew the motion previously made 
to strike the plaintiff's evidence, on the grounds previously 
assigned and on the grounds that these statements apply as 
well to· the testimony of the other witnesses who have gone 
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on since the plaintiff as they did to the testimony of the 
plaintiff, himself. 
The Court: I overrule the motion. 
Mr. Parker: I except. 
page 159 ~ GILLETTE T. BRYANT, 
a witness on behalf of the defendants, being duly 
sworn, was examined and testified as follows: 
Examined by Mr. Parker: 
Q. Your name is Gillette T. Bryant, and where do you live f 
A. Courtland. 
Q. And what is your job? 
A. Patrolman for the State. 
Q. What kind of roads do you patrol, or highways f 
.A. The secondaries. 
Q.. How long have you been attached to that job f 
A. About two years, a little over. 
Q. Is this road from Franklin to Joyner's Church, where 
this accident took place that this case is about, in your ter-
ritoryf 
A.. Yes, sir. 
Q. Are you familiar with it now! 
A~ Yes, sir. 
Q. Were you familiar with it in May of last year and prior 
to that time f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Tell me whether or not that road has been changed any 
between May of last year and now as to its grade f 
A. No, sir. 
Q. How about the width between gully and 
page 157 .} gully? 
A. 1No, sir. 
Q. How about its direction, that is., its curves and its 
straight of way? 
A.. No, sir. 
Q. It was at that time scarifiedt 
A. That is what they say. 
Q. Ho,v long was it scarified f 
A. Pretty near all the summer, I g11ess, Mr. Parker. 
Q. Before any oil was put on it? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Would your road machine on any work that you do up 
tJ1ere reach to an article on the top or near the top o£ the 
bank, or not? 
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A. No, sir .. 
i 
Q. It would not f 
A. No, sir. Q. Now, how wide is that macadam surface there now com-
pared to the one that was there before the road was scari-
:fiedt 
A. The surface that is there now is two foot narrower than 
the .old. 
Q. Is there any difference in the road now and May of 
19'36 as to the height of the banks on each side i 
A. No, sir. 
Q. How about fences Y 
A. They have recently put a fence: on the right-
page 158 ~ hand side going towards Franklin. 
Q. Going towards Franklin~ . 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. That is· on which side of the road, east or west! 
A. It is the west side of the road. 
Q. The west side of the road t 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Up until that fence that yon are just taTh:ing abont was: 
recently put there, how far from Harvey Cutchin's gate to-
wards Franklin did the fence that was there before comet 
A. I reckon about half way there. I never noticed exactly. 
Q. About half way from Harvey Cutchin's gate to where 
this curve is that "\Ve have been talking about~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
(No c:ross examination.} 
F. H. HAMBLIN, 
a witness on behalf of the defendants, being dnly sworn, was 
examined and testified as follows : 
Examined bv Mr. Parker: 
Q. 1\tfr. Hamblin, what is yonr occupation, please, or· busi-
ness, and length of experience? 
A. My name is F. H. Hamblin; occupation, pho-
page 159 ~ tographer; I live in Suffolk. 
. Q. How long have- you been at the work of pho-
tographyf 
A. About thirty years. 
Q. I show you pictures nurnbered 1, 3, 4, 5-A, 6, 7, and 8, 
and ask you whether or not you took those pictures.¥ 
A~ Yes, sir, I took these pictures. 
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Q. Are the descriptions and notations pasted on the back 
of each correct as to the place taken, the object shown, and 
the day and the conditions 1 
·A. Yes, sir. 
Q. ¥ay I ask you, starting at No. 1, to read into the. record 
the descriptions on the back of each. Simply say that No. 1 
is so-and-so. 
The Court: Why don't you file No. 1 and all in the record 
and they will be there then and have the record on the back1 
~Ir. Parker: I will do that in just a second. 
1\Ir. Martin: Is ;No. 2 missing, or you just did not use 
No.2? 
J\IIr. Parker: I just did not use .No. 2. 
Gentlemen of th'3 .Tury, here are sets of these pictures for 
each one of you to use as you choose while listeuing to this 
testimony. 
By }fr. Parker: 
Q. I ask you if the notations pasted on the 
page 160 ~ back of each of these pictures are correct as to 
the inforn1ation given by those notations' 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Then, you need not give it into the record, since it is 
agreed that the stenographer can copy that into the record. 
~fr. 1\Iartin: We do not object to the stenographer's copy-
ing it into the record. . 
Note: The seven pictures identified by the witness, as 
above numbered, were filed in evidence, marked "Defendants' 
Exhibits 1 to 7", inclusive, and the notations on the back 
thereof are as follows: 
Picture No. 1. 
"Taken fron1 back porch of Harvey Cutchin's house at 
heig·ht of man standing at wash bench, looking south towards 
Franklin. 
"Weather clear; date, July 15, 1937, at 11:45 A. :TYI. 
''The automobile is at a point 30 ft. south of (towards 
Franklin) the paper on the bank." 
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Picture No. 3. 
"Taken from the center line of the highway at a point 
immediately opposite the middle of Harvey Cutchin's gate. 
Taken from the height of a man driving a car. 
page 161 ~ ''The picture looks south towards Franklin. 
''The car facing away from the camera is at a 
point 30 ft. south of (towards Franklin) the paper on the 
bank. 
''The other car, headed towards the camera, has just come 
in sight around the curve which is beyond the paper on the 
bank.'' 
Picture No. 4. 
''Taken from point on west edge of paved surface, 30 ft. 
south of (towards Franklin) the spot where the paper is. on 
the bank. 
"Taken July 1, 1937, about noon, from the height of a man 
sitting in an automobile. 
''This view lool{s north, away from Franklin. 
"The automobile in this picture is just coming in sight 
around the curve beyond Harvey Cutchin's gate. The au-
tomobile is headed towards Franklin.'' 
Picture 5A. 
"Taken from point on west edge of paved surface 30 ft. 
South of (towards Franklin) the point where paper is on 
the bank. 
"Taken ,July 1, 1937, about noon. 
"This view looks south, towards Franklin. 
''The car is headed north away from Franklin, 
page 162 ~ and the picture was taken at the moment the ear 
first came into sight around the curve.'' 
Picture No. 6. 
''Taken July 1, 1937, abo:ut noon. 
''Taken from the centerline of the highway on the curve 
south of (towards Franklin) the place of accident. 
''Taken from the heights of a man sitting in an automo-
bile. 
"Taken at a point where the stretch of road towards Har-
i 
i. 
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vey Cutchin's gate first becomes visible when proceeding 
north away from Franklin. 
''The automobile in the picture is hea~ed south, towards 
Franklin, and is just coming into view on the curve at Har-
vey Cutchin's gate." 
Picture No.7. 
''Taken July 1, 1937, about noon. 
''Taken from the west bank of the road, looking straight 
across the road at the east bank. 
''Harvey Cutchin is pulling aside the weeds to show the 
paper OD: the bank." 
Picture No. 8. 
"Taken July 1, 1937, about noon. 
''Taken from a point on the extreme eastern 
page 163 ~ edge of the road immediately at the paper on the 
bank, looking north, away from Franklin. 
''Man furthest from camera is standing at point where 
Harvey Cutchin states Bryant brakes were first applied. 
''Man closer to camera is standing at point where Harvey 
Cutchin says Bryant's tires started completely sliding. These 
men ·are placed to show distance up and down the road only. 
Photographer not shown anything concerning measurements 
from rig·ht to left of centerline of road.'' 
By Mr. Parker: 
Q. Were these pictures in any respect changed, or altered, 
or retouched by you before the pictures were made Y 
A. 'No, sir, they were not. 
Q. Are the directions shown on the front of the pictures, 
that is, ''To Franklin'', correct f 
.... ~. Yes, sir, they are all correct. 
By ~fr. Pulley: 
Q. Mr. Hamblin, d~d you make some pictures for us, those 
that I exhi~ited here this morning? . 
A. Yes, s1r. 
Q. You were in court at the time the pictures 
page 164 ~ were exhibited? 
A. Yes, sir. 
(No cross examination.) 
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E. 0. FORBES, 
a witness on behalf of the defendants, being duly sworn, was 
examined and testi!ied as follows : 
Examined by Mr. Parker: 
Q. Please state your name and where you live·f 
A. E. 0. Forbes, I live in half a mile of Franklin eity Inn-
its .. 
Q. You were out at the place 'vhere this 'vreck happened, 
the day of the wreck but after it happened; weren't you 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. When you got there, was Mr. James L. Camp, Jr.'s car 
anywhere around 1 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Was 1\{r. Fenton Bryant in his ·car when you got theref 
A. No, sir. I got there, I reckon, it was 30 minutes after 
the wreck happened. 
Q. And 1\{r. Bryant at that time had been carried away in 
the ambulance, hadn't he! 
A. Yes, sir. -
Q. Will you tell the jury what you SR\V as to the position 
of the cars and what tracks you examined and 
page 165 ~ what they 'vere 1 
A. When I got there, both cars ·were headed 
towards the Country Club and .Sedley. Joyner's car was 
over in the bank as far as it could go~ Mr. Bryant's car was 
headed the same way, right beside of the Joyner car. 
Q. What did you see about Mr. Joyner's tracks~ 
A. I saw Mr. Joyner's tracks right beside the bank there 
as far as they could get. 
Q. I mean, did you find any tracks on the bank, itself, made 
by the car1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How far back of his car did those tracks extend? 
A. About as far as from here to that-I would say from 
here to that post (indicating). 
Q. Is that about 14 feet, !tir. Forbesf 
A. Just about, yes .. 
Q. Back of ·where his ear actually struck the bank1 could 
you or could you not see any tracks of his tires? 
A. Back of his car~ 
Q. Yes, tire tracks made by the Joyner car. 
A. Yes. It led up to where it stopped. 
Q. But before his car had ever touched the bank, itself, did 
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you see any tracks of his tires, themselves, on the ditch bank, 
or did you not Y . • 
A. Where he was going off the shoulder into 
page 166 ~ the ditch bank. 
Q. Did they go off gradually in a direction to 
the place where you found the cars, or was there any indica-
tion that he was knocked off, or slipped sidewise while going 
off? 
A. It went off gradually. 
Q. Did you see any tracks of 1\!Ir. Fenton Bryant's carY 
A. No, sir.~ 
Q. Did you look for any? 
A. I could not see any. There had been so many there. 
There was a crowd there when I got there. You could not 
see any tracks of 1\!Ir. Bryant's car. . 
Q. ·How about the nature of the road, itself? If anybody 
had 'valked over this road before you got there, or driven 
over it, could you have seen the tracks of a car 'vhich had 
driven over it and been hi an accident? 
A. I don't know. This road was mighty dusty and dry. 
Q. But the surface could easily have been ripped up by 
an automobile going over it, or not¥ 
A. :Oh, if it put on brakes, you could, yes. 
CROSS EXAl\iiNATION. 
By Mr. Pulley: 
Q. The road that had just been plowed up 'vas somewhat 
bumpy on account of the little lumps of tar that were in 
there, wasn't it f 
page 167 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And that i~ the reason why you could not 
tell so well about the tracks if brakes had been applied? 
A. Well, when I got there, there had been a lot of walking 
around there; they could have been trampled out. As I say, 
it was about 30 minutes before I got there after the wreck 
happened. 
Q. You don't know where the cars came together at all, 
do you? 
A. ;No, sir. 
Q. There were no signs there to indicate to you a half an 
hour .later just where the cars struck¥ 
A .. No more than the g·lass was around there, that was all. 
Q. You saw some glass there? 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. Did you look for any glass down the road towards 
},ranklin f 
A. No, sir, I didn't look down there. 
Q. You just saw some there at the car? 
A. That is right. 
Q. You don't know what made the Joyner car go off the 
road¥ You know from the tires and tracks that it went off 
at a certain place, but why it 'vent off, you don't 
page 168 ~ know, do you 1 
A. I just saw the tracks there where it went off 
in an embankment. 
RE-DIRECT EXA1'IINATION. 
By Mr. Parker: 
Q. Where was this glass, Mr. Forbes' 
A. The glass I saw was all around there by both cars. 
Q. Where they were sitting when you found them¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was it scattered around or broken ·up Y 
A. It was sea ttered all around there. 
Q. Could you tell where it came from t 
A. It looked like it came out of headlights. 
Q. What part of 1\ir. Bryant's car received the impact¥ 
A. His right front, right in the middle of the radiator, and 
the front bumper and light. · 
Q. And what part of the Joyner car? 
A. On the left. 
Q. On the left-that is front or back! 
A. The front. 
Q. Why didn't you look for the tracks of the Bryant carY 
A. At the time I got there, lVIr. Parker, as I told you just 
now, people had walked around there. I did look ; 
page 169 t I did not see any tracks of Mr. Bryant's car. 
Q. Was that on account of the fact that there 
had never been any, or that people had been around? 
A. Oh, I could not say there had not been any. There 
was a crowd when I got there. 
Q. How about automobiles-were they there, too? 
A. Oh, at the time I got there, there were several cars, and 
several cars came up there afterwards. 
Q. Did you look as soon as you got there, or after several 
cars passed Y 
A. I looked as soon as I got there. 
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S. W. R.A WLS. 
a witness on behalf of the defendants, being duly sworn, was 
examined and testified as follows: 
Examined by Mr. Parker: 
Q. Mr. Rawls, your name, · residence, and occupation, 
please. 
, A. S. W. Rawls, Franklin., oil distributor. 
Q. What is your connection, if any, with the State Highway 
Commission? 
A. Highway Commissioner for the Suffolk and Richmond 
District. 
Q. How long have you been living in Franklin, approxi-
mately? 
page 170 } A. Since 1912. · 
Q. Do you manage the farm out on the Frank-
lin-to-Sedley Road known as the Harvey ·Cutchin farm .on 
which Ifarvey Cutchin lives' 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Are you familiar with the road leading out there' 
.A. Yes, sir. · · 
Q. Ifow often do you drive itY 
A. Almost every day. 
Q. tOn the day of this accident you were on that roadt 
'veren 't you Y 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Will you please tell the jury what happened from the 
time you left the Southern Railway until the time you heard 
of the accident? 
A. I had met a car coming towards Franklin, I would say 
about half way up the hill, and then I met this other car which 
turned out to be Jimmy Camp's car around the curve up 
there. Then I met J\iir. Bryant up beyond the cross-roads, the 
new roa"d that goes down through the farms. 
Q. Then what happened after you met Mr. Bryant? 
A. Well1 after I met 1\{r. Bryant, just before I got to the gate of tins farm, I heard this awful noise and I glanced up 
in my mirror and saw this cloud of dust behind me and I 
drove up to the gate, headed in, and backed out and went back 
down where the wreck was. 
page 171 } Q. You passed one car, you say, after crossing 
the Southern, and th~n yon got to Jimmy Camp's 
car; that car was going in the same direction you were, or 
the opposite direction? . 
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A. That car was going to Franklin and I was going In 
the opposite direction. 
Q. Who was in it, or do you know~ 
A. I haven't the slightest idea. 
Q. Did you pass this car at the time or after you. got to 
the curve~ 
A .. I passe-d it before I got to the curve. 
Q. Did you pass any car going· in the opposite direction 
from you from that time until you passed 1\llr. Camp's car! 
A. No, I did not. 
Q~. When you passed 1\tlr. Camp's car, state. whether ·or not 
it was moving or standing still? 
A. I can say if it was not standing still, it was: moving 
very slow, because it was making very little dust. 
Q .. Did you recognize any person in the Camp carf 
A. I did not. I was looking the. other way. 
Q. What, if anything, can you tell the jury about Mr. Fen-
ton Bryant's speed, the dust he was causing, how far you sa'v 
that dust, and what you did¥ 
A. "'\Vell, I saw that dust coming around the curve just be-
fore he ge-ts in front of Harvey Cutchin rs house,. ' 
page 172 ~ and there was a right strong wind blowing, I would 
say a west wind, blowing the dust in my direction,. 
and I ran my front windo\v up, a~d I met 1\IIr. Bryant aucl 
he gave me the sign and I did him, and that is all there \vas 
to it. 
Q. Did you roll your windo'v. down again 1 ~ 
A. Yes, sir, I rolled my window down again because tne 
dust was blowing straight across the road. . 
Q. Did you roll your window up before you got to ~r .. 
Camp's carf 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. 'Why not t 
A. Because there 'vas not any dust there. 
Q. You say you sa'v lvir. Bryant's car before it got around 
that bend at l\i;r. Harvey Cutchin's; do you mean the car, it-
self, actually came into sight? 
A. No; I saw the car and the dust about the same time. 
The dust 'vas rig·ht off the back of the car. 
Q. How much dust was he making1 Describe it as best you 
can to the jury as to whether it was much or little. 
A. He was making a considerable dust. The road was verv 
dry. . -
Q. How long have you driven a car, 1\tlr. Bryant Y 
/ 
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The Plaintiff: Twenty-eight years. 
Mr. Parker: I beg your pardon. 
page 173 } By Mr. Parker: 
Q. How long have you driven a car, Mr. Rawls? 
A. About twenty-five or thirty years .. 
Q. How fast, based on your observation of that car, was 
Mr. Fenton Bryant driving when he came around the curve 
at Harvey Cutchin's 1 
A. The only way I could judge that speed would be froni 
the dust. I imagine he was driving forty or forty-five miles 
an hour. 
Q. And how fast was he driving- when he passed you f 
A. Just about the same gait. I don't think he was slow-
ing up any. 
Q. Did you see or not see anything to indicate he slacked 
up from the first time you saw him to the time he met and 
passed you1 
A. I did not. 
Q. Did you notice him after he passed you, after you met 
himf 
A. No. 
Q. When you first came around that curye headed towards 
Harvey Cutchin's gate, after you came to where the bank or 
the curve does not hide anything from you, how far could 
you see? 
A. I could see all the way down the road. I could see this 
car coming all right. 
Q. "\Vas there any car except Jimmy Camp's 
page 174} car on your left between you and F'enton Bryant 
when he came around the curve at Harvey Cutch-
in's gate¥ 
A. !No, sir. 
Q. Did any car pass him? 
A. Didn't any car pass before I passed him. 
Q. Was there any car between the Camp car and !tlr. Bryant 
when he came around the curve 1 
A. •No, there was not. 
Q. You spoke of the wind a moment ago. vVhich wav was 
that 'vind blowing f ~ 
A. That 'vind was blowing from the west. 
Q. Would you call that an average wind, or a strong breeze, 
or' what? . 
A. It 'vas a pretty good, strong breeze, enough to blow the 
146 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
8. W. RQ/Wls. 
dust in my direction. That is the reason I rolled the window 
, up. 
Q. How about the dust raised by your own carY vVas there 
or was there not enough breeze to move that Y ' 
A. Yes, that would 1nove that right on oyer to the right, 
too. 
Q. Your dust would have been moved away, then, from 1\Ir. 
Bryant"s vision, or into Mr. Bryant's vision Y 
A. It would have been moved away. 
Q. Where were you when you and Mr. Bryant passed each 
other¥ 
A. I was just beyond that road (No. ~36 on the 
page 175 ~·plat). 
Q. You mean by ''just beyond" that you had 
just passed that road going to Harvey Cutchin's gate? · 
A. Yes. 
Q. When he passed you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And where were you when you first saw him? 
A. Well, I was a good distance back down the road. I 
didn't know who he was coming. I sa'v the dust. 
Q. I mean, where 'vere you when you first saw either his 
car or the dust of his car f 
A. Oh, I had just gotten. around that curye good up thete; 
I imagine. 
Q. Which curve? 
A. I saw him a good distance before I got to this cross-
road, because I remember seeing him and then looking over 
the other wav. . 
Q. When did. you start rolling up your wirtdowf 
A. As soon as I saw this dust coming. 
Q. Did you see his car just as soon as you got around the 
curve leading up to the place where Jimmy Camp's car was, 
or did you see it after you had gotten into the straight-
away? 
A. I saw it after I had gotten into the straight 
page 176 ~ of way. 
. Q. Who was the first person, outside of the 
people in the Camp car, the Joyner car, and the Bryant car, 
to get to the wreck after it happened? 
A. I think I was the first one. I did not see anybody there. 
Q. Who was the next person f 
A. Harvey Cutchin. 
Q. What happened, so far as what was done to Joyner and 
Blythe, after you got to the wreck Y 
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A. After I got to the wreck~ I went over to see Fento~, and 
he said he was hurt very badly, or something. And I saw 
. these Joyner boys-I did not know them-they came down 
from around the back side of their car. They were bleeding 
very bad and had on white shirts. And I told Jmmy Camp· 
to take them to the hospital, and they walked diagonally across 
the road and got in Jimmy's car. And I walked back to Fen-
ton, and he told me to get an ambulance, and I looked at him 
and saw that his trouser leg had been torn, and he said to 
get an ambulance. 
Q. Did ,you move him at all¥ 
A. :No. I told Haryey Cutchin to stay there and I would 
go and try to get an ambulance, and I went downtown and 
finally succeeded in getting a doctor. 
Q. When you first got to. the wreck, where were the four 
children in the Camp car? 
page 177 } A. They were up in the road coming towards 
· Fenton's car. 
Q. Where was the Camp. car? 
A. The Camp car was 50 or 75 feet diagonally across the 
road from the wreck. 
Q. And in which direction from the wreck f 
A. Towards Franklin. 
Q. Had the Camp car at that time, where you saw it, been 
placed in the curve, ol' in the road before it got to the curve, 
or where? 
.A. No, it was not in the curve. 
Q. It had not reached the eurve t 
A. No. 
Q. ·Now, when these men were put into tlie car, was the car 
backed up to the wreck, or were they walking down to the 
car? 
A. They walked down to the car. 
Q. And the car went on with them whic4 way? 
A. 'Vent on towards town, to the hospital. 
Q. yvhen you pulled 1\tlr. Bryant ?ut _of the car, coUld you 
pull him out where the cars were, r1g-ht then and theret 
A. No. . 
Q. What did they do¥ 
A. I was not there when they pulled him out. 
Q. Tell the jury what you saw about Mr. Joyn-
page 178 ~ er's tracks. 
A. I did not see any tracks. I saw, about 12 
or 15 feet back of Mr. Joyner's car, w~ere evidently his hub-
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caps or running board had cut into this bank. I did not go 
to look for wheel tracks at all. 
Q. Did you see, or did you look for, any tracks of Mr. Fen-
ton Bryant's carT 
A. I did not. 
Q. When you got back there after you had gone downtown 
to get the ambulance, and so forth, were there any people 
up theret 
A. Oh, there were fifteen or twenty, possibly more than 
that. 
Q. Fifteen people, or cars 1 
A. I imagine fifteen or twenty cars. 
Q. ~1r. Rawls,. I show you a plat of this road, which. has 
not as yet been introduced into evidence, but on which I wish 
you to identify some points. Take it any way you want which 
is most convenient. Now, on that plat is the curve indicated 
around which you were coming before you met arid passed 
Mr. Camp's carT 
A. This is town back here,. isn't itt 
Q. Yes; the town is to your left on the n1ap. The curve 
that says "654 feet to Southern Railway'', and from there 
going north, is the curve around which you were coming be-
fore meeting and passing the Camp car; is that 
page 179 ~ correct, or not? 
A. Yes, that is l~ight. I was coming in this di-
rection. 
Q. Is this inscription that says ''Dirt Road. No. 636" the 
dirt road to which you referred when you were trying to place 
Mr. Fenton Bryant's car when you passed it? 
A. That is right. I passed him rig·ht along in here. 
Q. When you say "right along in here'", do you think vou 
passed him at the dirt road 1 .. 
A. No ; I passed him beyond the dirt road, I would say 
possibly 40 or 50. feet beyond the dirt roacl 
Q. Do you mean north or south 1 
A. Towards Sedley, north. 
Q. 40 or 50 feet. Is the house in this plat, marked "Resi-
dence Harvey Cutchinr', the house oecupied on the farm re-
ferred to by you f 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the gate there at the road opposite that residence 
or near that residence, is that or not the gate at which vo~ 
turned around before going back to- the wreck? · · 
A. That is the place. I headed in and backed out. 
Q. Is there or not any grade whatevers rise or fan or crest 
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of g-rade, between llarvey Cutchin's gate and the curve on 
the south end of· this plat, that obstructs vision from one end 
of the road to the other f 
.A. ·No, there is not. 
Q. You are brother-in-law to Mr .• James L. 
page 180 ~ Camp, Jr., and uncle to James L. Camp, III, aren't 
you? 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You married Mr. James L. Camp, Junior's, sisterY 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did :l_\,fr. Leland Storey's car either meet or pass you 
that day? 
.A. I don't know, unless that was his car I met going down 
the hill. 
Q. That was before you got to the Camp car? 
.A. Before I got to the Camp car. 
Q. The Joyner car was ahead of you, or behind you, 1\fr. 
Rawls? · 
.A. Behind me. 
Q. Did you ever see it~ 
.A. I never did. 
Q. Did you meet any car whatever between the time you 
met the Camp car and the time you met the Bryant car? 
A. I did not. 
CROSS EX.Al\1INATION. 
By ~Ir. :l_\,fartin: 
Q. 1\fr. Rawls, you said that when you saw the Camp car 
:first it was either moving slowly or had stopped, you don't 
know which? 
A. I do not. 
' Q. You could see it right plainly, could you 
page 181 ~ not? 
A. Could see it very plainly. 
Q. Why couldn't you tell whether it was moving or not? 
A. Because it was n1aking- very little dust and I was look-
ing over to the rig·ht to this farm. 
Q. If it ·was standing still, it would not make any dust, 
would it? . 
A. On that road that afterl)oon you- could make dust, yes. 
Q. l\{ake dust standing still? 
A. Possibly a little. 
Q. l\faking a little dust standing still? 
.A. Yes, the way the wind was blowing. 
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Q. When you passed the Camp car, did you recog_nize who 
was in it? 
A. I did not. 
Q. Why didn't you f 
A. Because I was looking over to the right to this farm 
I referred to just a few minutes ago. 
Q. Then you saw a great cloud of dust approaching? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you say you can estimate from the cloud of dust 
that he was going from 40 to 45 miles an hour¥ 
A. I say that is the only way I had to estimate the speed. 
Q. That is no way at all to estimate speed, is it? 
A. ·Yes, you can estimate it from the dust. 
page 182 } Q. You can tell the jury you can estimate the 
speed of a car by the dust 7 
A. I think I can tell the jury whether a car is going fast 
or slow by the dust. 
Q.· You know it is a bare guess, and not an estimate at all, 
don't you? · 
A~ No, I don't know that. 
Q. You know it is an estimate? 
A. I think so. . 
Q. How fast were you g·oing? 
A. I havP.n 't the slightest idea. I 'vas not going very fast, 
because I was looking· at this farm. 
Q. Haven't you the slightest idea f 
A. No. 
Q. You can estimate the speAd of the approaching car was 
40 or 50 miles an hour, but you haven't the slightest idea how 
fast you WP.re going·? 
A. I estimate I was going a moderate rate because I was 
looking at this farm over on the right. 
Q. Did you find out after the accident who was in the Camp 
car"'-you camP. back, didn't you Y 
A .. Yes, sir. 
Q. Who was in the Camp car? . 
. A. I didn't even :6.nd out then. I didn't know until the 
next day. I found out it was Jimmy Camp's car, 
page 183 ~ and I callP.d him and told him to take these men to 
the hospital. 
Q. Did you see Jimmy Camp there? 
A.. I did. but I did not recognize the others. 
Q. Yon did not recognize the others Y 
A.. I did not, because I was looking· out for the men in the 
car. 
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M .• T .. WADE. 
:a witness on behalf of the defendants, being duly sworn, was 
examined and testified as follows.: 
Examined by Mr. Parker: 
Q. Mr. Wade, where do you work? 
A. R. C. 1\fotor Company .. 
Q. How long have you been with the R. C. Motor Com-
pany! 
A. I have beAn there nine years. 
Q. What is your jobf 
A .. Mechanic. 
Q. Did you go out and help bring Mr. Bryant's car in after 
this wreck? 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. Will you tell the jury the position in which you found 
that car when you got out there, where it had been hit, and 
what you found to be the trouble with it after 
. page 184 } you got back~ 
A. Well, the car, I would say, was hit probably 
a 45-degree angle on the right. 
Q. When you found the two cars out there, which way were 
they headed? . 
A. They were headed north. 
Q. What parts of the Bryant car were injured and to what 
~xtent WArA they injured 7 
A. WAll, it was hit on a 45-degree angle on the right-hand 
side and the ·radiator fastening was smashed back to the cowl 
-in other words. just wrecked in front on the right. 
Q. Was there anything wrong with the starter? 
A. ThA starter was broken off. . The flywheel had been 
busted. 
Q. Anythin:2; with the front right wheel 7 
.A. The front right wheel was torn down. 
·Q. Was there anything wrong with the knee action! 
A. The king·-pin supports WAre bent back. 
Q. When you got there, no car belonging to Mr. James 
L. (lamp, Jr .• was on the scene of the accident, was there? A:. No, sir. 
Q. Was Aither Elijah .Joyner, known as "Buster" Joyner, 
or J\.Ir. Blyth A there when yon got there? 
A. I did not see him . 
. {No Cross Examination.) 
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page 185 ~ HERBERT SAUNDERS, 
a 'vitness on behalf of the defendants, being duly 
sworn" was examined and testified as follows : 
ExaminP.d by Mr. P'arker : 
Q .. JYir. Saunders, have you, at my request, measured the 
width of a •Chevrolet car similar to that belonging to 1\fr. J. 
Fenton Bryant on this: date! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How wide is such a cal'~ 
A. The '34 Chevrolet measurP.s 6R inches across from fen-
der· tip to fender tip, outside edge • 
. Q~ That is 5 feet B inches? 
A. 5 feet 8 inches. 
Q, Have you measured similarly a car like Mr. Camp's! 
A. That is 5 feet 11 inches. 
Q. And a Ford car like Mr. Joyne1·'st 
A. That is 69lj2 inches. Q. Where do you work? 
A. R. C. Motor Company. 
Q. And your full name and how long· yon have been witT! 
that company? 
· A.. Herbert Saunders, and I have been there about four 
years. 
Q. Did'you examine the car after it 'vas brought 
page 186 ~ in f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Will you please tell me to what extent and in what parts 
it 'vas injurP.d? · 
A. Do you want me to tell the parts? 
Q. No ; describe to the jury how the car was injured and 
what part was injured? 
A. ThP. car 'vas hit on the ri~·ht front fender at approxi-
mately a 45-degree angle, which tore the chassis up, burst the 
housing, the starter housing, burst the housing on the back 
end of the motor ; the knee action was torn down ; the radia-
tor core was smashP.d in on the motor; the rig·ht door was 
broken in, thn glass broken out; and the cowl pushed bacir in. 
I l1ave a complete list of parts, 1\{r. Parker. · 
Q. Never mind. Answer the questions of plaintiff's coun-
sel. 
(No Cross Examination.) 
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• J A~IES L. CAMP, III, 
one of the defendants, being duly sworn, was examined and 
testified as follows : 
}Jxamined by :Nir. Parker: 
Q. You are .Tames L. Camp, III, one of the defendants Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. On the day of this wreck, you were in charge 
page 187 ~ of your father's car? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. At the time of this wreck, was it daylight or getting 
dust? 
A. It was ~;etting dusk. 
Q. Was there the same amount of daylight up the road as 
there had been previous to that time, or not? 
A. Yes, sir, there was. · 
Q. Ho'v about the breeze that day? 
A. I think it was blowing west to east. 
Q. YQu know where ~Ir. Harvey Cutchin's gate is, don't 
you? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Tell the jury, from the time you got to ~Ir. Harvey 
Cutchin's gate, what you saw happen, in your own words. 
A. We 'vere riding along about 25 or 30 miles an hour and 
I told David, the boy that was driving, to start slowing down 
and stop bP.fore we got to the corner. A good ways before 
've g·ot to the corner, he started slo,ving down and pulling over 
to the rig·ht. Then he put on his brakes gradually and pulled 
over as far as he could get to the rig·ht. And after the car 
stopped, somebody yelled there was a car coming behind, 
and I looked behind. I did not know at the time it was Mr. 
Bryant's car, but it was a car coming, and then somebody 
said, after he had g·otten about to the side road, that another 
car waR -floming meeting us. and I didn't ever 
page 188 } look around and SP.e the .Joyner car, but I just 
watched Mt·. Bryant's car, and then they came on 
and they crashed. 
Q. Where 'vas Mr. Bryant's car when you first saw it? 
A. Well, it had just gotten beyond the curve. 
Q. Which curve? 
A. ~fr. •Cutchin 's, up tl1ere. 
Q. Mr. Cutchin's gate? 
A. Towards thP. Club, that last curve. 
Q. What part of your car were you sitting in, the back 
seat or the front seat? 
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J.l. I was in the back seat on the right. 
Q. When you sa'v Mr. Bryant's car, how did you see it, 
by looking through the mirror or throug·h the back 'vindow f 
.A. Looking throug·h the back window. 
Q. When you saw it, tell n1e whether it was making any 
dust or not, and, if so, what kind 7 
A. It seemed to be right much dust. I could see that 
plainly. 
Q. Was there any dust between you and itT 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How about l\Ir. Sol Rawls' dust after he passed you 
there? Did it ~·et in between you and Mr. Bryant's car at all f 
A. No, sir; I didn't even see that, no, sir. I mean, it did 
not get in the way between the cars. 
page 189 ~ Q. Did you wat.ch Mr. Bryant's car the whole 
time from the time you first saw it coming around 
that curve until the accident? 
A. I watched it all the way. 
Q. Tell me what it did all the way until it hit. 
A. It seemed to be corning pretty fast. 
The Court: If you will talk a little slower and a little 
louder, I believe we can hear better. 
A. (Continuing·:) Well, it seemed to be coming pretty 
fast, and as he approached you could see the dust piling up 
behind him. ::>nd he seemed to be right close before he saw us, 
hut I thoug·ht he was going to pass, or something, and then 
he slammed on his brakes and started skidding around. 
Q. Which dirP.ction did his nose go and which direction did 
the rear end of his car go? 
A. Well. his nose went to the left. 
· Q. And his rear end did what? 
A. Came around to the right. It seemed like it was com-
ing to us right parallel and he was still going around when 
l1e came to us. 
Q. Did you see the two cars all the time until they struck? 
A. All the time the car had been skidding it piled up enough 
dust I conld not see when they hit. · , · 
Q. V\Thcn tl1at dust cleared away, where did you 
pag·e 190 ~ find the two cars Y 
A. About ten or iifteP.n :feet behind our car. 
Q. And on which side of the road 7 
A. On the ri~ht-hand side g:oing to the Club .. 
Q. Both of them on the right-hand side Y 
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A. Yes, sir. I mean, they were right up together, close to 
that bank. 
Q. What did you all do after that dust had cleared away 
and you had seen and hP.ard that there Wl(lS a wreck? 
A. First, I went over to the car that was next to the bank 
because I thought maybe they might have been pinned in there, 
but I saw them get out of there, and then David called to 
lnP. that 1\1r. Bryant was in his car ·and seemed to be hurt 
right bad, and I ran over there to try to help get him out, and 
by that time "Big Sol" came. 
Q. And that is Mr. Sol-W. Rawls, isn't it? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Who has just testified. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. When you all stopped, what, if anything, do you remem-
ber about how close your car was to the right-hand bank or 
the ditch of the road? 
A. It seemed to be about as close as it could ge·t. 
Q. What do you remember happening, if you remember 
anything at all, to indicate where Jfou stepped after David 
stopped the carY 
page 191 } A. I just kind of stepped over a little bit on 
to the bank on the side of thP. road. 
Q. At that timP. was there any fence on that side of the 
field? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you have to jump in order to do that, or was it a 
normal step Y 
A. I could just take a long step. 
Q. Was it ftom the running board of your car that you took 
tl1at step Y · 
A. Yes. sir. 
Q. Is that the point where your car was 'vhen you first 
stopped, or was it moved closer. to the right-hand side before 
you took that step to the field? 
A. No, sir, it was not moved. 
Q. After you got out of the car and went down in the road, 
after 1\fr. Sol Rawls came, did any of you go back to it until 
yon put thP.se men in there to carry them downtown? 
A. I don't remembP.r that we did. I don't think I went 
back. 
0. Did you ever see the J" oyner car ahead of you before the 
accident happened, or did you simply know it was there be-
cause somebody called your attention to it? ' 
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A; I didn't ever see it. Somebody yelled it was 
page 192 ~ there. 
Q. Which way were you looking when that 
somebody called your attention to the Joyner carY · 
A .. I was looking back at Mr. Bryant's car. 
Q. ·when you stopped, was there a sudden stopping as of 
a hard putting on of brakes, or was there a gradual stopping,. 
or describe just how the stopping was made Y 
A. It was a gradual stopping. We just slowed np ever 
c;ince we left l\1r. Cutchin's gate. 
Q. Mter you left 'vhose gate? 
A. After we got to the side road, we 'vere going slow, ancl 
I told him to slow up before he got close to the cw·ve, and her 
did, he slowed gTadually. 
Q. Who was the oldest child in the car¥ 
A. ~Iaria·n Lawrence. 
Q. And who was the youngest f 
A. Ellis Frankfort. 
Q. He was on the seat with the driverf 
A. Yes, sir ... 
Q. And you werP. on the back seat~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. On which side were you¥ 
A. On the right-hand side. 
Q. \Vhere had you all been r 
A. To tl1e Club, swimming. 
Q. Jiminy, had your car ever ·reached that 
page 193 ~ curve ahead of you, between there and the South-
ern, when it stopped, or not? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. " 7ere yon stopped in ti1e curve, or at the beg·inning of 
the curve, or in the Btraight part of the road before you got 
to the cnrvP. f 
A. Just on the straight part of the road before you got to 
the curve. 
Q. WaR there any car between you and tl1e Bryant car 
whPil yon first looked back to s·ee it, that is, driving the same 
way tl1e Bryant car 'vasf 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did any car going to Franklin overtake and pass you 
just beforP. Mr. Sol Rawls g·ot to where you weref 
A. Not that I remember. no. sir. 
Q. Who was tlu~ next pe.rson to meet your car and pass it 
aftP.r 1\fr. Sol Hawls did 1 




James L. Camp, Jr., et als., v. J. G. Bryant, Adm'r. 157 
,Jan~es L. Oa1np, III. 
'CROSS EXAlVIINATION. 
Bv Mr. ~fartin : 
·Q. Mr. Camp, when you left home, were you in the car by 
yourself, or with some of the other young people? 
A. I got them from downtown. 
Q. You left home by yourself, didn't you? 
- A. Yes, sir. 
page 194 r Q. How old are you? 
A. I am sixteen. 
Q. When were you sixteen Y 
A. February 22nd. 
Q. Of 1937? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you went downtown and picked up your other 
friends? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And then you drove out, you at the wheel, to the Country 
Club to all go swimming? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. When you started back from the Country Club, who 
took the whc~e1? 
A. David tForbes. 
Q. How old is he? 
.A. I don't know-he is seventeen, I think. 
Q. How old was be then? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. Was he under sixteen 7 
A. I don't know, sir. 
Q. Is he here 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Why did you let him take the wheel? 
A. Because he asked me to and he wanted to learn how to 
drive. 
page 195 } Q. He wanted to learn how to drive? 
Mr. Parker: If your Honor please, I simply wish to in-
sert into the rooord the objection I made to this particular 
line of testimony, which I made previously in the testimony. 
The Court : All right. 
By Mr. ~fartin: 
Q. What was his name? 
A. David tF'orbes. 
Q. And David Forbes wanted to learn how to drive 1 
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A. Y P.S, sir. 
Q. So you let him take the wheel at the Country Club and 
drive on back towards home·? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you got on the back seat with one of the young 
ladies? 
A .. Yes, sir. 
Q. The g·irl 's name was what, and how old was she f 
A. Marian Lawrence. 
Q. Ho'\v old is shP.? 
A. Seventeeen. 
Q. And the other young lady? 
.A.. It was another boy. 
Q. And who is heY 
A. Ellis Frankfort. 
page 196 ~ Q. How old is he now? 
A. I don't know, sir. He was about :fifteen. 
Q. The boy learning to drive was in the front seat and you 
were in the back seat? 
A. Y P.S, sir. 
Q. You decided to stop the car, didn't you? 
A. Y P.S, sir. 
Q. And you told him, ''Stop the car'' Y 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. And h.e started to stop it and finally did it, didn't he 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Over how long a space was he stopping that carY 
A. Well, I told hiln to start stopping it over there at the 
road where it turns to the right going to the curve. 
Q. Coming away from the Club, that road is on your left? 
A. Yes, sir. fie had started slowing down before that, 
but I told him to stop it before he got close to the curve. 
Q. How far did he drive before he could get it stopped Y 
A. I don't know~ sir, how far he went. 
Q. Was it a hundred yards, or whatf 
A. I could not say. 
Q. It may have been a hundred yards~ · 
, page 197 ~ A. I haven't any idea. 
Q. Did he finally get it stopped with the hand-
brake or the foot-brake? 
A. With the foot-brake. 
Q. Why did he get it stopped? 
~Ir. Parker: Your Honor, I make the same objection I 
made this morning and take the same exception to your 
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Honor's ruling, if your Honor is inclined to rule the same 
way. 
Bv Mr. j\{artin: 
"'Q. Why did you want to stop the carl 
A. So I could g·et out and drive in heavier traffic. 
Q. That was the only reason you wanted to stop§ 
A. Yes, sir. · · 
Q. Did he get out~ 
A. He opened the door, and I was in the act of getting 
<>ut, so I did not watch him. 
Q. You got out, didn't you f 
.A. No, sir, I didn't get out. I opened the door and my 
foot was on the running board. 
Q. Then somebody yelled 7 
A. Yelled that somebody 'vas coming, and I got back and 
watched 1vir. Bryant all the time. 
Q. I undP.rstand you' to say you continued to watch him 
then until the crash? 
page 198 } A. Yes, sir. 
Q. With one foot. on the running board f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Looking back at him all the way? 
A. Yes, sir. 
i" \ 
Q. Then, I believe you said there was another yell that 
there ~as somebody coming the other way? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Well, after thP. accidP.nt, did you see the druggist, Mr. 
Cobb? 
.A. Yes, sir, I saw him. 
Q. Didn't you tell him it was your fault? 
A. I told him it was my fault simply for the reason if I 
had not been there it would not have happened, I don't think; 
Q. And you told him it was your faultt 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Didn't you tell the driver of the other car that it was 
your fault? 
. A. I said it was my fault on tl1at &'rounds. 
Q. Did you tell anybody else that 1t was your faultf 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Just those two? 
.A. That was the other boy that I took to the hospital. 
Q. ·You told him so, also t 
page 199 } A. ·Yes, sir. 
Q. Three of them t 
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A. Yes, sir. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION .. 
Bv Mr. Parker; 
·Q. What did they say to you when you said it was your 
fault! 
A .. Well, the two boys in the other car said not to wo:rry 
about. it, it was all right, that it had not been all my fault. 
Q·. They were the two boys that you were taking down to 
the hospital Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Mr. Herbert Cobb did not say anything of the kind to 
you, because hP. didn't know, did heT ' 
A .. No,. sir, he didn't say anything. He just tried to quiet 
me .. 
Q. Jimmy, did you recog.nize 1\Ir. Sol :R.awls when he passecl 
in his car, .or not' 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 200 ~ DAVID C. FORBES, 
a witness on behalf of the defendants, being duly 
Rwqrn, ·was examined and testified as follows : 
Examined by Mr. Parker: 
Q. You were the boy driving ,Jimmy'"s car and stopped just 
before this accident, is that right f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Will you tell tile jury wl1at happened from the time you 
Jeft the Club to come on in? 
A. Well, we left the Club to go home, and I don't remen1-
l>er, I believe I asked Jimmy to let me drive, I wanted to 
lHarn, so I tool{ the car and drove on in, and when I got down 
there by Mr. 1Cutchin 's I kind of tool{ my foot off the gas and 
slowP.d up a little because I knew I had to stop before I g·ot 
in the heavy traffic down there, so, when I got just a little 
beyond ·that side road Jimmy told me to stop, so, I pulled 
over to the right as far as I could and started applying my 
hrakes, and I glimpsed a man-just could see him coming 
nround the corner, just before I stopped there- 1\{r. Brya~t 
coming around the corner, but I didn't pay any attention to 
him; he was up there at 1\{r. Cutchin's. When I saw that ca1 .. 
comin,g around the corner in front of me, somebody hollered. 
·'Here comP.s a car!" And I turned around like that, and 
the car was coming kind of turned around sideways to me, 
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like that, and before I could see anv more I heard them hit 
on the left of n1e. • 
page 201 ~ Q. You say you had seen Mr. Bryant just be-
fore you stopped T 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How far did you roll after seeing him before you 
stopped, one car length, two, three, four, five, or how many 1 
A. Probably one car length. 
Q. You say you did not pay any attention to him; why 
didn't you Y . 
A .. \Because he was so far behind me that I did not see any 
reason ·why that he would hit me---'!he was just far behind 
rne and I knew he had plenty of time-
Q. Did you see the car coming in front of you, this Joyner 
ca1~, as it turned out to be, coming· from Franklin? 
A . .After I saw l\ir. Bryant's in: the mirror. 
Q. When Mr. Joyner met you and was going by you to-
wards the place where they hit, were you stopped' 
A. Yes, sir. When I saw the edge of his car coming around 
the corner, I was stopped then. 
Q. WP.rP. you in the middle of your driving lane, or in the 
middle of the road, or over on the right-hand lane when you 
stopped? 
A. I was over next to the ditch on the right-hand side. 
Q. On your right-hand side? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you have to put on the brakes hard and 
page 202 ~ stop in a hurry, or did you stop slowly and grad-
ually? 
A. I stopped slowly and gTadually. 
Q. TP.ll me how you stopped as to the use of the brakes . 
and thP. clutch from the time vou slowed downY 
A. When .Jimmy told me to stop, I pushed in my clutch 
and started applying my brakes and, as I did, pulled over to 
the right. 
Q. Did you apply your brakes as soon as you 'put in your 
clutch? 
A. I am not sure it was right then, but soon afterwards. 
Q. Did you do any coasting? 
A. It might have rolled probably three feet before I got 
mv m11 foot on the brake. 
"'o. When you stopped, had you reached the curve? 
.A. No, sir. 
Q. You stopped before you got to the cnnre? 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. How fast had you been driving after leaving the Club 
and before you got to Mr. Cutchin's gate-about how fast? 
A. About 25 or 30. . 
Q. How fast were you driving after you passed :h1:r. Cutch-
in's g·ate and began to slo\v down? How fast were you driv-
ing at the opening of the dirt road there when you got there? 
- - A. I could not say. Probably 20 miles an hour, 
page 203 } or 15 ; between 15 and 20 miles an hour, some-
thing like that.. you don't know exa~tly your 
speed. 
Q. Was there, at any time between the time you first saw 
Mr. Bryant back of you .and the time the accident happened, 
any car _back of you except Mr. Bryant's Y 
A. Not that I saw. 
Q. Was there at any time ahead of you, after you stopped, 
any car going to Franklin Y · 
A. Not that I remember. 
Q. Did you see Mr. Sol Rawls when he met you arid went 
on to Mr. Harvey Cutchin 's.Y 
A. ·Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you recognize him? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you, at any time there during that day, see Mr. 
Leland Storey's car p;o by you either ·way at allY 
A. No, sir, not that I remember. I don't remember seeing 
it. 
Q. After -rJ:r. Sol Rawls' car came and met you and went 
on to Mr. Outchin 's, did you see the next car that came in his 
direction? 
A. The way that Mr. Rawls was goingY 
Q. Yes. 
A. 1\{r. J oyner-the Joyner car. · 
page 204} CROSS EXAMINATION. 
Bv Mr. Martin: 
·Q. Son. how old are youY 
A. I am sevP.nteen. I was seventeen the 8th day of June. 
Q. Of1937Y . 
A. Yes. sir. 
0. At the time of this accident, then, you were not quite 
RixtP.en. were you Y · 
A. No, sir. 
1. 
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~Ir. Parker: ~Ir. Reporter, take the same exception, over-
tuled, and I save the point. 
A. ( Co:t?-tinuing-:) I don't think I 'vas quite sixteen. 
By Mr. l\iartin : 
Q. After you stopped swimming and got back into the car 
to come homP., you wanted to learn to drive' 
A. ·Yes, sir: 
Q. · So you asked Jimmy Camp to let you take the wheel to 
learn to drive? 
A. ·Yes, sir. 
Q. And you went along your way up to 25 or 30 miles an 
hour, didn't you? 
A. ·Yes, sir. 
Q. And as you went along, you pulled her down 
page 205 ~ to 15 or 20 miles an. hour Y 
A. Just before I g-ot ready to stop, yes, sir. 
Q. And then Jimmy Camp told you to stop the cart 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. So, the first thing you did to stop the car was to push 
in the clutch 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And let her coast? 
A. Probably-just time enough for me to get my foot on 
tl1e brake. , 
Q. After yon had pushed in the clutch and had time enough 
to put your foot on the brake, you put your foot on the foot 
brake? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And after awhile she stopped, didn't she Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And how far was it from the time you pushed in the 
clutch until you came to a standstill, Son? 
_~\.. What do you mean-the distance? 
Q. The distance after; was it a hundred yards, or two hun-
dred yards, or what? 
A. I don't know. · I can't measure anything in yards like 
that. I can tell you how it was. 
Q. Well, how far was it? 
A. About like from here to that-second window (point-
ing). 
page 206 ~ Q. The second window from here-
A. The second window from the last. 
Q. BP.fore you brought it to a standstill f 
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A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. And you brought it to a standstill so you could give up 
the wheel and let Jimmy Camp take it? 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. And he opened the back door to get out and swap seats 
with you' 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you open the front door 1 
A. Not that I remember. 
Q. Then, the crash came before you opened the front door r 
A. What do you mean? 
Q. Well, you heard somebody yell, "Here comes some-
body!'' and somebody else yelled, and then the crash came 
before you had even opened the door, didn't it? 
A. No .. When he yelled, I did not try to open the door; I 
looked back. 
Q. After he yelled, then you did not try to open the door f 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You were still sitting under the wheel then f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. When the crash came? . 
page 207 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And who 'vas it that yelled? The young 
lady? 
A. I think so. 
Q. There were one girl and three boys, weren't there f 
A. Yes, sir. 
RE-DIRECT EXA:MINATION. 
By Mr. Parker: 
· Q. On 'vhich side of your road were you driving before 
you ~:ot ready to stop 7 
A. Which side? 
Q. Yes. 
A .. On the rig·ht. 
Q. On the right-hand side, weren't you f 
A. Yes, sir. -
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MARIAN I. LAWRENCE, 
a witness on behalf of the defendants, being duly sworn, was 
examined and testified as follows: 
Examined by J\tir. Parker: . . 
Q. You are :M:iss Marian I. Lawrence, you live in Franklin, 
and you were in this car the. day of this accident, weren't 
you! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Wbo was the oldest child in the car-you? 
page 208 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How old are you? 
A. Seventeen. 
Q. "'\Vhen were you seventeen Y 
A. March 4. 
Q. Tell the jury how David was driving when you left the 
Club and what sidA of the road he 'vas driving on Y 
... ~. He 'vas driving on the rig·ht side of the road, and we 
didn't go over. thirty miles an hour all the way through, and 
when he got to Mr. Cutchin's gate he slowed down to about 
fifteen or twenty milf~s an hour, and then Jimmy told him 
to stop, a little ways up, and he started stopping at the road, 
the side road, and he stopped gTadually, and Jimmy started 
to get out of the car, and I looked around and saw Mr. Bryant 
con1ing, and he stayed in the car until Mr. Bryant was there 
right on us, and then I saw the tT oyner car after I saw the 
Bryant car and turned to look at 1\!Ir. Bryant's car after I 
saw it the first time. TbA next thing I heard was the crash. 
Q. Where was Mr. Bryant's car whAn you first saw it? 
A. It 'vas just turning the corner up there at J\tlr. Cutchin's. 
Q. And was coming your way?· 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Were you at that time standing still or in 
page 209 ~ the act of stopping Y 
A. I think he· was just stopping. 
Q. Was there any car behvAen you and it that obscured 
your vision and kept you from· seeing it? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. How about dust? 
A. There wasn't any dust, because he had stopped long 
c-mough for it all to have cleared away. 
Q. Did you turn and see the Joyner car, or did you keep 
your eyes back that way Y 
A. I saw thP. Joyner car first and then I turned around 
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to see if there was another car coming and that is when I saw 
· Mr. Bryant's car. 
Q. Was ther.e any dust between you and the Joyner car to 
keep you from seeing it? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did your car come as far as the curve before stopping? 
A. No, sir. • 
Q. Do you know how to estimate distance? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Had you gotten half way from the side road to the curve 
when you stopped Y · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Had you gotten half way from that half way point to 
the curve when you stopped Y 
page 210 } A. We were about in the middle, I think. 
Q. About in the middle of the second half of 
that straight portion-is that what you mean Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I am just trying to find out from you where you were 
when you stopped. 
A. i think we wP.re just a little past middleway from the 
side road to the curve that Mr. Joyner was coming around. 
Q. What did you see, if anything, as to dust from Mr. Fen-
ton Bryant's carY 
A. Well, yon cou1d see lots of dust blowing from behind 
his car because l1e was coming right fast, you could tell that, 
because thcrP. wasn't any dust betweAn the two cars. 
Q. Yon saw the Joyner car first and then turned and looked 
at ~fr. Bryant's. Did yon look at ~Ir. Bryant all the way 
until the wreck happened Y 
, A. No, sir. I did not look. 
0. When did you stop looking? 
A. When I ~aw he was coming so fast, I turned around, I · 
didn't want to see it. It lookAd like something was going to 
hanpen and I didn't want to see it. 
0. What did you seA his car do before yon turned around 
and did not look any more at it? 
· A. Well, it was just coming along the road 
pa,ge 211 } straig-ht and hadn't put on any brakes. 
0. Did yon see it when it skidded sidewise 
acrosR the road? 
A. No. It was almost at us when it was doing that, and I 
tnrned around. 
0. You did not see that part of it, then, did yon? 
A. No, sir. 
/ 
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Q. Did you see the cars actually come together? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. AftP.r they came together, what did you all do 7 
A. vV P. all g·ot out just as quick as we could, and I got out 
<Jn the field side and I stepped down in the little ditch-it is 
Jlot very much of a ditch-and walked back to the wreck. 
Q. How close was the car to the field Y You say you stepped 
down into the ditch? 
.A. Two wheels were off of the hard part of it and we could 
· not have been any nearer unless we had been down in that 
little ditch. 
Q. Unless your right wheels had been down in the ditch, 
ltself7 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you know how old Ellis Frankfort was at the time 
this took place 7 
A. No. I do not. He was a freshman in high school this 
year. 
Q. Did you ever see any car overtake and pass 
page 212 } you, going the same way Mr. Fenton Bryant's car 
was going, just about the time ·of this accident? · 
A. ·No,. sir. 
Q. Did any of you go back to the ·Camp car after you got 
QUt and before Mr. Sol Rawls got there Y 
.A. IN o, sir. 
Q. Were you in the car with Jimmy when he took two in· 
jured parties to Franklin? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Will you please .tell me what happened about this con-
versation that took place? · 
A. Well, Jimmy was right much excited, and he was all the 
more so when he saw it was 1\{r. Bryant, and he said it was 
his fault, in the excitement, and the two men in the back told 
him it 'vas not his fault, that he could not help it. 
Q. What did you see, if anything, to indicate that he was 
excited? 
A. Well, he ldnd of took his hands off the wheel and said 
it was his fault. 
Q~ Was he at any time in your presence crying, or not' 
A. No, sir, I didn"t see him crying. 
Q. "\¥hat was it you said about his hands and 
page 213 ~ the 'vheel? 
A. Well, when he said it was his fault~ he kind 
of took his hands off the wheel and said it was his fault, and 
then the men told him that it was not his fault, and we went 
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on in to town, put the two men out, and Jimmy went around 
to Dr. Rawls' office to get a doctor, and Dr. Rawls was not 
there, so Jimmy went on around to the drug store, and I 
went around there after he did. I parked the car and then 
went immediately around there. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mrw Martin:-
Q. Miss Lawrence, I understood you to say that, comhu; · 
back from the Club, the Forbes boy who was driving did not 
go· but thirty miles an hour t 
A. Well, he didn't go over thirty. 
Q. It was a very dry; dusty day, wasn't itt 
A .. Yes, sir. 
Q. Going thirty miles an hour you would kick up a tre-
mendous dust, \Vouldn 't you~ 
A. Yes, sir, some. 
Q. Quite a lot, wouldn't you 1 
A. Well, we didn't make very much dust. I didn't see 
any. 
Q. Wasn't it so dusty that you might almost say that s 
. car standing still would mak~ a little dust? 
page 214 ~ A. Well, when you first stopped, naturally, the 
little dust that you were making would have to 
clear away. The wind would blow it away. 
Q. As you came along towards a stop,. Jimmy Camp told 
the driver to stop, didn't he~ 
A. ltes, sir. . 
Q. And the driver did stop, and Jimmy Camp got partly 
out, didn't heY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. .And then you screamed, didn't you? 
A. I said I saw a car coming behind us. 
Q. You yelled or screamed, didn't you¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And said, "There is a car coming ·behind"', or some-
thing like that, and then you looked the other wav and saw 
a car coming· in front, didn't you? "' 
A. I saw the one in front to begin with. 
Q. You saw the one in front first~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You yelled when you saw that, didn't you~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. But when you looked behind and saw one coming from 
behind, you yelled? 
A. I ·told them to go on, there was a car coming. 
Q. You said to the driver, "There is a car com-
page 215 t ing. Go on''? . 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. But the driver sat there dumb, didn't he! 
A. Well, we had already come to a standstill and l\{r. Bry-
ant got there in such a quick time that he didn't hardly have 
time to start off, not being accustomed to driving. 
Q. Had he turned the engine off in your carY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What did he turn the engine off for? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. There wasn't any possible reason for turning the engine 
off, was there Y 
A. Well, not unless he was not accustomed to driving. 
Q. When you told hin1 to go ahead, there was a car com-
ing behind you, he could not start unless he turned his engine 
on and did the .other things necessary to start Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. When you saw the car coming behind, you thought there 
was danger and said, ''Go ahead"? 
A. Why, yes, naturally, the car being on the road. 
Q. And when you saw the car get closer from behind, you 
hid your face because you saw there was going to be a crash Y 
A. Well, after I saw Mr. Joyner's car, I thoug·ht if Mr. 
Bryant had been going at a slow rate of speed, 
page 216 ~ there was hardly room to pass. He didn't seem 
to know where he was going. 
Q. And you hid your face bec~use you expected there to 
be an accident? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Two or three days after the accident, did or dirl not 
Mr. Jimmy Camp say at f)chool it was all his own fault? 
A.· No, sir. 
Q. You did not hear that1 
A. No, sir. 
~fr. Parker: To whomf 
By Mr. 1Iartin: 
' I I 
Q. In your pr~esence? · ' 
A. No, sir. 
Q. He did say so that afternoon going in the car~ 
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A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. And he repeated it several times 1 
A. He only said it on~e that I remember. 
HARVEY CUTCHIN, 
a witness on behalf of the defendants, being duly sworn, was 
examined and testified as follows: 
Examined by Mr. Parker: 
Q. Mr. Cutchin, you are Harvey Cutchin, who owns the 
gate we have talked so n1uch about, aren't you Y 
page 2i 7 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You are up there at the north end of this 
stretch of road where the accident happened Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What is your business and your age, please, sir' 
A. Thirty-three. I am farming. 
Q. Where were you standing when this accident happened 7 
A. On my back porch. 
Q. Which way were you facing Y 
A. The road. 
Q. Let me ask you sotnething about one of these pictures 
right now, Mr. Cutchin. Look at this picture numbered 1 
and tell me whether or not it was taken from your back porch. 
Is that or is that not the view of the roan that you had when 
you were standing on your . back porch Y 
A. 1'Ir. Parker, I don't see any porch here. 
Q. You don't see any porch, of course. You see the road 
ahead of you, don't you 1 
·A. Yes. Here is a tree that is in my back yard. 
Q. And when you stand on your back porch, is that tree 
·between you and the road there Y · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. The way it shows there Y 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. (Now, did you see Mr. James L. Camp's car 
page 218 ~ pass your gate? 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. Do you drive an automobile your~elf, ~fr. Cutchin? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. About how fast would you say Mr. Camp ~s car ,\ras driv-
ing when it passed your gate? 
A. About fifteen or twenty miles an hour. 
I' 
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Q. What was the next car that passed your gate headed 
in the same direction 1 · 
A. ~Ir. Bryant's. 
Q. How do you know it w~s Mr. Bryant? . 
A. Well, I was just loolnng that 'vay and knowed Mr. 
Bryant, knowed who he was. 
Q. Did you see ~1:r. Bryant, himself7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you recognize him in the car 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How fast was 1\{r. Bryant traveling when he passed your 
gate? 
A. I judged 1\fr. Bryant to be traveling probably 45 or 50 
miles an hour. 
Q. What did you judge from besides just seeing him go 
along1 
A. Well, he was running fast, and then,. he had a heavy 
cloud of dust behind him. 
Q. A heavy cloud of dust 1 
page 219 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How was the dust behind Mr . .Camp's carY 
A. ~fr. Camp's car did not have as good as any dust. 
Q. How far down the road could you have seen Mr. Camp's 
car? 
A. If I had paid attention to it, I could have seen his car 
out sig·ht. 
Q. How far could you see Mr. Bryant's car through his 
dust? 
A. When he first come in sight, I could .see it was 1\Ir. 
Bryant on the road, and after he went by his car went out 
of sight in the dust. 
Q. After you saw them both pass by that .way, what was 
the next thing you heard 1 · 
A. I heard the brakes squealing. 
Q. After that, what? 
A. After hearing the brakes squealing, I heard a crash. 
Q. At that moment when the crash took place, where was 
Mr. Sol Rawls' car? 
A. 1\fr. Rawls was in between that side road and my ga.te. 
Q. What did Mr. Rawls do? 
A. The best I can remember about Mr. Rawls, he backed 
in this side road and went to the wreck. 
Q. What did you do about going to the wreck? 
page 220 ~ A. I j:umped off the porch and ran down the 
road. 
172 Supreme Court of .Appeals of Virginia 
H ar,vey Outchi'l~. 
Q. Tell me where the Camp car was when you got there 
and what you did about putting one of those men in the Camp 
car! 
A. Well, I judged Mr. Camp's car to be probably 40 or 50 
feet from the wreck, from the back of lVIr. Bryant's car and 
Mr. Joyner's. ~ 
Q. Was the Camp car, even then, as far as the curve¥ 
A. No, sir, it had not gotten to the curve. 
Q. By the way, where were the two wrecked cars¥ What 
is there, if anything, on that part of the road to mark for 
you \vhere those two cars were 1 
A. A piece of cardboard that come out of M:r. Joyner's 
Ford. · 
Q. How do you know it came out of his Ford f 
A. Well, I saw them take it out of there, and why they 
took it out, he had some poison in the back of his car to go 
on tomato plants, and also, there was a loaf of bread in there, 
and they throwed all of that together when they \vere taking 
the car to tow it away. 
Q. And where did they throw it f 
A. The paper was left, part of it in the gully and pa1·t on 
the bank. 
Q. Now, were the two cars that you found, the wreck eel 
cars, where that paper is now on that bank~ 
A. Where the paper is now. 
page 221 ~ Q. And did you show that paper to a man 
named 1\fr. Armistead, a surveyor, \Vhom I took 
out there to make a survey of that road t 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you show that paper to Mr. Hamblin, a photographer 
whom I took out there to make a picture of that road~ 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. In this picture No. 7, who is the handsome gentleman 
I see in that picture 1 
A. I think I am in it. · 
Q . .And what is that object on the bank there that you nre 
pointing at? 
A. That is the piece of cardboard. 
Q. You say the ears were there when you fmmd them and 
the Camp car was further down the road. On which eide of 
the road was the Camp car? 
A. .The right-hand side. 
Q. That is, the rig·ht-hand going the way it was going--is 
that what you meant 
'I 
I 
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A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What did you do, if anything, about putting- one of 
the hurt boys in the carY 
A. Mr. Joyner jumped off the mnbankn1ent in front of the 
wrecked cars as I ran up and told rne to carry hhu to the 
doctor, so, I grabbed him by the arm and rushed down the 
road by the wreck with him and said, ''Get in 
page 222 ~ this car, he will take you". 
Q. What car was that? 
.A.. That was ~Ir. Camp's car. 
Q. Was the other boy already in there Y 
A. The Blythe boy was already in there. 
Q. How far was it from the back of ~{r. Fenton Bryant's 
car to where you put Elijah Joyner in the Camp car~ 
A. I will say probably 50 or 60 feet, just roughly guess-
ing. 
Q. How many steps do you guess, or do you judge it by 
feet? 
A. I judge it by feet-something like that. 
Q. After 1vir. Sol Rawls went there and went downtown, 
what did you do then·¥ 
A. He told me to stay with ~{r. Bryant until the an1hulance 
came. 
Q. Did you do so 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. The fact is, you stayed at the wreck until the ambulance 
had gone, didn't you? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. While you were with ~Ir. Bryant, tell me whether or 
not you had a chance to see what tracks had been rnade by 
~Ir. Fenton Bryant's car and, if so, all you remember about 
those tracks. 
A. What I reinember about ~fr. Fenton Bry-
page 223 ~ ant's tracks up there 'vhen he first commenced to 
put on brakes, he was not dragging the tires; he 
'vould just probably skid a little bit-probuhlv you have seen 
them do it-just eight or ten steps, something "like that, and 
I imagine he thought he was not going to stop and he put on 
brakes and con1mcnced skidding. I mean by that, in this shape 
(indicathlg)-
Q. You are indicating by moving your hand from side to 
side. 
A. Yes, sir. And when he hit ~Ir. Joyner, he 'vas sittin()' 
in an angle across the road and the back end of ~Ir. Bryant'~ 
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car went around against lvfr. Joyner's car, the back end of 
~Ir. Joyner's car. . 
Q. Where you say that he first put on brakes, what did you 
see in the road to indicate to you where he did first put on 
brakes~ 
A. Well, you could see where he had skipped his tires for 
just a small place, you see, and then probably he would ease 
up on them, just bump them. 
Q. Where you saw that at another point he began waver-
ing, how could you tell that? 
A. Dragging on the road fro1n his tires. When he used 
his brakes the short length from time to time, his car com-
menced waving and he made a cut across the road in that 
angle, and when he struck 1\Ir. Joyner's car that turned his 
car around and slammed it against Mr. Joyner's. 
page 224 ~ Q. Could you see the track that his back wheels 
followed after he and the Joyner car came to-
getherY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How did they go 1 
A. They went out towards-you see, he was sitting in this 
shape-Mr. Bryant was, then his car swung around towards 
Franklin, you might say, and went up against Mr. Joyner's 
' car. 
Q. Was Mr. Joyner's car, at the time of the collision, 
against the bank, or not, judging· from the tracks that you 
sawY 
A. Mr. Joyner's c~r was against the bank. 
Q. Did you point out to this same surveyor on one day, 
and this same photographer on another day, the points at 
which Mr. Bryant's tracks showed that he first put on brakes 
and the point you say his tracks showed wavering? Did you 
show those two points to Mr. Armistead Y 
A. I will ask you to go over that again. 
Q. Did you show to this same photographer and surveyor 
awhile ago the point where Mr. Bryant's tracks showed he 
put on brakes Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you show to those two same men the point where 
lVIr. Bryant's tracks showed he commenced wavering before 
he commenced skidding? 
A. Yes·, sir. 
page 22~ ~ Q. You were standing at one of those points in 
the pictures? · . 
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A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And the other man was standing at the other point, 
isn 't that right f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Who was the first person to get to the wreck after it 
1rappened, except those in the cars? 
A. Mr. Rawls. 
Q. Who was, the second f 
,A. I was second. 
Q. When you got there, where were the people in the Camp 
car? 
A. The best I can remember, Mr. Parker, all of them was 
in the car except one and he seemed to be waiting for the 
boy that I had by his arm, and I rushed the boy to the car, 
and I didn't know who it was, but he kind of took charge and 
shut the door and I turned around and went back. ~fr. Ra-\vls 
called me back there to stay with Mr. Bryant. 
Q. Between the time you got there and the time the car 
left, none of these other children went back except Jimmy and 
JYiarian, did they, or did they not? 
A. I didn't see anybody there but I and Mr. Bryant when 
J.\;lr. Rawls left. 
Q.' The others had g·one 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 226} Q. How long· did you stay there with Mr. Bry-
ant before anyqody else came up, by yourself? 
A. I reckon I stayed as much as three or four or five min-
utes, something like tl1at. 
Q. Did you talk to him the whole timet 
A. Yes, sir, I talked with him some. 
Q. I said,· the whole time Y 
A. No, sir, not all the time. 
Q. Why didn tt you? 
A. Well, I couldn't do him any good and Mr. Bryant 
seemed to be suffering, so I kind of swung off to the back of 
the car there. 
Q. ~ile you were at the back of the car, which way were 
you facrng? 
A. I \yas facing Franklin. 
Q. Was it during that three or four or five minute period 
that you saw the Bryant tracks, or not? 
A. No, sir. At the time I was talking to Mr. Bryant, he 
was asking me to take him out of the car. Then is when I 
noticed the Bryant tracks. · 
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Q. Well, I will put it the other way: When was it that 
you saw the Bryant trac.ks.f 
A .. That was after Mr. Rawls had left and ~ir. Bryant was. 
asking me to take him out. 
Q. ·Now, did you see Mr. Joyner's tracks¥ 
A. Yes, sir. . 
page 227 ~ Q. What tracks did you see~ 
A. I saw lVIr. Joyner's tracks. He drug that 
embankment, I reckon, for fifteen or twenty yards,. probably 
more~ 
Q .. Which way was the wind that day t 
A. West. 
Q. Was it strong enough to have any effeet on the dust on 
the road~ 
A. Yes, sir; it ·blew it pretty hard .. 
Q .. Was it blowing it over to your side of the road t 
A. Yes, sir .. 
CROSS' EXAMINATION .. 
By Mr. Martin: 
Q. When you got to the scene of the accident, did you see 
the Forbes child, David Forbes Y 
A. No, si:t. 
Q;. Where was he 1 
A. vVell, l imagi.ne he was in the car. I don't know where 
he was. I didn't lmow any of them. 
Q. He did not get out of the car at all, then Y 
A. I don't kno,v. I didn't see him. 
Q. And where was Jimmy ~Camp? 
A. I could not tell you where he was. There was one on 
the outside of the car as I ·went up with lVIr. Joyner by the 
arm and he taken hold of him and Mr. Joyner got in the car. 
When I tu1·ned him loose, I went hack to Mr. Bry-
page 228 ~ ant. I don't know who it was on the outside. 
Q. You work 1\fr . .Sol Rawls' farm, do you notf 
A. Yes, sir. 
RE-DIRECT EXM!LNATION .. 
By Mr. Parker: 
Q. ~~r. Cutchin, yon kno'v Leland Storey, don't you! 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. Did Leland Storey go by your gate in between Jimmy 
Camp and Fenton Bryant? 
A. I have not seen l\fr. Storey. 
Q. Did anybody headed that way go by your gate between 
those two~ 
A. No, sir. The only cars I saw was Mr. Bryant's car and 
Mr. Camp's car. . 
Q. If anybody had gone by, would you have seen them Y 
A. Yes, sir, I think I would, l\ir. Parker. From the time 
Mr. Camp's car was-you know, I just taken my mind off of · 
him-wasn't expecting anything like this here-and I was 
washing my hands. ~lr. Bryant came by and I was noticing 
him. · 
Q. The car that you said was Mr. Bryant's car could not 
be Leland Storey's, or could it? 
A. No, sir; that was l\{r. Bryant's. 
page 229} RE-CROSS EXAl\i!NATION. 
By Mr. Martin: 
Q. Why were you watching the cars so carefully that after-
noon? 
A. Why I paid attention to 1\Flr. Camp's car, the ones that 
were in it were laughing and talking. 
Q. And they were laughing and talking to such an extent-
A. I heard one laugh out as they drove by the g·ate and I 
just naturally looked up, but I didn't pay any n1ore atten-
tion to it. · 
Q. The laughing and talking· in that car .were such as to 
make you notice it? 
A. I heard one laugh. 
Q. Then you recognized it was the Camp car? 
~- Yes, sir. 
Q. Then you didn't pay any more attention, is that right.? 
A. Th~n Mr. Bryant came by. I just happened to look up 
and see It was l\ir. Bryant. 
Q. You don't mean to say yo-q know every car that passes 
there? · . 
A. No, sir. 
Q. They are constantly passing? 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 230 ~ 
o'clock.) 
(Thereupon, at 5:30 P. l\L, an adjournment was 
tal{en until the following morning at 10 :00 
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page 231 ~ SECOND DAY. 
·Courtland, Virginia, July ~3, 1937. 
The Court reconvened at 10:00 A. ~I., pursuant to adjourn-
ment from. the preceding day, with the same appearances 
heretofore noted. 
The Court: Gentlemen, we will resume the hearing. 
page 232 ~ Mr. Parker: Gentlemen of the jury, I read to 
you the deposition of Ellis Frankfort (reading): 
"The deposition of Ellis Frankfort, taken on the 17th day 
of July, 1937, at 9:25 o'clock, P. M., pursuant to notice at-
tached. It is agreed that the signature of deponent is waived 
by counsel. 
"Present: Junius W. Pulley, attorney for complail!ant, 
John tO. Parker, Jr., attorney for defe.ndants, in the su1t of 
J. F. Bryant, J ~-, v. J an1es L. Camp, Jr., and James L. Camp, 
3rd, an infant. 
ELLIS FRANI(FORT, 
being first duly sworn, deposes .and states as follow5. 
page 233 ~ "Statement by }'lr Pulley: This witness has 
been summoned to appear in Court on the 22nd 
day of July, 1937, in the trial of this case by both sides. It 
'vas learned this afternoon by counsel for plaintiff that Mr.· 
Parker had excused the attendance of the witne·ss and I re-
fused to excuse him from testifying and finally consented to 
take his evidence ·and examine him as my witness in order that 
he mig·ht be relieved of the necessity of attending court. 
''Statement by Counsel for Defendants: I object to the 
previous statement being r~ad or included as a part of the 
deposition now being taken, for the reason that such state-
ment is immaterial,. irrelevant and not a part of the testimony, 
nor of the legal prerequisites for the taking of depositions. 
Examination by 1fr. Pulley: 
Q. State your name, age and residence. 
· A. Ellis Frankfort, age fourteen. I live in Franklin. 
Q. Were you in the automobile belonging to James L .. 
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Camp, Jr., in company with James L. Camp, 3rd, on the 26th 
day of May, 1936? · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. When did you get ip. the car with these people Y 
A. You mean first? 
Q. I mean when did you get in the car. 
A. You mean at the Club? 
page 234 } Q. I mean when was the first time, what hour, 
was the first time you got in the automobile owned 
by James L. Camp, 3rd, on that day? · 
A. I am not sure. I think it was about two-thirty or three 
o'clock. I am not sure what time it was. 
Q. Where did you get in the car? Can you answer that t 
A. I don't remember where. 
Q. At whose invitation 7 
A. Jimmie's. 
Q. Jimmie is James L. Camp, 3rd? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where did you go? 
A. To the Country Club. 
Q. What did you do there? 
A. Went swimming. 
Q. How long did you stay at the Country Club? 
A. From about three o'clock till, I am not sure, .but I think 
. it was about three, to five-thirty or six. 
Q. vVhat road did you travel in getting to the Country 
Club? 
A. You mean from here? 
Q. Yes. · 
A. Went up and turned off by Jimmie's house and went out 
the Sedley road to Joyner's Church, to the Club. 
page 235 } Q. What was the condition of the road. up to 
Joyner's Church where you turned off? 
A. You mean from Jimmie's house, don't you? 
Q. Yes. . 
A. It had been plowed up and had loose dirt on it. 
Q. Was it dry and dusty? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Who drove out there 7 
A. Jimmie. Q. VVho drove backf 
A. David drove as far as we came. Drove to where the 
wreck was. 
Q. David who Y 
A. David Forbes. 
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Q. Who sug-gested that David drive~ 
A. I don't remember, I believe I was in the bath house at 
the time, but I am not sure. 
Q. Did he drive from- the Country Club to the scene of the 
accident, all the way? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where were you sitting? 
A. In the front seat by David .. 
Q. Who was in the back seat i 
A. Jimmie and J\riarion. 
Q. ~!arion who? 
A. Lawrence. 
page 236 ~ Q. Did you drive bacl{, did you not come back 
about as fast as you went? ~ 
A. I am pretty sure we didn't come back as fast as we 
went. 
Q. Who suggested that you stop the car at the place ·where 
the accident happened~ _ 
A. I don't remember, but I guess it was Jimmie, if it 'vas 
anybody. 
Q. You recall talking to n1e this afternoon f 
A. Yes; sir. 
Q. Didn't you tell me today that it was Jimmfe that sug-
gested that? -
A. I said it was Jimmie if it was anybody. 
Q. Well, did anybody suggest it? 
A. I think they did. 
Q. Where was the car stopped, what point of the road T 
A. On the right side, off the road. 
Q. Off what 1·oadY 
A. Off the Sedley road. 
Q. How far did you get offf 
A. That is hard to tell, but I imagine it was at least Italf 
tJ:w way as the road 'vas torn up and it is hard to tell where 
the hard surface was. 
Q. Do you mean half off what had been the 
page 237 ~ hard surface? · 
A. At least half. 
Q. Did yon notice a-bout tbat when the car was parked r 
A. It was as far off as you could get off and ·when the hard 
surface was there it would have been about half off. 
Q. But I asked you if you noticed that at that time. 
A. You couldn't tell where the hard surface was. 
Q. And did you at that time take notice of where you were 
parkingt 
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.A. What do you mean where we were parking? 
Q. I mean at the time the car was parked, did you notice 
then that it was parked about half off of where the old hard 
surface had been Y 
.A. Not exactly. 
Q. Did anyone pass your car going either way after it was 
parked? 
.A. I didn't see anybody but Mr. S. W. Rawls coming. 
Q. He was coming from Franklin~ 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you see anyone pass you from towards Sedley, go-
ing to Franklin? 
.A. I didn't see anybody. 
Q. When Mr. Rawls went by did he or not ere-
page 238 ~ ate any dust? 
A. Some, yes. 
Q. Did you see J\IIr .. J. F. Bryant, Jr., approaching from 
towards Sedley¥ 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. Was he making any dust¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How did the dust he made compare with that made by 
lVIr. Rawls' car f Was it more, or less, or· the same 1 
A. It looked to me like it was more I ·believe, I don't know. 
Q. How fast was 1\IIr. Ra-wls going? 
1\IIr. Parker: Objection, because witness not qualified to 
judge speed and answer to such a question. 
A. I would not say because I am not sure about that. 
Q. Was he going fast or slow? 
A. Rather fast, not so fast. 
Q. How far back was ~Ir. Bryant when you first saw him 
approaching towards the rear of your car? 
A. He was just coming around the corner at 1\IIr. Harvey 
.Cutchin's. 
Q. How long had you been parked there before you saw 
1\tir. Bryant coming? 
A. I am not sure, but it was not so long. 
Q. vVell, about how long, how many minutes 1 
page 23g. ~ A. About one or two, I reckon. 
Q. Why did you happen to see Mr. Bryant? 
A. Because 1\farion told Jimmie to watch out there was a 
car coming behind. 
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Q. What was Jimmie doing at that timet 
A. He was about to get out of the car. 
Q. On which side! . 
A. On the right-hand side, I believe it was. 
Q. Do you know what side Jimmie started to get out on Y 
A. I think it 'vas the right side. ·. 
Q. Did you start to get out 7 
A. ·No,. sir. 
Q. Did anyone else .start to get out 1 
A. ·Not at that time. 
Q. Did Marion tell anyone else to wateh out the car was 
coming! 
A. I don't think so. 
Q. Did .you watch l:Ir. Bryant's car continually, that is 
constantly from the time you first saw it until the accident, or 
not? 
A. I turned around once and saw Joyner's car. 
Q. Did any of you give any warning to Mr. Bryant by horn, 
or signal of any kind that you. were parked there Y 
A. I don't remember about that. · 
Q. How close did Mr. Bryant get to your car 
pag·e 240 ~ before he turned offY 
A. Turned off where Y 
Q. Turned to his left. About how close¥ . 
A. I don't believe I saw him turn to the left. 
Q. How did he get into the Joyner carY 
A. He skidded around. 
Q. vVell, on what side of the road was he traveling on be-
fore he started skidding? 
A. Rig·ht side. · · 
Q. You mean his right side Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. ~Now, when he started skidding, what happened to his 
car then, which direction did it take? 
A. It turned sideways, the front was pointed to the left. 
Q. Do you know whether his car slid, whether he. applied 
brakes, or whether he suddenly turned to the leftY 
A. I don 1t know, I couldn't say what he did. 
Q. ~How close was he to your car when his car started skid-
ding, about how close Y 
A. About fifty feet, I imagine. 
Q. How far is fifty feet, pick out some object in front of 
this house? 
Mr. Parker: Objection, because obviously an attempt to 
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contradict his own witness without having shown 
page 241 } surprise, and for the additional reason that the 
answer would be unintelligible without seeing the 
house in question and the object to whieh witness may point. 
A. I would say to the_ edge of that :field. 
Pulley to Parker: What :field is he talking about? 
Parker to Pulley: The one across the street. 
Parker to StenogTapher: Get that in there because that 
is more than fifty feet. 
Q. When he started to skidding, wbat happened to his' car 
at that point? 
A. It turned sidewa vs. 
Q. To rig·ht or left 7 • 
A. To the left. 
Q. What happened at that point? 
A. It slid into Joyner's car. 
Q. How far did it go toward you after it started to sliding 
and before it struc1{ Joyner's car? 
A. About fifteen or twenty feet. 
Q. How far was it back of Joyner's car,-back of your car, 
vthen it struck Joyner's car? 
A. I would say about ten or fifteen feet. 
Q. How far were you parked from the Southern Railroad 
crossing~ ' 
1\fr. Parker: Objection, because Qbviously im-
r>age 242} possible for witness to answer .unless me·asured 
same. Railroad not being visible from any por-
tion of the road in qu(~stion. Question asl{S for a conclusion 
merely. 
A. I would say about one hundred and twenty-five or fifty 
feet. 
Q. What did you do after the accident 7 Where did you 
go? 
A. After the accident one of those men that were in Joy-
ner 's ca.r called me and asked me where he was hurt. Then 
after they took them away, somebody told me to go down 
there and tell the cars coming up not to go so fast because 
the cars were wrecked there. · 
Examination by 1\ir. Parker: 
Q. Ellis, how old were you -\vhen the wreck happened? 
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A. Thirteen. 
Q. What was the date of your birth t 
A. April 23d. 
Q. Then you were just one month over thirteen when this 
wreck happened¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You were the youngest of the four in Jimmie's cart 
A. Yes,. sir. · 
Q. And you have never driven or had any experience in 
driving cars Y 
page 243 ~ A. No. 
Q. Now, regardless of the time that you all 
stayed out at tl1e Club, and the exact hour at which you left, 
this accident happened in broad daylight, didn't it i 
A. Yes, it was still light. 
Q. 'Vas it at all dark! 
A .. Not when tile wreck happened I don't thinic. 
Q. Now when yon heard the wreck happen behind you, all 
four of you in Jimmie's car got out, didn't yon t 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. That was after you had heard the collision that any 
of you got out, wasn't it Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did ·you go back to Jimmie's car between the time of 
the collision and the time you first got out after the collision 
.and the time J\tir. S'ol Rawls got there f 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you see any of the other fou1· go back and get in 
Jimmie"s car during that time? 
A. I don't remember that I did. 
Q. Well, are you not sure then that you didn't see. any 
of them go back Y 
A. Just about. 
Q. When you got out, yon got out on the right-hand side,. 
which was the side you were sitting on, didn't 
page 244 ~ you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And when you got out you stepped right down off the 
running board on the right-hand side, didn't you? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. N O"\V where you stepped down to ~he ground, how close 
was that to th~ little gully that runs rightalong the field and 
the edge of the road there 7 
A. About a foot I would say. 
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Q. Did you have to jump over towards the ditch to step 
down where you did? 
A. I don't think so. 
Q. Was the Camp car stopped on a straight part of the 
road before you got to the curve Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You never did reach the curve in the Camp. car before 
you stopped, did you~ 
. A. I don't think I did. 
Q. You don't know how many feet it was between where 
you stopped and the curve, do you Y 
lVfr. Pulley: Objected to on the ground that witness has not 
stated tha.t the car was not parked in the curve. 
Q. Didn't you say ·that the car was not parked in the curve 7 
A. I have forgot what I said now. 
page 245 ~ Q. 'Veil, tell me now, 'vas it parked in the curve Y 
A. I don't think it was. 
Q. Are you sure f 
A. Yes, I guess I ain. Yes, I am sure. 
1\tir. Pulley: I suggest that the witness did not say what 
counsel says he said and object to questions and answers 
predicated on that assumption. 
Q. Did you really hear Jimmie tell David to stop, or are you 
imagining that Y 
A. No answer. 
Q. Ellis, wasn't 1\fr. Bryant's car raising a whole lot more 
dust than any other car you saw on the road about that time 1 
A. I guess I thought it was because I noticed that more 
than I did the others. 
Q. You have said that when Mr. Bryant's car was first seen 
by you it was just coining into sight around the curve at Mr. 
Harvey Cutchin's gate. Is that correct Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. At that time the automobile you were in had stopped, 
hadn't it? 
A. If it hadn't, it had nearly stopped. 
Q. And what do you mean by nearly¥ How 
page 246 r many lengths of the· automobile did it run after 
that Y 
tha.t, or did it run as much as one l~ngth after 
A. Not over one length at the most, I don't think. 
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Q. When you looked back and saw Mr. Bryant's car, was 
there any dust between you and his car that came either from 
Mr. Sol Rawls' car, or anywhere else that kept you from see-
ing Mr. B.ryant's car clearly? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. And you saw ~Ir. Joyner's car ahead of you coming 
from Franklin before he ever reached you, didn't you Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And your vision at that point was clear also, wasn't it¥ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Isn't it a fact that from your observation you would 
judge Mr. Bryant's car to be going faster than any other 
car you saw traveling on the road at that point? 
A. Well,-
~ 
Mr. Pulley: At that point witness hesitated more than a 
minute before answering and it was suggested by Mr. Parker 
that he has as much intelligence as any person in this room 
and there is no reason why he should not answer the question 
promptly. 
page 247 ~ A. Yes, at that point I think it was the fastest 
one I saw at that point. · 
. Q. Wha.t do you judge from 1 
A. Dust mostly. 
Q. You say you didn't 'vatch 1\ir. Bryant all the way from 
the first time you sa.w him until the collision because you 
turned and looked at Mr. ,Joyner's car, is that correct?· 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. But you did see Mr. Bryant when he was skidding cross-
ways the road after he had gotten in wha.t you judged to be 
fifty feet of you T 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How was his car behaving, Ellis Y 
A. At first it looked like it was wavering, and then turned 
sideways. 
Q. And from the time he started wavering his nose went 
further and further over to his left towards Joyner's car, 
and his back came around further and further in a direction 
across the road, didn't itT 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you actually see the two cars when they first smashed 
into each othert 
A. No, sir. 
'·' 
I . 
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Q. Why didn't you see them when that happened? 
A. Because of dust. 
page 248 ~ Q. And whose car was it that kicked up that 
much dust? 
A. Mr. Fenton Bryant's, I think, when he swung around .. 
Q. Mr. Rawls, judging from his speed, wasn't going auy-
tbing like as fast as 1\Ir. Bryant, was he? 
A. I don't think so. 
Q. Did you see Mr. Bryant the :first time you saw him at 
all, which you .have testified was when he was coming around 
the curve at Harvey Cutchin's gate, by looking through the 
back window of the car you were in t 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. When you saw Mr. Fenton Bryant's car at that time, 
that is, when he was coming around the curve at Mr. Harvey 
Cutchin's gate, was there any other car headed towards 
Franklin between you and Mr. Fenton Bryant's car 7 
A. No, sir, I didn't see ·any. 
Q. If there had been any between you and it you would 
have seen it, wouldn't you~ 
· A. I irttagine I would. 
Q. You stayed around the wreck until Mr. Bryant had been 
taken away in an ainbulance, didn't you 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And David Forbes did toot 
A. Yes, sir, so he said. 
Q. Then you and he walked home together? 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 249 ~ Q. And you live in the town of Franklin, both 
of you, don't you? 
A. Yes, sir.· 
Q .. How· long was it after you :first saw Mr. Joyner's car 
coming towards you before Mr. Joyner passed your car? 
A. I don't know, sir, I turned back around and saw Mr. 
Fenton Bryant. · 
Q. And during the time that Mr. Joyner was driving from 
the point you first saw Mr. Joyner's car to the place where 
he was hit Mr. Bryant traveled the distance from where you 
first saw his car to the place where he was hit, didn't he 7 
A. Yes, sir. · · 
Q. That had to be true, because both cars came into your 
sight for the first time a.t just about the same moment, isn't 
that correct? · 
A. About. 
Q. When you answered the question Mr. Pulley asked you 
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about how fa.r was fifty feet, you specified a distance from 
your house across the highway to the edge of the field be-
yond, didn't you 1 
A. I believe I did. 
Q. That l1ighway is tile highway from Franklin to Court-
land, isn't it? 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 250 ~ Q. And your house sits back from that highway 
a considerably greater distance than the width 
of the highway, don't it? 
A .. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you have never stepped off or mea~ured that dis-
tance, have you f 
A. No, sir, guessed. 
Q. You were merely going by your eye and it appeared 
to you to be about the sa.me. distance as Mr. Bryant's car 
was behind you when he first started wavering, didn't it~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did David stop by getting slower. and slower, or all of 
a suddenf 
A. Slower and slower. 
Q. Do you know of your own knowledge whether he put on. 
any brakes or not Y · 
A. I think he did. 
Q. Was there any sudden stopping at the end of his getting 
slower and slower when he put on brakes, if he did so? 
A. I don't remembe-r any. 
Q. Did you recognize 1\fr. Sol Rawls in his car when he 
met and passed you t 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did Mr. Bryant hi ow his l1orn at any time f 
A. I don't remember hearing it. 
page 2·51 ~ Q. When you first saw ~rfr. Joyner's car coming 
towards you, was there any cal~ in sight ahead of 
you going towards Franklin? 
A.. I don't remember seeing any now. 
Q .. Well, you were looking that way when yon saw Mr .. 
Joyner"s car, 'veren't youf 
A. Yes, sir, but I don't remember any car. 
Examination by Mr. Pulley: , 
Q. You refer to 1\rfr. Bryant ,.s car wavering ancl sliding. 
What is the difference in your opinion between the two, anyf 
A. I meant at first he kinder waved like that (waving his 
1. 
I 
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hand fron1 one side to the other and back again), and then 
slid around. 
Q. Wabbled, you mean? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did he wabble far down the road? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. When he finally slid, did he slide far down the road? 
A. Not so far. 
Q. Did another automobile pass you going towards Frank-
lin at about the time you stopped T 
A. I don't remember seeing one. 
Q. Had one passed you going towards Franklin 
page 252 ~ shortly before you stopped Y 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. .Are you ~nd Jimmie Camp friends? 
Mr. Pa.rker: Objection, for the reason that question is to 
discredit examiner's own witness and he was not called as 
an adverse witness, nor could he have been so called. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Who does your father work for? 
Mr. Parker: Objection, as irrelevant, immaterial, and in 
attempt to discredit examiner's own witness and of such a 
type as to prejudice the jury. 
A. Mr. Camp. 
Q. What Camp? 
A. James L., Jr. 
Q. Has 1\fr. Parker talked to you about this case~ 
Mr. Parker: Objection, because immaterial, irrelevant and 
impertinent to the issues involved in this case and in attmnpt 
to discredit examiner's own witness and calculated to preju-
dice the jury. 
A. Yes,-
Q. How many times, son? 
page 253 ~ A. Two, I reckon you would say. 
Examination bv ~Ir. Parker: 
Q. Ellis, :1\{r."' Bryant slid from the- time he started sliding 
until the time he hit Mr. Joyner, didn't he? 
A. Yes, sir. 
190 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
8. W. Armistead. 
Q. And the breeze was blowing from your right-lJand side 
of the road to your left-hand side, wasn't it? . 
A. I think so, let's see,-yes. 
A.nd further this deponent sayeth not. 
Signature waived.'' 
S. W. A.Rl\IIISTEAD, 
a witness on behalf of the defendants, being duly sworn, 
was examined and testified as follows: 
Examined by Mr. Parker: 
Q. Mr. Armistead, what is your name and residence and 
occupation, please, sir? 
A. S. W. Armistead, Norfolk, Virginja., Civil Engineer. 
Q. How long have you been eng·aged in your occupation of 
Civil Engineer? 
page 254 ~ A. Oh, over twenty years, I reckon. 
. Q. Did ypu, at my request, make a survey of the 
Franklin-Sedley highway between the curve at Mr. I-Iarvey 
Cutchin's gate and the next curve south of that·pointY 
A. I did. 
Q. I present to you a plat marked "Pla.t No. 1 ", and ask 
you if you made that and if that is a true pla.t of your survey 
of that portion of the road that I have mentioned Y 
A. It is. 
Mr. Parker: I file that in the record as Defendants' Ex-· 
bibit No.8. 
Q. I present you with Plat No.2 showing a smaller portion 
of that road, and I ask you if that is a true survey of that 
portion shown on this plat? · 
A. It is. 
Mr. Parker: I present that in evidenae as Defendants' Ex-
hibit No. 9. 
Q.- Now, Mr. Armistead, will you please take this Plat No. 
1 before the jury. On the large pla.t here you show a dotted 
line and sho'v ''This section shown on Plat No. 2' '. Will 
you please explain to the jury, or please state for the record., 
why tha.t much takes up so much space on the other plat? 
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A. The difference is a difference in scale. On 
page 255 } the large plat one inch on the map equals fifty 
feet on the ground, and on the smaller plat, No. 2, 
~ne incli on the plat equals ten feet on the ground. 
Q. Now, on Plat No. 1 ther~ are two lines; one is at the top 
of the plat and the other one is a straight line on the bottom, 
and it says, "Profile on center line of road". "What does that 
profile line show 1 
A. That profile shows the elevation of the road shown 
above, of the center line of the road . 
. Q. ·And is the profile on the same scale up and down as it 
from one end to the other? 
A. The profile is never shown with two scales the same. 
This particular one has a horizontal scale of one inch equals 
.50 feet, which is the same as the map above. The particular 
scale showing the different elevations is one inch equals 20 
feet. 
Q. Does that mean that the elevation, that is, the rise and 
fall of that profile line, is exaggerated or minimized as com-
pared to the actual grade of the road on the ground? 
A. I think you would call it exaggerated. If we used the 
same scale both horizontally and vertically, the thing would 
be so close to a straight line that you could not see the dif-
ference on paper. . 
Q. vVhat do these numbers below your profile 
page 256 ~ mean, the numbers 7, 8, 9, 10, and so forth t · 
A. They are simply a reference on there to get 
distances. They are my survey stations. Each one equals a 
hundred feet. 
Q. So that in getting the distance from one point to another 
on either of these maps, you could do so by referring to those 
survey stations as 100 feet apart, is that correct 7 
A. Exactly. 
Q. On your smaller plat, that is, Plat No. 2, your survey 
stations are not put on except with reference to certain 
points? 
A. Just two or three points. -1 . 
Q. Are the survey stations referred to on your small plat 
the same stations that y~u have got marked on your larger 
plat? 
.A.. They are. 
Q. Tell me, 1\IIr. Armistead, by referring to that larger 
plat there, how far between Harvey Cutchin's gate and that 
other curve this road is a surveyor's straight-away, that is, 
no curve whatever, even to a surveyor's instrument! 
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A. The long tangent is 77 4 feet long .. 
Q. Wha.t do you mean by ~'tangent''! 
A. Tangent is a straight line. 
. Q .. And did you, at my request, _make a. test t(J) 
page- 257 ~-determine how far f:rom one of those curves you 
could see, a ca.r approaching from the other direc-
tion around the other curve·t 
A .. I did. 
Q .. And what is that distance-f 
A. That distance is 1,162 feet. 
Q .. Ho'v did you n1ake thai test f · 
A. I n1ade that test by using two· automobiles and set ihem 
out of sight and they approached each other- nntU they were: 
plainly visible. 
Q .. And then yon marlmd thos·e points and put them on your 
plat, is that right Y 
A. I did. 
Q. vVhat points are tlley to whicil you have- just referred f 
How are they designated on y.our large plat here·, that isr 
the point from which you could seer 
A.· One is marked "Visibility Point A 11 witb a station ana 
the distance, the ofher "Visibility Point B'" with the sta-
tion. 
Q. Now, the Visibility Point A is almost immediately op-
posite the opening of Harvey Cutchin's gate, isn't it? 
A. It is, yes. 
Q .. Is· Harvey Cutchin's llonse put in there to sc-aie as to 
its position~ 
page 258 ~ A. It is. 
Q. Will yon please tell me 'vhether or not Mr. 
Cutchin pointed out to you certain paper enrbedded in the 
· bank up there on the east side of the roa:d t 
A. He did. 
Q. Is that paper marired on your plat·r 
A. It is .. 
Q. On both plats 1 
A. ~larked on bobi plats. 
Q. Now, wha.t, if anything, did !Jfr·. Harvey Cl.1tcl1in show 
you with reference to tracks whic.h he said he saw, made by 
Mr. Fenton Bryant's c.arf . 
A. He stood at two places on tile road and marked tl10se 
two points that I located. 
Q. What did he tell you at the time they represented~ 
A- The first one, the one nearest his hous.e, tb.e· nocthern-
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most point, was where a. 1\{r. Bryant, I think it was, :first 
started putting on brakes. 
Q. How have you marked that point on your two plats? 
A. I have marked that "Cutchin Point A" ·with the dis-
tance. 
Q. And what was the second point he showed you? 
A. The second point was where he said the brakes locked 
on the thing-on his car . 
. Q. How did you mark that point? 
page 259 ~ A. I marked that point "Cutchin Point B". 
Q. How far, 1\{r. Armistead, is it from Cutchin 
Point A to Cutchin Point B ~ 
A. 62 feet. 
Q. How far is it from ~Cutchin Point B to a line run across 
the road to the paper on the bank? 
A. 66 feet. 
Q. Then, what is the total distance, as shown you by 1\'Ir. 
Harvey Cutchin, behveen the point where Mr. Bryant .first 
put on brakes and the point where the paper is on the bank Y 
A. 128 feet. 
Q. When did you make that survey¥ 
A. I made it June, 1937. . 
Q. What is ,the width of the macadam surface on that road, 
or that was on the road at the time you made this survey? 
A. 16-foot macadam. 
Q. And what is the width of the shoulder and outside of 
the shoulder· up to the center of the ditch on each side? 
A. From tl1e edge of the macadam to the center of the ditch _ 
is 7 feet on each side. 
Q. Does this width as to th~ macadam· and the space on 
each side prevail from one end to the other, of your survey, 
or not¥ 
page 260 ~ A. I think it is pretty uniform from one end. 
to the other. There may be a slight difference 
in the southernmost course as it goes down grade. 
Q. Now, is there any elevati~n in this road from one end 
to the other on your large plat there which prevents clear 
visibility? I am speaking of grade now. 
A. From one end of the whole plat to the other? 
Q. V\! ell, from Visibility Point A to Visibility Point B? 
A. There is nothing to impede vision as far as grade is 
concerned. · · · 
Q. And the same is true from B back to A~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. What is the total change in elevation from the highest 
point shown on your map to the lowest point shown on the 
mapY 
A. From the highest point shown on the map to the lowest 
point shown on the map is 10 feet and 8/10. 
Q. And over what distance does the road travel in making 
that change in elevation? 
A. About 1,200 feet. 
Q. Therefore, the drop in that road is less than cne foot 
per hundred feet? 
A. It would be about 9 jlO, or 11 inches per hundred feet-
less than a foot. · 
Q. Now, how far is it from the point where the 
page 261 ~ paper on the bank is to the theoretical beginning, 
that is, the surveyor's beginning·, of the curve 
which is south of that point? 
A. 110 feet. 
Q. Now, as a matter of fact, Mr. Armistead, is the theoreti-
cal beginning of a curve discernible, that is, can a person going 
out there tell that with his eye, or do you have to pick that up 
by instruments? 
A. You 'vould not get it in a car, the exa~t beginning of a 
curve. You have to g·et out and locate it closely on the ground. 
Q. Well, you can see a considerably greater distance from 
that paper on; the bank south than the beginning of the curve~ 
or notY 
A. You can. 
(No Cross Examination.) 
Mr. Parker: The defendants rest, your Honor. 
page 262 ~ J. F. BRYANT, JR., 
recalled, was further examined and testified as 
follows: 
-
Mr. Martin: We would like to ask the plaintiff just one 
question as to how old he is, where he sits. 
By Mr. Martin: 
Q. "'\Ve forgot to ask you how old you are, Mr. Bryant. 
A. I will be 59 -the 13th of October. 
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L. W. 1J1 cGrath. T. H. Barrett. 
L. "\V. ~IcGRATH, 
a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, was duly sworn and took 
the stand. 
page 263 ~ Examined l:iy Mr. Pulley: 
Q. Please state your name and residence? 
A. IJ. W. 1vicGrath, Capron, Virginia. 
Q. Wha.t is your occupation, lV[r. McGrath? 
A. Farming. 
Q. Do you hold any official position in the county¥ 
A. Supervisor. \ 
Q. Do you lrnow ~Ir. J. F. Bryant, Jr.? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How long have you known him, sir? 
A. I don't know-twelve or fifteen years. 
Q. Do you kno·w his reputation for truth and veracity? 
A. I would think so. I have associated with him a great 
deal. 
Q. What is that reputation? 
A. Very good, so far as I know. 
page ~64} CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Parker: 
Q. Mr. McGrath, your a.nswer would be the same for any 
witness that has been on this case, wouldn't it, so far as you 
know? 
A. Yes, sir, so far as I know. 
T. H. BARRETT, 
a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, being duly sworn, was 
examined and testified as follows: 
Examined by Mr. Pulley: 
Q. Your name is T. H. Barrett, you live in Southampton 
County, and you are Chairman of the Board of Supervisors 
and a farmer? 
A. Yes. . 
Q. How long have you known Mr. J. F. Bryant, Jr., Mr. 
Barrett? 
A. I expect about' all his life. I am a little older than he is. 
Q. Do you know his reputation in the community for truth 
and veracity¥ 
A. Perfect, I would say~ I never heard anything else. 
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page 265 ~ CROSS EXAMINATION .. 
By Mr. Parker: 
Q. And your answer would be the same for every other 
witness that you know anything about who has been on the 
stand, wouldn't it, Mr. Barrett Y 
A .. Yes, sir .. 
By Mr. Pulley: 
Q. Do you kno·w any of the other witnesses 1 
A. Quite a fe·w of them I do not know.. He said, t.hos.e I 
knew .. 
R. C. KNIGHT, 
a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, being duiy sworn,. was 
examined and testified as follows~ 
Examined by Mr. Pulley: 
Q. ~Ir. Knight, you live at Boykins and your occupation 
is insurance agent,~ sir? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you know Mr. J. F. Bryant, Jr. f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How long have you ]{nown him, ~Ir. Knightf 
A. About thirty years. 
Q. About thirty years Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you know his reputation for truth and veracityf 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 266 ~ Q. vVhat is it f 
A. Good. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Parker: 
Q. And your answer would be the same for the other wit-
nes~es that you kno·w, wouldn't it! 
A .. Yes .. 
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R. A. Pretlow. 
. R·. A. PRETLOW, 
a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, being duly sworn, was 
examined and testified as follows: 
Examined by 1\Ir. Pulley: 
Q. ~Ir. Pretlo,v, you live in Franklin and are in the pea-
nut business and farming, a.nd you have lived in the same 
town with ~Ir. J. F. Bryant, Jr., haven't you? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How long have you known Mr. Bryant? 
A~ Well, I have known him practically all his life. 
Q. Do you know his reputation in the community in which 
he lives for truth and veracity? 
A. Perfectly good, excellent. 
'})age 267 ~ :CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Parker: 
Q. lVIr. Pretlo·w, you being in Franldin, do know some of 
these other witnesses, don't you Y 
A. A few of them, yes. 
Q. And you would believe every word they testified, I think, 
wouldn't you? · 
A. I would. 
~{r. Pulley: If your Honor please, that is not a proper 
kind of qu~stion on reputation-asking him if he would be-
lieve every word they have testified to. 
By Mr. Parker: 
Q. Their reputation for truth and veracity is unblemished, 
isn't it? 
A. I have no reason to question it-those that have testi-
fied. 
By Mr. Pulley: 
Q. Those that you l{now? 
A. Those that I know. 
The Court: Why n1ultiply witnesses on this question, Mr. 
Pulley? 
~Ir. Pulley: Your Honor, we had 1\{r. W. T. 
page 268 ~ Pace, Sr., and Mr. G. G. ·~rcCann, of tFranklin, 
on the same line. We have had only one witness 
in Franklin about that. They were coming over here. I had 
to phone them, and they said they would be here in ten · 
minutes. 
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The Court: All right, if you want to call them. Are they 
h~t . 
Mr. Pulley: They are on their way here. 
The Court: I suppose counsel would admit that they will 
say the same thing. 
Mr .. Parker: If they are going to put them on the stand, 
I would like to have one of them on cross examination. 
The1 Court: I am not going to hold the case open for them 
to get here . 
. Mr. Pulley: Your lionor, we won't insist on waiting for 
those witnesses. 
The Court : You close the caseY 
Mr. Martin: Yes, sir. There were two pictures whicl1 we 
gave the Reporter yesterday. I am not sure they were for-
mally put in evidence. We wish to put them in evidence for-
mally (Plaintiff's Exhibits 3 and 4). 
The Court: All right. 
page 269 ~ Mr. Martin: We rest. 
The Court: Give me your instructions, gentle-
men. 
(The jury retired from the court room.) 
page 270 ~ Mr. Parker: Before we discuss the instructions, 
. I wish to renew my motion to strike the plain-
tiff's eviden(l.e on the grounds that the plaintiff's evidence 
shows contributory negligence, as a matter of law. I un-
derstand that you overrule that motion, and I take an ex-
ception. 
I wish further to move that the adnrissions of James L. 
Camp, III, be stricken from the testimony and that the jury 
be instructed to disregard them, for the reason previously 
assigned, that they are not. admissible against him, he being 
an infant; for the addition~! reason that they are inadmissi-
ble against his father, the co-defendant, because not made durn 
fer·vet opus, and for the further reason that could not have 
been ascertained before the admissions were put in testimony; 
that they are not admissions concerning facts, but are merely 
an expression of the witness' own conclusion, which would 
be no more admissible than if he would express his conclusion 
on the stand. 
Mr. 1\tf~rtin: \Ve do not object to telling the jury, your 
Honor, that the admission of the boy cannot be regarded 
as an admission of the father. (~fr. Parker: To the Court: 
"No, thank you.") Mr. 1\tfartin, continuing: As to the rest 
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of it, though, I submit that they are plainly admissions of 
one of the defendants, himself, and of a very powerful nature, 
arising shortly after the thing, when everything was fresh 
in his mind, and as to him they are extremely admissible. 
The objection was not made at the time that it could not be 
raised against the father, but we are willh~g, even 
page 271 ~ at this time, for that to be done wunc pro t·unc, 
as it were. 
The Court: I do not believe that the fact that the child,~ 
or the boy, said it was all his fault makes it his fault at all. 
Mr. Martin: It is powerful evidence of it, however. It does 
· not control absolutely, but it is admissible. 
The Court: Well, I admit it to go to the jury. I could see 
how the child might have said that under the excitement at 
that time, when there was not a semblance of fault on his 
part. · 
Mr. Martin: He might have, and then the jury will con-
sider that, so it is purelv a jurv matter, as we view it. 
Mr. Parker: I make the point that any instructions sub-
mitted by me on the question of these admissions are sub-
ject to the exception I 1iave taken to the admissibility of that 
evidence. 
The Courb Of course, after I overrule your objections, 
you have to do the best you can then. 
Mr. Parl{er~ I note an exception to your ruling that they 
are adn1issible, and to the jury's not being instructed to dis-
regit.rd thmn, and submit instructions on that point 
page 272 } subject to this exception. 
(Thereupon, the instructions on behalf of the parties were 
submitted to the Court and argued by counsel, and at 1 :00 
P. 1\L an adjournment was taken until2 :00 P.M.) 
})age 273 } AFTERNOON SESS]ON-SECOND DAY. 
The court reconvened at 2:00 P. M., and counsel concluded 
their arguments on the instructions, the jury returned to the 
court room and were instructed by the court as follows: 
The Court: Now, gentlemen of the jury, we have come 
to you as the court of last resort. You are the ones who must 
decide from now on, and I am going to ask you to pay atten-
tion to the law which I am go1ng- to read to you. Some of 
you, I understand, have never served on a jury before. You 
hear the evidence and decide what you think has been proved. 
Many times, there are conflicts in the testimony. Some wit-
nesses testify to one state of facts and some other witnesses 
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testify to different facts. You have to decide which seems 
to you the most reasonable story about a case. People may 
be perfectly honest and still see things so cliffer~ntly that you 
can hardly reconcile their stories, and it is up to the jury t() 
say whom they will believe, and that you will 4ve to deter-
mine where. there is a conflict in the testimony. 
In every action of this character, the real question upon. 
which the suit is based is negligence. I might say to you; 
that negligence is the doing of somethin~. that a prudent P.er-
. son would not do, or the fallmg to do somet1nng 
page 274 ~ that a prudent' person would do-that is neg1i-
. gence-and there has to be that element in a case. 
in order for there to be a. recovery. There may be accidents, 
where that element does not exist at all. It may be what \V•} 
speak of frequently in the country as ''a pure accident'',. 
where nobody is to blame-just couldn't help it--and, of 
course1 there can be no recovery. There may be cases where. 
both parties are to blame and both parties are negligent up; 
to the time of the accident, and in that kind of case there can 
be no recovery. The party who is to be given a verdict must 
be free from negligence, and the party ot· parties ag·ainst 
whom a verdict is rendered must be guilty of negligence that 
brought about the injury. Now, you get those ideas in your 
mind and you will be able the better to understand the in-
structions and dispose of the case. 
(The Court then read to the jury the written instructions 
gTanted.) 
page 275 ~ INSTRUCTIONS .. 
Plaintiff's Instr·u.ction No. 1 (Granted)~ 
''The Court instructs the jury that if they believe. front 
the evidence that the defendants negligently stopped their 
car on the highway, or negligently aiiovred it to remain stand-
ing on the highway, under such circumstances that as a proxi-
mate result thereof the plaintiff was injured without contribu-
tory negligence on the part of the plaintiff then it is the duty 
of the jury to find for the plaintiff.'' 
1\It. Parlmr :· The defendants except to the gTantino- of 
Plaintiff's Instruction 1 in the form in which it 'vas ghren. 
Said instruction includes the words ''or negligentlv allowed 
it to remain standing- on tl1e highway", when there w-as no• 
testimony to support any theory ·that the defendants' car was 
allowed to remain on the hig·hway for any such length of time 
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that could be constituted negligence, the evidence being, on 
the contrary, that it was stopped a comparatively short length 
of time before the accident. A further objection to this in-
struction is that it does not differentiate between the objects of 
stopping and the fact of being stopped. Both of these changes 
iii the instruction were requested by the defendants before the 
i;nsttuction was granted. 
page 276 ~ Plaintiff's Jnst·ruction No. 2 (Granted): 
''The Court instructs the jury that if, by the negligence of 
another, a person, without fault on his own part, is placed 
in a perilous position, and is compelled instantly to choose 
between two hazards, and n1akes suqh choice as an ordinary 
prudent person would make, if placed in a similar situation, 
he will not be held guilty of negligence, if he happens to 
choose a means of escape which results in his injury." 
Plaintiff's Instruction No. 3 (Refused): 
''The Court instructs the jury that no vehicle shall be 
stopped on the highway in such n1anner as to impede, or in-
terfere with, or render dangerous, the use of the highway by 
others, and if you believe from the evidence that the motor 
vehicle of the defendants was allowed to remain upon the 
highway in such unreasonable manner as to impede or in-
terfere with, or render dangerous, the use of the highway by 
the plaintiff, the defendants were guilty of n,egligence. '' 
].Fir. 1\fartin: The plaintiff excepts to the refusal of hi~ In-
struction No.3, on the ground that it properly states the law 
applicable in the case at bar; that there is evidence to sup-
port this instruction; and that it oug·ht to have been granted 
as a proper expression of the law in this case. 
page 277 ~ Plaintiff's Instruction No. 4 (Granted): 
"The court instructs the jury that J. F. Bryant, Jr., is 
p ·esumed to have used reasonable care in the management 
a d operation of the automobile driven by him, and unless 
hi laclr of such care is disclosed by the plaintiff's evidence, 
o fair inferences to be drawn therefrom, the burden of proof 
i upon the defendants to sho'v by a preponderance of the 
e idence that J. F. Bryant, Jr., was guilty of negligence in 
f iling /to use ordinary and reasonable care for his sRfety, 
a that his negligence, if any, contributed to his injury.'' 
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Plaintiff's Instru.ction No. 4-A (Granted): 
"The court instructs the jury that it is the duty of every 
driver of a motor vehicle who intends to stop on the high-
way to use reasonable care to see that such stopping can be 
done in safety.'' ·· · 
Plaintiff's Instntetion No. 5 (Granted): 
''The court instructs the jury that if you find for the plain-
tiff you may, in estimating damages, take into consideration 
the damages to his automobile, bodily injury, expenses of 
hospitals, doctors and nurses, and medicines, disability and 
disfig-urement, sustained by him, if any, and the pern1anent 
or temporary character· thereof, and the pain and nwntal 
anguish caused by said accident, if any, and fix the amount 
of damages at such sums as will be a just, reason-
page 278 ~ able and proper compensation th~refor." 
.Defendants' Instruction A (Granted): 
''The court instructs the jury that the Plaintiff cannot re-
cover unless you believe from the evidence (1) that the De-
fendants were g-uilty of negligence which was the proximate 
cause of the accident and (2) that the Plaintiff was not guilty 
of any negligence which contributed to the accident. 
''If you believe that neither of them were negligent, then 
there can be ·no recovery. 
''If you believe that the Plaintiff alone was guilty of neg-
ligence then there can be no recovery. 
''If you believe that both of them w.ere negligent and the 
negligence of both contributed to the accident, then there can 
be no recovery. The law will not undertake to balance the 
negligence of the respective parties to determine which was 
most at fault.'' · 
Mr. JVIartin: The plaintiff objects and excepts to the grant-
ing of Instruction .A offered by the defendants, on the ground 
that in Paragraph 1 the language should be, ''a proximate 
cause", as, without that, the jury might think that because 
the Joyner car might be a proximate cause, that this would 
excuse the defendant, although the defendant was also guiltv 
of negligence as a proximate cause. "' 
pag·e 279 ~ Defendants' Instruction B (Granted) : 
''The Court instructs the jury that the burden is on the 
Plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 
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the Defendants were guilty of negligence ,vhich caused the 
accident; and the burden is on the Defendants to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the Plaintiff was guilty 
of negligence which contributed to the accident; but if the 
Plaintiff's evidence discloses his own contributory negligence 
or it may be inferred from all the .circumstances in the case, 
it bars his recovery, no matter where the burden rests.'' 
Defendants' Instruction C (Granted) : 
I • 
''The Court instructs the jury that the mere fact that the 
plaintiff was injured as the result of an accident which took 
place at or ncar the point where the defendants' car was at 
the time of the aecident raises no presumption that the de-
fendants were guilty of negligence. The burden is upon the 
plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the eyidence ·that 
the defendants were guilty of negligence which proximately 
caused the accident, and unless this is shown there can be no 
recovery against the defendants and no case is made against 
them which it is necessary for them to answer." 
Defendants' Instr1.ection D (Refused): 
''The Court instructs the jury that verbal ad-
page 280 ~ missions, whether made by .a child or an adult, 
may be considered by the jury along with all the 
, other evidence, but they are to be cautiously weighed with 
due regard to the person making them and the cireumstances 
under which they were made; and the admissions of a child 
arc to be more cautiously weighed than the admissions of 
an adult, with due regard to the child's age and -to· his ex-
perien~e, intelligence and judgment, or his lack of these quali-
ties.'' ' 
lVIr. Parker: The defendants except to the refusal of the 
Court to grant Defendants' Instruction D, on the ground that 
it properly states the law applicable to the evidence and is 
not covered by any other instruction &'iven. This exception 
is made subject to the previous exception concerning the in-
admissibility of the testimony concerning admissions made 
by Ja~lCS L. Camp, m. 
Defendants' Instruction D-1 (Refused): 
''The Court instructs the jury that the admissions of J. L. 
Camp, 3rd, that he was at fault do not prove that he was at 
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fault. The question of whether he was at fault is one for 
you to decide from the evidence.'' · 
Mr. Parker: The defend.ants except ·to the Court's refusal 
to grant Instruction D-1, for the reason that the instruction 
properly sets forth the law applicable to the tes-
page 281 ~ timony in regard to the admissions of James L. 
Camp, ill, which law is not covered by any other 
instructions in the case. This instruction concerns admis-
sions made by James L. Camp, III, which were solely to the 
effect that the accident was all his fault. Defendants Inain-
tain that this was a legal conclusion and, therefore, not prop-
erly ad1nissible, and that, inasmuch as it got into the testi- · 
mony over defendants' objection,. the instruction to disre-
ga-rd same would have been of no practical effect and some 
instruction concerning same should have been given incor-
porating the substance of Instruction D-1. 
Defe,ndants' Instruction E (Granted): 
"Tile Court instructs the jury tilat in this case the fact 
that the defendants' car was being driven by David Forbes 
'vhen he ~as two weeks under 16 years of age and when he 
was learning· how to drive is not the proxitnate cause of this 
accident, for the reason that the car was already standing 
still when the plaintiff first saw it. The Court therefore in-
structs the jury that you are not to consider the age of D·avid 
Forbes nor the fact that he was learning to drive, in passing 
on this case.', 
Jvfr. 1-fartin: The plaintiff objects and excepts to tile grant-
ing of Instruction E for the defendants, on the 
page 282 ~ ground that the instruction states that the age of 
Forbes and that he was learning to drive are not 
to be considered, when, in fact, these are elements which may 
properly he considered, under the evidence in this case, as 
bearing· upon the negligence of the defendants in stopping and 
the conduct of their car. 
Defenilan.ts' Instructian F (Granted): 
''The Court instructs tile jury that under the laws of tl1is 
State the driver of an automobile may stop for wbatever pur-
pose he wishes, provided the stopping is properly made as 
to place and manner. The question is not the purpose of 
the stop, but the manner of stopping. A stop not otherwise 
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negligent is not made so because it was for the purpose of 
changing drivers. 
"The present statute which was in force \yhen the accident 
happened in this case, is that 'no vehicle shall be stopped 
in such manner as to impede or interfere ,vith or render dan-
gerous the use of highways by others, and no vehicle shall 
be stopped except close to the right-hand curb or edge of the 
highway'. 
"The law requires that a driver 'vho is going to stop shall 
put out his hand as a signal, but if you believe from the evi-
dence. in this case that the defendants' car was standing still 
when the plaintiff first saw it, or that the plaintiff could not, 
on aecount of distance, curves, dust or anything 
pag·e 283 ~ else have seen such signal if it had been given at 
the proper time, or if you believe from the evi-
dence that at the time the defendants' car slowed up and 
stopped the relative positions of plaintiff's car and defend-
ants' car were such that a reasonably prudent person in the 
exercise of ordinary care under all the circumstances of the 
case would have had no reasonable ground for thinking that 
the process of stopping· 1night affeet the operation of the 
plaintiff's car, the~ the driver of defendants' car owed the 
plaintiff no duty to give the said signal and the failure to 
give said signal is not negligence in this case. 
"The Court further instructs the jury that there is no re-
quirement that the said signal shall be continued after the 
car is stopped or that the driver of any car lawfully stopped' 
on the road shall give any signal· to indicate that he is so 
stopped.'' 
Mr. 1\fartin: The plaintiff objects and excepts to the grant-
ing of Instruction F for the defendants, on the g-round that 
the first paragraph thereof says that the purpose of the stop 
is immaterial, whereas, the purpose of the stop may be quite 
material, as there would be excuse for stopping a car in dust, 
or in a dangerous position, if the engine had broken down 
and a stop was necessary at that point, whereas, to stop in 
dust, in a dangerous position, merely to change 
page 284 ~ drivers when, by driving on a short distance, the 
.· drivers could be changed at a safe place, where 
the ro d was not dusty or scarified, would be relevant and 
imn tant in this case. 
Defendants' Instruction G (Refused) : 
''The Court instructs the jury that the plaintiff Brvant: 
was under the duty of exercising reasonable care in keeping. 
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a constant outlook ahead of him while he was drivin ; that 
e was un er e u y o exerCising reasona e care as· to 
the s eed at which he was drivm ·; that he was under the 
ut o exerc1s1no· reasonab e care to kee his car n e 
trol at a rmes; t at he had no right to leave these du:&\: 
unperformed in the assumption that the road ahead of · 
was clear;_ that on the contrary he was under the duty of 
exerCising reasonable care to antici ate and discover traf c 
a ea _ o 1m an o con ro 1s car and s eed accordino-1 ; w.£1. 
a e was un er e u , e1t er when driving on a Ektsty 
roac1( Ql! whQ.B seeing an espee.ially thielf-q-l.Ylrnti-~~ 
...at- him to exercise reasonable care to bring and keep his car 
at such speed thatshe could stop within the range of his vision 
and that he had ~o right to continue driving at a speed 
faster thau that in the assumption that the road ahead was 
clear beyond the point to whichshe could actually see it; that 
as soon asshe saw, or in the exercise of reasonable care should 
have seen, a car ahead of ..I£fm moying in the same 
page 285 ~ direction~he 'vas going but at a slower speed than 
.She was going,She was under the duty of exercising 
reasonable care to so slow clown and bringqfis car under such 
control thatJhe would not run~id car~ or be forced, in or-
der to avoid running into it, to pass it at a time when5he could 
not see~ left-hand side of the road suffic~ntly to know 
'vhet4er or not there were other cars coming ~way; that as 
soon as~he saw, or in the ~rcise of r~q~g~kk A~re should 
have seen, a car ahead of iUlli stopped~illiiSsiae'"Orthe road, 
She should have exercised reasonable cl're to slow down or stop 
so as· not to run .into it and so as not to place lihnself in 
a position where, .in order to keep from running into it, 5he 
would be forced to pass by it at a time whenshe could not see 
his left-hand side of the I;oad sufficiently to know whether or . 
not there were cars coming in the opposite direction; that he 
was under the duty of exercising reasonable care not to pass 
to the left of a car ahead of him until he could see whether 
there was oncoming traffic and whether he had room to go 
by .. 
''The Court instructs the jury that if the emergency in 
which Mr. Bryant decided to turn to his left rather than run 
into the defendants' car was caused in whole or in part by 
his failure to perform the above duties, or any of them, then 
he was negligent and cannot recover. 
''If you believe from the evidence that there 
page 286 ~ was no such emergency, and· that J\!Ir. Bryant sim-
ply decided to overtake and pass the defendants' 
car after he saw it ahead of him and that immediately before 
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or at the time he was in the act of passing he failed to per-
form any of the duties mentioned above, and that such fail-
ure caused or contributed to the accident., he cannot re-
cover.''_./ ~ ""--t_ ) r~ t') '-
Mr. Parker: The defendants except to the refusal of the 
Court to grant Defendants' Instruction G, on the ground that 
said instruction states properly the la·w applicable to the 
'case; as disclosed by the evidenee, and covers the theories 
of the case on both sides and incorporates matters not in-
cluded in any of the other instructions. 
The defendants particularly except to the refusal of the 
Court to grant the instruction including the last paragraph 
of said Instruction G, for the reason that this is the law 
~overing one theory of the accident which is not included in 
any other instructions. . . -
Defmulants' lnstruct.ion G-1 (Granted): 
''The Court instructs the jury that the plaintiff Bryant 
was under the duty of exercising reasonable care to keep a 
constant lookout ahead of him_, to drive at a reasonable speed 
and to keep his car under control; that he had no 
page 287 } right to leave these duties unperformed in the 
assumption that the road was clear, but on the 
contrary was under the duty of reasonable care to discover 
whatever traffic was ahead of him; that if the road was dusty 
he could not assume that it was clear any further than he 
could see throug-h the dust; that as soon as he saw or in .the 
exercise of reasonable care should have seen, that a car was 
ahead of him on his side of the road, it was his duty to exer-
cise_ reasonable care not to run into it, and not to pass it until 
he could ~ee that the left-hand side was free from oncoming 
traffic. 
''if you believ~ from the evidence that Bryant failed l.n 
any of these duties and therP.by contributed to the emergency 
in which he found himself, or otherwise contributed to ·his in-jury, he ·cannot recover.'' · 
Mr. 1\tiartin: The plaintiff objects and excepts to the grant-
ing- of the instruction given for the defendants marked ''In-
struction G-1 ", on the ground that. it does not properly ex-
press the law of the case, and especially that it says n ~ 
must have his automobile so that he can ston .;l. 
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Defendants' Instruction H (Refused): 
''The. Court instructs the jury that the fact that David 
Forbes did or did not put out his hand as a sig"Ilal is not evi-
dence to be considered in this case, for the reason 
page 288 ~ that the defendants' car was standing still when 
the plaintiff first saw it." 
Note·: The foregoing instruction was dictated to: the Re-
porter by counsel for the defendants during the course of 
argument on the instructions, as a part of the foregoing In-
struction F, and was refused by the Court, to which action 
of. the Court the defendants, by counsel, excepted. 
page 289 ~ After receiving the foregoing instructions. 
granted by the Court and bearing argument of 
counsel, the jury retired, at 4:02 P. M., to consider of their 
verdict, and at 5 :29 returned the following verdict: 
"vVe, the jnry, find the defendant wholly in fault of the-
accident. We fix the compensation a:t $10,000. (Signe-d} C. A ... 
Worrell, Foreman of the Jury.'' 
The Court: Just let the jury be discharged. . 
¥r. Martin: Do you want to .leave it in that shape, or just 
shape it in the usual way? 
The Court: Gentlemen, your verdict was all right as it 
was, but it was not quite in form. I have put it in this form: 
"We, the jury, find for. the plaintiff and fix the damages at 
$10,000,'' if that is what you want to· find. The Foreman 
will come up- and sign it. 
Note: The amended verdict was read by the Clerk as: fol-
lows: . 
"We, the jury, find for the plaintiff and fix the damag"es at 
$10,000. (~Signe·d) C. A.. Worrell, Foreman.'" 
Mr. Parirer: If your Honor please, I wish to move that the 
verdict be set aside and judgment entered in favor of' the de-
fendants, or, in the alternative, that a new trial be 
page 290} awarded, on tlle grounds, first, that there was no 
evidence, or insufficient evidence, that the de-
fendants were neglig-ent; second, that the evidence shows 
e plaintiff guilty of contributory neglig-ence which was the 
ximate cause of· his injuries, as a matter of law· and for 
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Now, I do not imagine you want to take it up now, because 
most of those errors will appear on the transcript, and I will 
have to decide whether to take it up. 
The Court: Yes. I would rather look at the transcript 
about that. I think it is a very close case. 
And said n1otion was continued. 
page 291 } JUDGE.'S CERTI:b-,ICATE. 
I, J. L. ~IcLemore, Judge of the Circuit Court of .South-
ampton County, ·virginia, who presided over the foregoing 
trial of J. F. Bryant, Jr., ve·rsus James L. Camp, Jr., and 
James L. Camp, III, in said court, at Courtland, Virginia, 
on July 22-23, 1937, do certify that the foregoing is a true 
and correct copy and report of all of the testimony and evi-
dence, all of the instructions offered, amended, gTanted, and 
refused by the Court, and the other incidents of the trial of 
the said case, with the n1otions, objections, and exceptions of 
the respective parties as therein set forth. As to the original 
exhibits introduced in evidence, as shown by the foregoing 
report, to-wit, Plaintiff's Exhibits Nos. 1 to 4, inclusive, and 
Defendants' Exhibits Nos. 1 to 9, inclusive, the san1e have 
been initialed by n1e for the purpose of identification, it hav-
ing been agreed by counsel for the plaintiff and counsel for 
the defendants that said exhibits shall be transmitted to the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia as part of the record 
in this case, in lieu of certifying to said court copies of 
said exhibits, which agreement is. in writing and is hereto 
attached and hereby referred to. · 
And I do further certify that the attorneys for the plain-
tiff had reasonable notice in writing, given by counsel for 
the defendants, of the time and place when the foregoing re-
port of the testimony, instructions, exhibits, roo-
page 292 r tions, objections, and exceptions and other inci-
dents of said trial would be tendered and pre-
sented to the undersig11ecl for sig·nature and authentication. 
Given under my hand this 30th day of December, 1937., 
within sixty days after the entry of the final judgment in 
said cause. 
J Al\£ES L. ~IcLEl\tiORE, 
Judge of the Circuit Court of Southampton 
County, Virginia. 
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page 293 ~ AGREE~iENT OF COUNSEL. 
We, the undersigned counsel for plaintiff and for· defend-
ants, agree that the original exhibits introduced in evidence 
in this cause, to-wit, plaintiff's exhibits tNos. 1 to 4 inclusive 
and defendants' exhibits Nos. ·1 to 9 inclusive, shall, after 
having been identified by the Judge of this Court who pre-
sided over the trial of this cause, by the endorsement thereon 
of his initials, or signature, be transmitted to the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia as part of the record in this 
cause, in lieu of certifying to said court copies of said ex-
hibits. · 
JUNIUS '\V. PULLEY, 
,JAS. G. MARTIN, 
Formerly Counsel for J. F. Bryant, Jr., and now' 
for J. G. Bryant, Administrator of the Es-
tate of J. F. Bryant, Jr., deceased. 
JOHN C. PARKER, JR., 
Counsel for James L. Camp, Jr., James L. Camp, 
III, and John C. Parker, Jr., Guardian ad 
Ute1n, defendants. 
December 30, 1937. 
Filed. 
,JAS. L. McLEMORE. 
page 294 ~· CLERI{'S CERTIFICATE. 
I, H. B. ~IcLemore, Jr., Clerk of the Circuit Court of 
Southampton County, Virginia, ¢l.o certify that the foregoing 
report of the testimony, instructions, exhibits, motions, ob-
jections, exceptions, and other incidents of the trial in the 
case· of J. F. Bryant, Jr., versu.9 J as. L. ·Camp, Jr., and J as. 
L. Camp, III, in, said court on July 22-23, 1937, together with 
the original exhibits therein referred to, all of which have 
been duly authenticated by the Judge of said Court, were 
lodged and filed with n1e as .Clerk of the said Court on the 
30th day of December, 1937. 
H. B. :McLEMORE, JR., 
Clerk of the Circuit Court of Southampton 
County, Virginia. 
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page 295 ~ BILL OF EXCEPTIONS NO. 1. 
Be it remembered thatat the trial of this action, immedi-
ately after the conclusion of the testimony of the plaintiff, 
J. ] 1 • Bryant, Jr., and again immediately after the conclusion 
of the testimony of all the witnesses introduced by said plain· 
tiff, the defendants moved the Court to strike the testimony 
introduced by the plaintiff to maintain the issue upon his part, 
upon the ground t11at said testimony conclusively disclosed 
that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence which 
was the proximate cause of his injuries; but the Court over-
ruled said motion, to which action of the Court the defend-
·ants at the time excepted; and in order to save ·the defend-
ants the benefit of their exceptions to the ruling and action 
of the Court in overruling said motions, this the defendants' 
bill of exceptions No. 1 which was tendered to the undersigned 
the 30th day of December, 1937, is signed, sealed and 
made a part of the record in this cause; which is accoraingly 
done on this 30th day of December; 1937, within the time 
prescribed by law, and after due and reasonable notice in 
writing to counsel for plaintiff as required by law. 
\· JAMES L. 1vlcLEMORE, (Seal) 
! Judge of the ·Circuit Court of Southampton 
County, Virginia. 
page 296 } BILL OF EXCEPTIONS NO. 2. 
Be it remembered that at the trial of this action after the 
verdict of the jury was rendered, the defendants moved the 
Court to set aside the verdict and render judgment in favor 
of the defendants on tlle grounds, first, that there was no evi-
dence, or insufficient evidence, to show any negligence on the 
part of the defendants, .and second, that there was no evi-
dence, or insufficient evidence, to show that the defendants 
were g-uilty of any negligence which proximately caused the 
injuries con1plained of by the plaintiff, and third, that the 
evidence shows that the plaintiff was guilty of conttibutory 
neg-lig-ence which was the sole proximate cause of his injuries. 
But the Court overruled the said motion and on the 15th day 
of November, 1937, entered an order of judgment upon the 
verdict of the jury, to which action of the ·Court in overruling-
the said motion and in entering the said judgment the defend-
ants at the time excepted; and in order to save the defend-
ants the benefit of their exceptions to the ruling and action 
of the ·Court in overruling said motion and entering said 
judgment, this the defendants' bill of exceptions No. 2 which 
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was tendered to the undersigned the 30 day of December1 1937, 
is signed, sealed and made a part of the record in this cause; 
which is according·Iy done on this 30th day of December, 1937, 
within the time prescribed by law, and aft~r due and rea-
sonable notice in writing to counsel for plaintiff as required 
by law. 
page 297 ~ 
J.A~IES L. 1\icLEJ\iORE, (Seal) 
Judge of the Circuit Court of Southan1pton 
County, Virginia. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE. 
I, H. B. 1vicLemore, Jr., Clerk of the Circuit Court of South-
ampton County, Virginia, do certify that the foregoing bills 
of exceptions, being defendants' bills of exceptions Nos. 1 
and 2, both of which have been duly signed by the Judge of 
said Court, were lodged and filed with me as Clerk ·of the 
said Court on the 30th day of December, 1937. 
H. B. ~lcLEMORE, JR., 
Clerk of the Circuit Court of Southampton 
County, Virginia. 
page 298 ~ ·CLERK'S CERTIFICATE. 
I, H. B. ~IcLemore, Jr., Clerk of the Circuit Court of 
Southampton ·County, Virginia, do hereby certify that the 
foregoing is a true transcript of the record in the foregoing 
cause; and I further certify that the notice required by Sec-
tion 6339, Virginia Code of 1936, was duly given in accord-
ance 'vith said section. 
Given under my hand tllis 30th day of ·Decen1ber, 1937. 
H. B. 1\llcLE1riORE, JR., 
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